A

HISTORY

OF THE

CAMPAIGNS

OF

GENERAL PICHEGRU

WITH THE

ARMIES OF THE SAMBRE AND THE MEUSE.

A

HISTORY

OF THE

CAMPAIGNS

OF

GENERAL PICHEGRU,

CONTAINING

The Operations of the Armies of the North, and of the Sambre and the Meuse,

FROM MARCH 1794 TO MARCH 1795:

WITH

ANECDOTES OF THE CAMPAIGN,

AND MEMOIRS OF GENERALS

PICHEGRU, JOURDAN, MOREAU, MACDONALD, SOUHAM, VALETAU, DEVINTHER, DAENDALS, SALM, BONNEAU, JARDON, REUNIER AND DUVERGER.

BY CITIZEN DAVID.

TRANSLATED FROM THE FRENCH.

Nunquam stygias fertur ad umbras
Inclita virtus. Vivite fortes;
Nec Lethœos sœva par amnes
Vos fata trahent.

SENEC.

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PREFACE.

IT will not soon be forgotten, that there was a period of the French Revolution, when an universal frenzy seized upon the nation; when our fellow-citizens for the most part seemed to be cloathed with that fatal robe, whose influence is represented as bereaving man of his senses; when parents lingered in dungeons at the command of their children, the bonds of confidence between the husband and

the wife were torn asunder, the master held his life at the will of his servants, and men fled with terror from all the usual confidence of society, and even shunned the bosom of their friends; in a word, when a great portion of our legislators assumed the appearance of a troop of maniacs, and the ministers of justice treated errors and even virtues as crimes, and honoured the most horrible of actions with the appellation and rewards of virtue. At this period, being unaccustomed to ape either rage or folly, I was compelled to quit the scene of public delirium.

To

To abandon my country was an extremity to which I did not think myself reduced, because I did not despair of the cure of her error; and I could not contemplate a voluntary and perpetual banishment, without inexpressible repugnance. I went, therefore, and took refuge in the armies.

A great truth was once uttered by a man who was assassinated for his crimes, and afterward worshipped by a horde of savages, and whose very name excites unconquerable aversion in every Frenchman's breast. He insolently said, *that the time would come when some would be too happy*

if they could fly to the armies to be massacred. His atrocious principles, and those of many of our legislators, have produced the reality of what might have seemed wanton prophecy. On the frontiers, the enemy was before us; we had the power of combating for our lives, or selling them dearly; and a few Proconsuls only were tyrannical, absurd, and cruel: at home, our enemies were in our houses and around our beds; we were bound and butchered with as much method as animals that are sent to the slaughter-house; and not a few merely, but the multitude, seemed to be seized with madness. In truth, the French armies formed a retreat,

where the patriot found himself disburthened of a load of terrors. To this scene I retired, among others; and there I could have lived content, if no history of the crimes of my country could have reached us. It demanded, however, nothing less than the circumstances I have painted, to compel me to seek my safety amidst scenes of carnage. No person can have more aversion than myself to the character of a Conqueror. The philanthropist cannot love the man who is employed in spreading havoc among men and their fairest works. Alexander, Cæsar, Gengis-Kan, Charles XII. and Khouli-Kan, have sometimes forced from me a tempo-

rary

tary admiration, but never secured my esteem. He who makes a canal, or a wood, or introduces any new art or commerce among men, is, according to my principles, a being preferable to all modern and ancient heros.

In my route to the armies, I was often compelled to appear before the Revolutionary Committees. I had occasion to attend that of Arras when one of the tyrants, who was the terror of the northern departments, was present. Guilt or fear was painted on every countenance, and the portrait of a man, which had been taken a year before that period, would no longer

longer have had any resemblance to the original.

At length, through many dangers, I reached the army, having my mind inconceivably agitated with the unhappy state of my country. I now contemplated the countenances of the soldiery as I had studied those of my countrymen at home, and was astonished to find them far more composed and chearful. Many of the officers were anxious to inspire me with confidence. I became acquainted with them; and I recognized the features of man. It was not long before I found that the patriots of the frontiers had no manner of resemblance

to the pretended republicans of the interior of my country. The former possesed the courage and generosity of the lion; the latter, the fierceness and rage of the tiger.

During the winter, I applied myself to the acquiring a knowledge of the organization of our armies, and to comprehend the principles and policy which directed them. I perceived with satisfaction, that they were composed of the worthiest part of the French nation, and that the portion of contagion which had reached them from the interior, would soon be subdued by a rigid and wise discipline. I was sometimes employed

ployed to draw up addresses, designed to call them back to principles of equity, and I saw with infinite pleasure these were no strangers to their hearts. In an army, there will always be a small number of incorrigible plunderers ; it is these who exercise depredations, from which no country can be secured that is visited by great armies. But I protest, before the world, that those committed by our troops were not of such a nature as ought to bring any disgrace on the nation: I should be happy, if I could add the same of some of our Proconsuls, and the several administrations employed in the conquered countries.

From

From the moment in which the campaign opened, I began to keep a journal of the operations of our armies. In visiting the field of battle, as was my constant practice, I examined our dispositions and those of the enemy, of which I was careful to preserve minutes. When I was at a loss to comprehend any of the movements of the troops, Pichegru, Reunier, and other general officers, were obliging enough to gratify my curiosity by an explanation of the motives of each manœuvre. From these sources I have drawn this history. I did not hold any military employment; yet I had every opportunity of being exact, for I was on the spot, I conversed daily with all the great actors

tors of the scene, and those officers took a pleasure in furnishing me with the information I had occasion to demand.

There will, no doubt, be writers impatient to give a history of this war, and to such I think it my duty to say, that they cannot be too careful how they receive the accounts of our Journalists, nor even the reports of the Convention. When I read the statements derived both from the one quarter and the other, it was difficult to express my astonishment at their infidelity. If, therefore, this work serve only for materials to the historian, I shall be repaid for my labour; and the

the persuasion that it will answer that purpose is a principal motive with me for its publication.

DAVID.

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A HISTORY

A HISTORY OF THE OPERATIONS OF THE ARMIES OF THE NORTH, AND THE SAMBRE AND THE MEUSE: &c.

. . . . . .

CHAPTER I.

State of France previous to the Campaign.

THIS History commences at a period when France was devoured by an anarchy of which no other nation ever afforded any example. The administration of affairs was in the hands of men who were more depraved than Caligula, more ignorant and brutal than Claudius, and more cruel than Nero. Never was any state placed in so

alarming a situation, and no social body ever approached so near to its dissolution.

The war and the tribunals of blood made daily havock among that part of the citizens who were the most courageous, or were possessed of the greatest talents and information; while the latter sapped the morals of the ignorant and pusillanimous. To avoid the general proscription, it was necessary to become an accomplice of the ruling faction. To die, to be criminal, or to escape from their country, were the alternatives to which all Frenchmen were reduced. Death hovered over us, and threatened every one with destruction; echos repeated only his petrifying shrieks, and every wall was covered with his frightful image.

The laws that proceeded from the legislative body, the arrêts of the inferior administrations, the extravagant deliberations of the revolutionary committees and popular societies, were all marked with a character of injustice, of rage, and of dissolution, the horrid picture of which will shock the latest posterity.

Our dreadful situation was sometimes compared to that of Athens under Draco. But the difference was immense! Draco made some cruel

cruel laws. He even made some that were unjust; particularly when he punished the indolent with death. The code, indeed, of this atrocious legislator cannot be read without exciting emotions of indignation, and a desire to erase his name from the page of history. What then will be the opinion of posterity, when it shall look back on the proceedings of the Convention during the period of its tyranny? Indolence is injurious to society as well as to the individual who is under its influence; and if the corruption of the Athenians did not justify the law, it might at least extenuate its severity. But what can justify or even palliate laws which punished piety, humanity, hospitality, and every social virtue with death? What will our descendants think when they learn that a man after being outlawed because he had been of a particular party, or rather because he belonged to none, was dragged to the scaffold along with him whose humanity had afforded him an asylum? When they read the decree of the 22d Prairial, and others of a similar nature, will they not be tempted to believe that these laws were proposed by none but cannibals, and adopted only by drunkards or madmen?—Will they not despise and abhor the present generation?

O posterity! suspend thy detestation and contempt, and bestow execrations only on those who have deserved them. Know, that in this period of profligacy and cruelty, France still possessed virtuous men, who understood the principles of justice and never departed from them. Know, that even the Convention, independent of its martyrs, contained men of probity, the enemies of tyranny and crimes.—Let it be remembered, that though in an army of an hundred thousand men there may have been plunderers, it ought not to be concluded that the French army is composed of robbers.

Posterity will doubtless be astonished to find that a great nation was enslaved by a handful of robbers and assassins. But let our conduct serve as a lesson to those who have a similar work to perform, and prevent them from committing like mistakes. The French had no experience of the effects of revolutions, and those who could have conducted them safely through the political tempest had fled, or were confined in dungeons awaiting certain death. Before we are blamed, let it be considered that in all revolutions vicious men have a plan long before the good; that those correspond and coalesce, because they know they are

are a minority, while these are driven from the scene by their aversion to blood; in a word, that plunderers and murderers govern always by terror, until they fall beneath the sword of the law.

CHAP. II.

State of the Armies at the same Epoch.

IF the evil was at its height in the interior of France, it was not less alarming on the frontiers. The soldiery, like the other citizens, had their informers, their revolutionary tribunals, and their executioners. Rank depended upon the caprice of the Proconsuls, who, to make room for their relations or friends, frequently removed and imprisoned those officers whose stations they coveted for them. Prudence, moderation, and decency in dress (then called *muscadinism)* were qualities sufficient to deprive those who cultivated them of their rank and their liberty. The true means by which preferment was to be gained, was not the punctual execution of duties, but the making of extravagant motions in the Clubs. If a soldier abandoned his post to attend a popular society, the officer who presumed to punish him for this breach of discipline was dismissed the service. The story of the chief of brigade Valeteau (1)* is well

* See here, and where a number occurs in this manner, the corresponding numbers at the end of the work.

known

known to the armies of the North. Unfortunately his was not the only example of the kind.

The lives of the officers were then more exposed than that of other citizens; for beside a commission of death, composed of the same elements as the revolutionary tribunals, they had to meet the fire and the steel of their enemies. Their political existence depended on a gesture, a word, or on the false insinuations of calumniators who wished to succeed them. The Proconsuls made a sport of making and removing officers at their pleasure: that is to say, of disorganizing the whole army.

It will, perhaps, be asked, why some thousands of brave officers, beloved by their fellow-soldiers, suffered themselves to be disgraced and insulted at the pleasure of a band of profligate men? The answer is easily given. Good soldiers look only to the destruction of the enemy. They know they can triumph only by strict discipline, and that the smallest murmur might lead to the most serious consequences. On the other hand, the ambitious were gratified by removals which sometimes promoted more than an hundred individuals at a time. Those among them who gained nothing, dared not to express any dissatisfaction, lest they

should lose the opportunity of advancing themselves on another occasion. Those who stepped into the vacancies became frequently the calumniators of them who were dismissed. Injustice soon terminated in being praised. Thus the power of the Proconsuls became absolute. Richard and Pichegru were severe but just: the greater part of the others were ferociously unjust. They who knew how to connect justice with severity were beloved and esteemed; the others were execrated.

Until the commencement of this campaign, the army of the North had been every where defeated, except at Hondschoote, and at the blockade of Maubeuge. It was dispersed in small corps, which were cantoned from Givet to Dunkirk. It was unconnected: and it was only before the towns where the Proconsuls resided that any great body of troops were concentrated.

It was necessary to occupy all the frontier villages. If an officer evacuated one because he discovered another place more proper for collecting his forces, and the covering of which was of greater importance, he became the object of the denunciations of the popular societies. He was accused of treason; and to be displaced, guillotined,

guillotined, or shot, were the only means of expiating this measure.

Was the government, which at that period bore the name of the Committee of Public Safety, desirous that we should triumph over our ennemies? Many will answer in the negative. My own observations demonstrate to me that they wished us to be beaten. That which made my opinion incline to this side, was the dismissing of Jourdan at the moment in which he had driven the enemy from before Maubeuge, at the moment indeed in which he had saved the Republic. Many officers who, as well as myself, followed the imperative orders sent by the committee to the armies, thought in this manner.

Be this as it may, Condé, Valenciennes, le Quesnoy, and a number of other places, were in the possession of the enemy. They were encamped in all points on the French territory, and we occupied only a single village of theirs.

Such was our situation when General Pichegru (2) and the Representative of the People Richard arrived at the army. These citizens being sincerely desirous of making our arms triumph, applied themselves to the re-establishing of order.

Denun-

Denunciations soon became less frequent, and the dismissals more just. The partizans of the clubs were obliged to remain at their posts; or, if they abandoned them, they found their eagerness to declaim, instead of now being a reason for mitigating the punishment which they had incurred, contributed only to its being aggravated. The young men of the first requisition were disciplined with the greasest care. In a word, the whole army was organised on another footing; and speedily, from an assemblage of declaimers and calumniators, we became an army.

CHAP

CHAP. III.

Opening of the Campaign: Taking of Courtray: Battle of Moëscroen: Taking of Menin by the French: Taking of Landrecies by the Austrians.

AT this period, the Government sent to the generals the imperative and ridiculous order *to conquer*. Pichegru received an order of this kind at the moment when the three best fortresses of our first line of fortifications were occupied by the enemy. This order was his only instruction. He did not even receive a plan of the campaign. In the conferences which he had at Paris, it was simply proposed, that he should attack the enemy in the centre, and mean-while harass them upon the flanks. Though this plan presented many obstacles, it was followed at first ; but it was soon abandoned.

The troops left their cantonments in the beginning of Germinal *(the end of March)*. They formed small camps, which were spread all over

the frontier. The objects of these encampments were chiefly to accustom the soldiers to military movements, and to render them active. They served, at the same time, to conceal our plans from the enemy.

A greater number of troops were afterwards assembled round Cambray and Guise. It was then intended to attack the centre of the allies between Cateau-Cambresis and le Quesnoy, to drive them from the famous forest of Mormale, which was then the terror of all the politicians of Paris, and afterwards to form the siege of Quesnoy.

The enemy had likewise marched the greatest part of their troops to this point, and had chosen it for the centre of their operations. Thus, on the 29th of Germinal (*April* 18), they invested Landrecies, while we were unable to oppose them with a sufficient force.

Our troops being continually defeated at this point, they were nearly reduced to despair, and no longer met the enemy with their wonted courage. Pichegru was convinced, that by remaining obstinately on a spot so often moistened with

with the blood of our defenders, it would be impossible to relieve Landrecies. He determined therefore, to abandon that place to its own force for the present, and to pursue the following plan:

Pichegru ordered an invasion of Flanders, to make a strong diversion, and remove the enemy from the theatre of their successes, while he acted powerfully on their centre, agreeably to the orders of the Committee of Public Safety. For this purpose, the division of General Souham (3), consisting of about 30,000 men, and the division commanded by General Moreau (4), which amounted to nearly 20,000, were put in motion on the 7th of Floreal (*April* 26). The first proceeded to Courtray, by the roads to the right of Menin, and forcing all the posts it fell in with on the way, entered Courtray at six in the evening, and took some prisoners and several pieces of cannon.

The other directed its course along both sides of the river Lys, and proceeded to form the blockade of Menin. Thus, by these bold and well-combined operations, Courtray was taken and Menin invested on the same day.

The

The enemy, astonished by a movement so daring and unexpected, assembled the troops which they had in the neighbourhood of Tournay, brought up a part of their reserve which was between Valenciennes and St. Amand, and attempted to oblige us to raise the blockade of Menin.

On the 9th (*April* 28), they drove in some of our posts which covered the road from Lille to Courtray, took possession of Moëscroen and the heights of Castrel, which cut off all communication between Lille and Courtray. Thus Menin was upon the eve of being relieved.

In the mean time, this place was vigorously bombarded, and was on fire in several places; but before it could be taken, it was necessary to defeat the enemy's army, and this was done on the tenth (*April* 29).

Fully comprehending the character of the French, and knowing that our soldiery conduct themselves more gallantly in an attack than when they act on the defensive, Pichegru anticipated Clairfait by giving him battle. The first shock was vigorous, and obliged the enemy to retire to the

the heights of Castrel. We did not obtain the victory until we drove them from this post, and forced them to fall back upon Tournay.—Such were the operations which led to this first engagement of the campaign, which was obstinate and bloody, but which was the first step towards our future triumphs.

This attack presented the greatest obstacles. To come up with Clairfait's army, it was necessary to ascend the heights, by five very narrow defiles, covered with batteries, from which the enemy poured showers of grape-shot. It required the greatest boldness, and even temerity, to attack them in this position. But Frenchmen in battle look only to victory, and never to danger. The conflict was terrible, and Clairfait was obliged to give way. The Austrians and Hanoverians were completely routed. Twelve hundred prisoners, including 80 officers, 33 pieces of cannon, 4 standards and 500 muskets, were the fruits of this first victory.

It has been often said, that the personal bravery and exertions of generals is of little consequence in battle. I can attest, that on this occasion, it accomplished almost every thing. Our

Our right wing was totally routed on the 9th (*April* 28). The greater part of those troops was composed of young men of the first requisition, who had never been engaged. I may venture to say, that if the generals and officers had not displayed great personal courage, they would not again have faced the enemy. Their example rallied the fugitives; and these men never after deserted their posts. There soon appeared no difference between the fresh levies and the most veteran troops.

All the officers and soldiers distinguished themselves in this action; but the bravery of General Souham and the fifth regiment of Chasseurs surpassed all praise.

After this check, the enemy could no longer hope to relieve Menin, which surrendered on the 11th of Floréal (*April* 30).

In the night between the 10th and 11th (29*th and* 30*th April*), an event occurred which proves that desperate men are often compelled to accomplish great achievements. The garrison of Menin was chiefly composed of French emigrants. About an hour after midnight, they made

made a sortie from the gates of Ypres and Courtray. They replied in French to our centinels, and passed themselves for a French battalion. All the posts at this point they put to the sword; and, not content with escaping the greatest of all dangers, they even made some prisoners. So bold an exploit, though performed by our greatest enemies, deserves to be recorded in the history of this war.

On the same day that Menin surrendered to the French, Landrecies was taken by the Austrians, without having made the resistance which might have been expected from it.

After these first advantages, Pichegru, instructed by experience, saw that he could have no hope of success by adhering to the original plan of acting only against the centre of the enemy. He therefore completely relinquished it, and determined to make vigorous attacks upon the wings, without attempting the recovery of Landrecies.

He left in the centrical fortresses only small garrisons, sufficient to prevent a surprize. He concentrated 20,000 men, who had been defeated near Cambray, and encamped them at Sanghien,

to bring them nearer to the victorious corps at Courtray. He marched all the other troops towards the Sambre, to act with the army of the Ardennes against the left flank of the enemy. These troops, which were a division of the army of the North, under General Desjardins, and a division of the army of the Ardennes under General Charbonnier, acted in concert, captured Beaumont, and made some incursions into the territory between the Sambre and the Meuse.

CHAP.

CHAP. IV.

Battle of Courtray: Reduction of Thuin, Fontaine-l'Evêque, and Binch: Defeat of the English Army at Lannoy, Turcoing, &c.: Retreat of Clairfait to Thielt: Bloody Action at Pont-Achin.

CLAIRFAIT having received fresh reinforcements, proceeded to Thielt for the purpose of covering Flanders. On the 21st of Floréal (10 *May*) he made an attempt to drive us from Courtray; and advanced to attack us by the left of the Lys. On the same day a corps of observation from General Souham's division proceeded along the right of this river, to reconnoitre the banks of the Scheldt, and to drive from Coëghen, Dotignies, and other posts a body of Hanoverian troops, who would otherwise have been able to form a junction with Clairfait. Our troops which remained in Courtray made an excellent defence, and arrested the progress of Clairfait; but as he could have made such dispositions on the 22d (*May* 11) that they would have been too feeble to resist

him, the reconnoitring division received orders at eleven in the evening to reinforce the garrison of Courtray. This counter-march was not observed by the enemy; and at four in the morning the division reached the town.

The order was given to attack Clairfait precisely at three in the afternoon. Generals Macdonald (5) and Malbrank were ordered to cross the Lys at Menin, and to fall on the rear of the enemy while the sortie was made from Courtray. These operations were skilfully combined; but the troops of those two generals being fatigued by their march on the preceding night did not arrive in time to execute that part of the plan.

The dispositions of the enemy before Courtray were made with the greatest military knowledge. They had erected seven batteries between the causeways of Bruges and Menin. Two of the batteries commanded both these roads with grape-shot, and by them only could a sortie be made. Their marksmen were posted in the suburbs and corn-fields. Their battalions and squadrons, who formed a semicircle, had excellent positions in the plain. Clairfait, although he sunk under the superior talent of Pichegru, possessed (as every good

good soldier will allow) the talents and the knowledge of a most excellent general.

The numerous obstacles we have related did not dismay our young soldiers. They made their sortie, though assailed by a shower of balls and grape-shot; and fought with the greatest obstinacy till ten in the evening, when Clairfait, despairing of being able to resist them, availed himself of the obscurity of the night to retire to Thielt. His retreat was so precipitate that he left his dead and wounded on the field of battle. The Austrian General Wanekem was killed in this action.

Our loss in this desperate sortie was from four to five hundred men. About two hundred only were killed on the spot; but of six or seven hundred that were wounded more than one half died. The loss of the enemy was at least as great.

This battle was the second in which the troops of the first requisition were engaged. As the dead and wounded were removed during the action, they were carried through the ranks. It was only the enthusiasm of liberty that could have made these inexperienced soldiers support so shocking a spectacle. That France should have

found generals capable of conducting her troops to victory was easily to be conceived. An enlightened nation, which Vandalism had not yet totally ravaged, might be supposed to have contained many men of superior genius who wanted only an opportunity to display their talents: but that our peaceful cottages should send forth, in a moment, men capable of facing the most veteran troops, must shake with astonishment all the enemies of our country. The allegories of ancient mythology relate that the founders of Thebes sprang from the bosom of the earth completely armed. History may without any hyperbole assert that Frenchmen are born soldiers, and that they require only arms to be put into their hands.

On the same day, the 22d *(May* 11), while we triumphed at Courtray, the left wing of the army of the North, united to that of the Ardennes, crossed the Sambre and took possession of Fontaine-l'Evêque and Binch. But reinforcements arriving from the centre of the Austrian army, our troops were forced to repass that river on the 24th *(May* 13).

This army acted without any principle of union. It was kept in terror by St. Just and Lebas, though it feared not the enemy. These

tyrants

tyrants wished to pursue vigorous measures, but they were ignorant of the means of executing them. They believed that to place the soldiers between death and victory, was sufficient to insure our triumphs: and their extravagant arrêts decreed the punishment of death for the slightest faults. Such was the conduct of these monsters, that one is almost tempted to believe they were more desirous of destroying their fellow-citizens than the army of the enemy. The conjecture is even strengthened by the imperative orders they issued several times after the 24th of Floréal *(May* 13) to pass and repass the Sambre, without having calculated the means of supporting the army on the other side of that river. These absurd movements occasioned many very obstinate combats, in which we lost a prodigious number of our brave defenders, without obtaining any advantage that could influence the fate of the campaign.

After the success obtained at Courtray, Pichegru gave the command of the left wing for some days to General Souham, and proceeded to the right wing to organize it, to give method to its movements, and to accelerate its operations. He even formed the plan of passing the Sambre, with this part of the army, and attacking Charleroi; but finding that the two tyrants were determined

to act, by mere dint of sacrifices, without the aid of military combinations, he returned quickly, and directed all his attention to the left wing.

The bold enterprise of these troops in Flanders, attracted chiefly the attention of the Coalition.

Deceived by the success of the preceding campaign, the Emperor dreamed only of victory, and proceeded in person to the frontiers. He and the Prince of Cobourg, with 20,000 men, arrived at Tournay, where they joined the English and Hanoverian army under the command of the Duke of York. This junction effected, they formed the bold project of cutting off that part of the French army which was at Courtray. This enterprise was concerted with Clairfait; of its execution, both by that General and the Duke of York, the reader will judge.

On the 28th *(May 17)*, the Duke of York marched from Tournay, and, with an army of 45,000 men, attacked the camp of Sanghien. He captured Lannoy, Turcoing, Roubaix, Mouveau, and indeed all the posts to the right of the great road leading from Lille to Courtray. Clairfait having marched from Thielt at the head of

of 25,000 men, surprised our posts on the Lys, and put them to the sword. He then crossed that river at Warwick and Comines, and took a position under the heights of Blaton and Lincelles. In less than an hour he might have joined the Duke of York's army, and cut off all communication between Lille and Courtray. But the great caution, or rather tardiness, with which this march was made, prevented him from arriving before the night of the 28th *(May* 17). Thus the communication between Lille and Courtray was left open, and orders reached the troops that had retired to the neighbourhood of Lille to put themselves immediately in motion, and attack the enemy at break of day on the following morning.

The attack began the 29th of Floréal *(May* 18), at four in the morning. It was chiefly directed against the Duke of York's army. The onset was vigorous, and the resistance obstinate. The battle lasted nearly the whole of the day; and the victory, which remained long doubtful, was at last secured by the steady courage of our troops. The enemy's ranks being broken, they fled in disorder to Tournay, and left a prodigious number of dead and wounded on the field of battle.

In

In consequence of this victory, we took 1500 prisoners, 60 pieces of cannon, a number of dragoon and artillery horses, a considerable quantity of baggage, some covered waggons, and several standards. The Duke of York, who had established his head quarters at Roubaix, was indebted for his safety to the fleetness of his horse.

At half past eight in the morning, General Moreau's division attacked the corps commanded by Clairfait. As the enemy occupied a strong position, and had the superiority in numbers, they gained some advantage at the commencement of the action; our advanced-guard gave way for a moment. The waggons and the artillery which were stationed at Halluin, being panic struck, fell into disorder, and filed off towards Lille: but our brave troops speedily resumed their courage; and the Duke of York being defeated, movements were contemplated no less daring than to surround Clairfait on the right bank of the Lys, and to compel him (in the case of remaining in that position the whole night) to surrender his army, or to see them attempt to cross the river by swimming in the face of the French. It appears, however, that he had received notice of the defeat of the Duke of York, for he took advantage of the darkness of the night,

night, and crossed the river. His retreat to Thielt was conducted in so masterly a manner, that on the next day not a vestige of his army was to be seen.

The next plan of operations was to draw nearer to Tournay; to reconnoitre the fords of the Scheldt; to invest Tournay should an opportunity offer; and to profit of the defenceless situation with respect to artillery, to which the victory of the 29th of Floréal *(May* 18) had reduced the enemy. To accomplish these objects the army was put in motion on the 3d of Prairial *(May* 22), and directed to proceed along the left bank of the Scheldt. This movement produced no advantage, because the plan was changed; on the contrary, it was very disastrous to the Republic, having occasioned the destruction of a great number of brave soldiers. It is true indeed that their courage hurried them beyond the orders of General Pichegru. They fell upon the enemy at several points; but the engagement was hottest at Pont-Achin: this action was the most obstinate and bloody of the campaign. Both armies fought all day with uncommon fury, and without any advantage being gained by either party. The carnage was dreadful; and it terminated at last by our troops returning to the positions they had occupied on the preceding evening.

The

The loss was great on both sides. The allies stated their loss at 3000 men; and we may without exaggeration reckon ours to have been equal. All that was obtained by this desperate action was the burning of some vessels, laden with forage, on the Scheldt. This may be regarded as the severest day of the whole campaign.

CHAP.

CHAP. V.

Passage of the Sambre several Times by the Right Wing of the Army of the North: Retreat of the Emperor to Vienna: False Attack on Ypres: Investment of that Place: Battle of Hoogleden: Capitulation of Ypres.

THE right wing of the army of the North repassed the Sambre on the 1st of Prairial *(May* 20), recaptured Fontaine-l'Evêque and Binch, and partially invested Charleroi. This position was maintained for some days; but General Kaunitz, being reinforced with troops from the centre of the Austrian army, attacked us vigorously on the 5th *(May* 24), and again obliged us to repass the Sambre. In this unfortunate affair, we lost 25 pieces of cannon; and a great number of our soldiers were killed and wounded. The enemy took from 12 to 1500 prisoners.

On the 6th *(May* 25), and the following days, this part of the army made repeated attempts to recross the Sambre; but all their efforts were ineffectual; notwithstanding the fierce exertions of St. Just, who threatened the troops with death by the guillotine or the musket, if they suffered themselves to be driven back.

On the 10th *(May* 29), the French again resumed their positions beyond the Sambre; renewed the blockade of Charleroi; and on the 11th *(May* 30), began to bombard it. But the enemy being reinforced by troops from Tournay, seized the opportunity of attacking us on the 15th, at the very moment when the garrison of Charleroi had made a sortie. They compelled us to raise the siege of Charleroi, a part of which was already on fire, and once more to repass the Sambre.

Had Saint-Just and his worthy colleague Lebas understood military tactics as well as they did the management of the guillotine, they would not have persisted in the siege of Charleroi; they would not have divided their forces before that place, nor would they have commenced where they ought to have finished. If after having passed the Sambre, they had exerted themselves

to

to defeat the enemy, and had succeeded in this enterprise, they would have obtained a decided superiority from the commencement of the campaign. Fewer difficulties would have then been experienced in the siege of Charleroi. The brave men who perished in these reiterated passages might still have lived to serve the Republic, and our successes would have been much more rapid. But these men were ignorant of military affairs; all their tactics consisted in dismissing, imprisoning, and condemning to death, the best officers in the service of the Republic. Did these sanguinary men really wish that our armies should prove victorious? I maintain they did not. If, however, such were really their object, we may fairly conclude that they were the most stupid as well as cruel beings that ever existed.

The Emperor was now no longer able to endure the aspect of his affairs in this theatre of the war. Perceiving that no more laurels were to be gathered, and that the French were ready to seize upon his dominions bordering upon their territory, he departed abruptly from Tournay, and returned to Vienna by the way of Brussels.

The left wing of the army of the North, after the severe contest of the 3d of Prairial (*May* 22), rested

rested some days in its positions at Courtray and Sanghien. Any attempt upon Tournay would have been rash and premature. It would have required a numerous army, composed of veteran infantry and cavalry, to have covered the immense plains which surround that place. But although the bravery of our troops had been proved, they were not sufficiently exercised in the various manœuvres necessary to be executed. Beside, by proceeding against Tournay, we should have approched the enemy's centre, which would have enabled them to bring up their forces with facility from the right or the left, and direct them against any point they wished to attack.

It was again in contemplation to attack Clairfait : but he was at too great a distance, and it was to be feared that he might be able to anticipate us before we could possibly reach him.

All these considerations determined Pichegru to fortify Courtray, to abandon every attempt upon Tournay, and to make a false attack upon Ypres. As Clairfait would naturally come to the relief of that place, Pichegru's object was to draw him into an engagement ; and, by defeating him, to render the siege of Ypres less difficult.

In

In prosecution of this plan, some troops were pushed forward on the 13th of Prairial *(June* 1); and they arrived before Ypres on the side of Elverdinguen and of Villecatte. On the 14th we established some batteries of mortars and howitzers, which began to play upon the town on the following day, and set it on fire in several places.

Clairfait must have understood our design, for he did not advance from Thielt as had been expected.

It was then determined seriously to prosecute the siege of Ypres. This enterprise was the only one that could at that time be attempted with any prospect of advantage. Beside, the possession of that place was absolutely necessary for rendering the position of our army in Flanders secure; and to attack it vigorously was the only means of bringing Clairfait to action.

Ypres was blockaded on the 17th of Prairial (*June* 5); and an army of observation encamped between Paschendal and Longuemark. The command of this army was entrusted to General Souham, and General Moreau had the direction of the siege.

The regular attack of Ypres attracted the attention of Clairfait, who soon left his position at Thielt, and advanced as far as Rousselaer and Hoogleden. We learned, from the reports of deserters and persons sent to discover his situation, that he waited only for reinforcements to attack us; but Pichegru, knowing the French character, gave orders to anticipate the enemy. The army of observation was therefore put in motion on the 22d of Prairial (*June* 10). The columns which marched from Courtray lost their way, and did not exactly follow their instructions. Notwithstanding the delay which this mistake occasioned, the enemy, though not completely defeated, were vigorously pressed, and obliged to retreat to Thielt. We made a great number of prisoners, remained masters of the field of battle, and took possession of the positions which the enemy occupied at Rousselaer and Hoogleden.

Clairfait, having received considerable reinforcements from the Prince of Cobourg's army at Courtray, attacked us on the 25th (*June* 13) on all the points of our line from Rousselaer to Hoogleden. With superior forces, and the advantage of making the attack, he must have expected the greatest success. He even had for a moment a glimpse

glimpse of victory. At the first onset, he drove back our right wing, threw it into disorder, and took possession of Rousselaer. But General Souham's division, and particularly Macdonald's brigade, which occupied the plain of Hoogleden, soon enabled us to recover all that we had lost. This brigade being left without any support on the right, was attacked both in front and flank, and was placed in such a dangerous situation that any other officer beside Macdonald would have thought only of retreating. This brave Scotchman received the first shock with most astonishing steadiness. Being quickly reinforced by the brigade of Devinther, both columns fought with such uncommon obstinacy, that the enemy were obliged to fall back. We made no prisoners in this engagement; but we killed a great number of the enemy. Clairfait abandoned Rousselaer, and retired to his former position at Thielt.

This was among the severest actions of the campaign. It was also one of the most decisive. Not only Ypres, but all West-Flanders fell into our hands; and after this period the enemy were not able to make any formidable resistance, neither in the centre nor on either of their wings.

The brave Macdonald, who preserved our troops on this occasion from a total defeat, had been dismissed by Saint Just, under the pretext of his not being a sound patriot. It was in vain that the generals represented that Macdonald was an excellent officer and a good republican, and even pledged themselves for his fidelity: Saint Just was resolved on the ruin of the army, and among others dismissed this officer. It is believed that Richard had the courage to burn the order of Saint Just, and gave permission to Macdonald to continue in the service. With the exact state of the case I am not acquainted; but if the fact be as it is said, France has great obligation to that Representative of the People. Macdonald served with capacity and courage on every occasion, but in the affair of Hoogleden his conduct was brilliant. Without his unexpected and extraordinary resistance, it is probable the French must have raised the siege of Ypres; and military men will understand the evils that would have resulted.

The garrison of Ypres, having learnt the defeat of Clairfait, capitulated on the 29th of Prairial (*June* 17). Athough there were between 6 and 7,000 men in the place, they were compelled to accept of our terms. They surrendered all the cannon, ammunition, and baggage, laid down their arms on the glacis, and were made prisoners of war.

CHAP.

CHAP. VI.

Formation of the Army of the Sambre and Meuse: Passage of the Sambre, and Recommencement of the Siege of Charleroi, by this Army: The Siege raised, and shortly afterward recommenced: The several Posts that cover Valenciennes evacuated by the Enemy.

WHILE Ypres was invested and the troops of Clairfait menaced by the left wing of the army of the North, Jourdan, at the head of 30,000 men detached from the army of the Moselle, advanced through the Ardennes, and on the 15th of Prairial (*June* 3) made himself master of Dinant. The army of the Ardennes and the right wing of the army of the North, being repulsed before Charleroi, and compelled to raise the siege of that place, Jourdan formed a junction with them; and these different forces, in virtue of a decree of the Convention, assumed the name of the army of the Sambre and Meuse. Jourdan was placed at the head of this army, but it still continued to receive orders from General Pichegru.

On the 24th of Prairial (12 *June*), Jourdan passed the Sambre in the face of the Austrians, and began to reconstruct the works before Charleroi. But he was soon repulsed. On the 28th (16*th June*), after a bloody engagement, he was compelled to raise the siege, and recross the Sambre. The bravery of the General and the troops was not to be subdued. They returned to the charge on the 30th (18*th June*), and, in despight of incredible difficulties, took a position between Mons, Brussels, and Charleroi. The siege of this last place was, once more, undertaken: and this fortunate and brilliant action was the first step of the interrupted and astonishing career of the right army of the French during the remainder of that campaign.

The unfeeling politician may calculate at leisure the waste of blood in these several enterprises against Charleroi. The friend of human nature turns with impatience from the mistakes of men who press forward as if it were to the pleasures of a fine spectacle, to contest with other men whom they never saw, for a place in which they have no interest, and it may be even for words which they do not understand. The fiercest animals of prey never fight but for their food, and the object of their passions. The French people contended for

for the quiet possession of their homes. These are objects to be comprehended. But what is to be said of intelligent beings who spill their blood for another with whom they have no personal acquaintance, for whom the greater part can have no love; but who has assumed the ridiculous title of their master, and who bids them die for his pretensions?—Let us cast a veil over human misery!

The presence of the French before Charleroi, in this last affair, disconcerted the Prince of Cobourg, who had remained at Tournay with the English and the reserve of the Austrians to guard the Scheldt. He perceived that every effort was to be made to augment his forces on the banks of the Sambre, in ordre to raise the siege of Charleroi. He therefore abandoned the defence of the Scheldt to the English, withdrew his posts from before Valenciennes, le Quesnoy, and the other French towns in his possession, and marched with these reinforcements and the whole of his reserve to join his left wing: but victory began to smile on the Republic; and we shall soon see that all his activity and military skill was compelled to give way before the enterprise and vigour of our brave troops.

After the affair of Hoogleden and the taking of Ypres, it could be no longer doubted that the whole of West Flanders must fall into the hands of the French; and so much was this part of Belgium considered as already conquered, that, on the 2d of Messidor *(June* 20), the army of the North received orders to file off to the right; in consequence of which it took a position behind Wackem and the Mendelle.

The enemy having quitted Thielt, were posted in the neighbourhood of Deinse, but were soon driven from that position by an advanced party of the French, of considerable force. Informed of our march toward the Mendelle, to avoid a general engagement they retired to Ghent, and were pursued by our troops to the very walls of that place. On this occasion a number of Hanoverians were made prisoners, and those were the first, either of the English or Hanoverians, that had been taken since the Convention had passed that atrocious law by which the French were forbidden to give any quarter to those troops. It will be seen speedily what was the conduct of our soldiery toward these poor men condemned to be slaughtered in cold blood.

After

After this success the French might have made themselves masters of Ghent; but that place required a very strong garrison, and the possession of it was no way essential to the operations of the campaign. In fact, Pichegru had formed a vast plan: he was, however, compelled to abandon it by the Committee of Public Safety. We are about to develope this plan to our readers, willing that it should be judged by those who know how to conduct an army to victory.

CHAP.

CHAP. VII.

Design of Pichegru to pass the Scheldt, in the Neighbourhood of Oudenarde: Entrance of the French into Bruges, Ostend, and Ghent: taking of Oudenarde and Tournay.

PICHEGRU had resolved to pass the Scheldt, in the neighbourhood of Oudenarde. His object was to break the communication between General Clairfait and the English army, to cut off the retreat of the former towards Brussels, and to engage him in that position. Pichegru, if successful in these operations, would then fall on the rear of the enemy on the banks of the Sambre, who in this situation must have been either completely beaten, or dispersed; and there was, mean while, no obstacle to his junction with the army under Jourdan. This plan resulted at once from comprehensive views and great military prudence; it was scarcely susceptible of miscarriage, and was eminently calculated to spare the effusion of blood: but where vultures have the dominion,

dominion, carcases must be found to gorge them.

In execution of these operations, the French encamped on the 7th of Messidor (*25th June*), between Cruipshauten and Moreghem. On the 9th (27th *June*), they approached Oudenarde and took a position between Norteghern and Huisse, and the passage of the Scheldt, was to be executed on the 10th or 11th (*June* 28 *or* 29). In this interval, very peremptory orders were brought to General Pichegru, from the Committee of Public Safety, to march with his army and make himself master of Ostend; and to detach 16,000 men from the army of the North to seize upon the Island of Walcheren. Of this sagacious project, it is to be observed, that the division of Moreau, which was already at Bruges, had only to shew itself before Ostend to compel the surrender of that place; and that the expedition into Zealand was utterly absurd, and in truth produced no other effect than that of depriving the army of the services of 16,000 men during two months that these troops were, in consequence of this movement, shut up from action.

It has been asked, by persons conversant in military affairs, why Pichegru had not endea-

voured to display to the Committee of Public Safety the absurdity of this project, and the value of his enterprize? And why, in the midst of victory, he made a retrograde movement with the precipitancy of a forced retreat, sacrificing even his convoys of bread to the enemy? These questions are natural enough; but there is no difficulty in the solution. The *ultima ratio* of our tyrants was the *revolutionary tribunal*, an escape from which was as little to be expected as from the den of wild animals. To prove to ignorant men that they are deceived, is to draw down their hatred, and when fools possess power they will have vengeance. Pichegru was therefore compelled to obey, and to be silent.

In conformity to the orders of the Committee of Public Safety, the army of the North returned on the 12th of Messidor *(June* 30), to Deinse, and arrived at Bruges on the 13th *(July* 1). Lord Moira had passed through this town on the 10th *(June* 28) with 5,000 men, that had lately landed at Ostend, to reinforce the enemy's troops acting on the Scheldt; and on the 11th *(June* 29), the troops under Moreau made themselves masters of the place.

There

There was a very feeble garrison in Ostend, and a French patrole appearing before the gates on the 13th of Messidor (*July* 1), they embarked with great precipitation, and, without firing a shot, left us to take possession of the place.

There was no longer an enemy to face us in West Flanders. Nieuport, Sluys, and the other fortified towns had been abandoned to their own strength. Pichegru left the divisions of Moreau and Michaud to besiege those fortresses, and to guard the coast. Thus the left wing of the army was separated for a while from the main body: but the centre and the right were sufficient to pursue and rout the enemy.

On the 15th of Messidor (*July* 3), this part of the army marched from Bruges to proceed to Ghent. It was divided into two columns, which marching on the two sides of the canal, presented a beautiful spectacle. They passed the night in the environs of Saint-Joristendelle and Kuesselaire. On the following day, they filed through the city of Ghent, which had been evacuated by the enemy; and were received by the inhabitants with shouts of joy. It is to be feared that, since that period, the presence of the French has been regarded with other sentiments.

Some

Some individuals of the French soldiery may, no doubt, have robbed the inhabitants of the conquered countries; this is not, however, a reasonable cause of general reproach to our troops, for it is probable this species of depredation was more frequent in the enemy's armies. But the representatives sent to make requisitions, the commissaries of the army, and the commercial agents, have ruined the unhappy country of Belgium for a long period. Will it be readily credited that *lace, and other articles of a like nature,* were put in requisition, *under the pretence of providing for the wants of the troops?* Some individual, no doubt, was interested in placing an embargo on articles of luxury. Some future day will expose the truth: mean while, let the guilty sleep, if they can!

Oudenarde surrendered on the 15th of Messidor (*July* 3); and on the evening of the same day, Tournay was evacuated by the enemy. Thus, in one day, Ghent, Oudenarde and Tournay, fell into the hands of the French. It was not by spiling oceans of blood before these places, that they were reduced: it was by beating the enemy in the open field, and by a combination of movements that made the resistance of these towns hopeless. This campaign is sufficient to convince persons who

who would study military affairs, of the error of the old tactics, which commenced by filling the trenches of the enemy's strong places with the carcases of the bravest of the troops. A strong town is impregnable while it is covered by an unbroken army; but no fortress can hold out, when the army by which it was defended is driven from the field. The re-taking of Valenciennes, le Quesnoy, Condé, and Landrecies, by the French, affords proofs of this proposition. Pichegru never besieged a place that was not necessary to secure the position of his army; yet, on this principle, he made greater progress in the enemy's country than the generals who preceded him.

CHAP.

CHAP. VIII.

Decree of the Convention, forbidding the French Troops to make English or Hanoverian Prisoners: Another Decree commanding the Austrians who garrisoned Valenciennes, le Quesnoy, Condé, and Landrecies, to be put to the Sword, if they did not immediately surrender those Places: Reflections on these Decrees.

THE supposition that intrigues were practised by the Prince of Cobourg in our armies, and in the interior of France is unworthy of credit. That Prince was a manly and liberal soldier, who held in disdain the perfidious arts of the cabinet of St. James. The people of France, however, subjected him to a full portion of all the disgrace of Pitt's atrocious conduct; and so extravagant was this injustice at one period, that had any accident destroyed the church of Notre-Dame, it would have been confidently asserted that Pitt and Cobourg had paid for its destruction. Although it would be unjust to ascribe to the English Chancellor of the Exchequer all the crimes which are laid

laid to his account, it is not to be doubted that his depraved spirit and his gold have done us infinite injury in hiring some of our representatives to pass absurd and odious laws: but there is no ground for the presumption that the Prince of Cobourg was involved in the iniquity.

Men mutually deceive each other by exaggeration; and it is well to be on our guard when it is asserted that it was the Cabinet of St. James alone that engendered the various commotions in France; that at once hired and sustained the several factions in the interior, and the hostile armies on our frontiers; and that excited, organised, and protracted the war in la Vendée. This is to leave nothing to the other causes which must have operated in such a Revolution as this of France. On the other hand, it would demand an uncommon share of scepticism to reject the whole of the accusation.

It was not by the dint of its prowess merely that a nation like England, whose natural resources seemed to place it only in the second rank, could be raised to the greatest pitch of prosperity and glory. Pitt worked the miracle by the weapons of intrigue, which were employed by him as artfully against the allied powers as against France.

Pitt has justly incurred the hatred of Europe: but he merits the gratitude of the English. It is urged against him, that his politics are groveling and perfidious; and this is true: but he governs England, and in that he finds his excuse.

To imagine the interests of the Bourbons and the French Emigrants had any influence in the conduct of England, would be to speculate on the malignant genius of the Cabinet of St. James with utter ignorance of the subject. These pretexts had no real share in the enormous projects of the English minister. His designs were to ruin our trade, annihilate our manufactures, destroy our finances, and give to England the exclusive commerce of the world. In the prosecution of this plan, he contemplated it as a subordinate part to divide our territory among the allies, and to remove this irresistible weight from the balance of Europe. But the enthusiasm, begotten by a love of liberty, and the unexampled courage of the French, which were totally overlooked by Pitt in his calculations, in part defeated his projects; and it will not be long before we shall see England descend from her unnatural elevation. A peace of ten years duration, the establishment of schools for the instruction of our seamen, an increase of our navy, prudent laws which shall bind

bind the colonies by affection to France, and concord at home, are means by which this event cannot fail to be produced.

When the impolitic decrees of the Convention against the English resident in France, and the English troops serving in the allied armies, are considered, it cannot be denied that England had her emissaries both in the Convention and in the Club of the Jacobins: but to maintain that the authors of those decrees were the direct agents of Pitt, would be to hazard a great opposition. Let us carry our views back to the period when these laws were passed, and let us maturely examine the circumstances which provoked them, and the character of the persons by whom they were supported, and then, perhaps, this opinion may not appear altogether improbable.

It is well known there was a great repugnance in the English *Nation* to enter into the coalition against France, and that, in the first instance, it was the Court, and not the People, who made war upon us. To push the war with vigour, the Minister saw the necessity of engaging the Nation as a party in it. The interest of the Bourbons, and of the French Nobility, whom the English hated, was not calculated to make any

impression on them. Other means were to be employed; and an attack by the Convention on the relations and friends of that people seemed to be of a proper complexion for the object. It is for these reasons I consider the first of these laws, ordaining the imprisonment and the confiscation of the property of the English who were resident in France, as having been obtained by the intrigues of the English Minister.

But the French people and their representatives were to be deceived also by this modern Carthaginian. It was asserted in all our journals that the representative of the nation, Beauvais, was put to death in an ignominious manner by the English: and on this report Fabre d'Eglantine, and the other agents of Pitt, solicited and obtained the disgraceful decree. Both parts of the scheme were now accomplished. The English orators of the ministerial party availed themselves of this law to paint the French in the most odious colours, and to excite Britain to vengeance. The Opposition in England could not combat arguments drawn from a fact of this character: and Pitt triumphed over the deluded nation.

The barbarous law which commanded the massacre of the English soldiers was another effect

fect of the diabolical machinations of the English minister. The English were frequently engaged in the advanced-guard of the allies, and were exposed with the other troops, to the continual encounters of the out-posts. Their loss was very great, and they obtained very little reputation to compensate the loss. The nation began, therefore, to murmur; and Pitt obtained this law in the Convention, by which artifice he prevailed on the allies to place the English in the third line: and in effect, while this law existed, although we took some Irish and some Hanoverians, it was very rare to find an Englishman among our prisoners.

If this conduct is not to be ascribed to Pitt, how was it that our journals did not inflame the public against the Austrians as well as the English? Why did not they assert that Drouet and his companions were hanged, and why did they not demand an exterminating war to be carried on at once against the Germans and English? This is the solution of the difficulty—neither the Emperor nor the other powers allied against France maintained emissaries in the Convention and the Club of the Jacobins: and the Cabinet of St. James duped and betrayed those powers as

completely as the French by their unprincipled practices.

The atrocious decree of which we are speaking, was at once impolitic and subversive of all the laws of war. It was impolitic, because the enemy is more annoyed by the making of a great many prisoners, than by the destruction of a small number of the troops: but those who are experienced in war know, that less time is in general consumed in making two or three thousand prisoners, than in the massacre of one hundred men. This decree could not fail to exasperate the troops against whom it was directed; but military prudence forbids us to reduce the enemy to despair. In a word, this law tended to diminish the courage, and to debase the minds of our soldiery.

This decree was equally unjust. War, in the midst of its calamities, has its principles of law and humanity, and wretched is the nation by which these are contemned and violated. War is not a natural relation existing between man and man, but a relation between one government and another. While a soldier is armed, he is the enemy of the soldier of the adverse party. But having thrown down his arms, he returns to his natural situation; and he into whose power

he

he falls, owes to him all that humanity demands for the unfortunate. The savages slay their prisoners and devour them: men who are partially civilized, but in this respect more savage still, make slaves of their enemies: but a free people make prisoners of them, and treat them with kindness.

It is fortunate that governments have not always the power of rendering the people as unjust and ferocious as themselves. The decree in question had little effect on the French troops. A reconnoitring party, on the 4th of Messidor (*June* 22), pushed from Wakem to the gates of Ghent, and took a considerable number of Hanoverian prisoners, who were conducted to Wilbek, which was the head-quarters of General Souham. An officer of the état-major happened to see them arrive, and said to the serjeant of the party, —"This is an embarrassing affair, comrade: I wish you had left those men where you found them." The serjeant replied—"General, there are just so many less of the enemy." "You are right," said the officer, "but a barbarous law exists against those poor men."—"We know it well," replied the brave soldier fiercely; "but the Convention will not pretend to make executioners of the republican soldiery! Send the pri-

soners to the Representatives of the People: if these men must die, let *their* hands be steeped in their blood!"

There were others who had not the courage of this gallant soldier. A general of brigade, through the fear of being dismissed, caused several Hanoverian prisoners to be shot; and it has been said, that another general put one to death with his own hand. I forbear to name them: but if, during the remainder of their lives, they should experience an hour of returning sensibility, they will be sufficiently punished. It is a subject of consolation, that this barbarous law was almost universally resisted by the army of the North.

The decree which denied quarter to the garrisons of the French towns in the hands of the enemy was of the same nature as that we have been considering. It was calculated to drive these troops to a desperate defence, which might have cost us an infinite number of men: beside, we then occupied all the strong places of Belgium, and had the Emperor adopted the same policy, and we had afterward been unsuccessful, our brave troops would have been reduced to the alternative of being executed in France for cowardice,

cowardice, or put to the sword in the fortresses of Flanders.

Under such destructive policy, how did men expect to find soldiers? Every good citizen will die for his country, when it is necessary; but it is more desirable to live for the purpose of serving her; and no man is called upon to throw away his life without utility. In fact, the absurdity of these two last decrees inclined some who were spectators of the affairs of France to believe, that those who then governed us, embarrassed with the controul of so many millions of brave men, were desirous of depopulating the country.

The commandant of le Quesnoy gave a fine lesson to those who summoned him to surrender on this occasion. He cooly replied—"No nation has a right to command another to dishonour itself."

CHAP.

CHAP. IX.

Taking of Charleroi: Battle of Fleurus: Evacuation of Mons, Marchiennes, &c.: Investment of the French Towns occupied by the Enemy.

THE allies, completely routed on the left of their line of operation, and weakened in the centre, were of necessity greatly exposed on the right. This was, therefore, the period to act with vigour on the Sambre; and it was not neglected. Charleroi, the siege of which had recommenced on the 30th of Prairial *(June* 18), was compelled to capitulate on the 7th of Messidor *(June* 25).

It was a singular circumstance that the generals of the allies were not apprised of this capitulation; and this ignorance gave occasion to the celebrated battle of Fleurus. On the 8th of Messidor *(June* 26), at break of day, the enemy were in motion to attack us, for the purpose of relieving Charleroi, which they imagined to be still in their possession.

possession. The engagement which followed, and concerning which Barrere employed so many extravagant figures of speech, took place in the plains of Fleurus, from which it assumed its name. I shall not undertake to be its historian; because persons well informed have assured me, that at present it is not to be seen but through a false medium, and I am not desirous of dealing in the marvellous. I shall therefore content myself with saying, in general terms, that the enemy were repulsed at almost every point of their line. They were on the eve of returning to the charge, when they were informed of the fall of Charleroi. They then retreated in good order to Marbaix, and afterwards to Vivelle.

This was unquestionably a very decisive battle; but it was also very bloody: and if we have heard more of it than of some others of equal influence in the affairs of France, it is because it arrived opportunely to prop the tyranny of the Decemvirate for a while. From this cause may be traced the fulsome exaggerations of Barrere on the subject.

In truth, the successes of this campaign were a series of extraordinary and brilliant events: but those which fell out as the power of the tyrants declined,

declined, were sedulously embellished, while succeeding events have been even disparaged. Tyrants, it is known, prefer the gratification of their lust of power to the progress of the public service.

On the 13th of Messidor *(July* 1) General Jourdan attacked the enemy at Mont-Palissel, drove them from that position, and made himself master of Mons. In consequence of this action, the allies were compelled to evacuate Saint-Amand, Marchiennes, Cateau, and other places, which they had till then occupied: and Condé, Valenciennes, le Quesnoy and Landrecies, were abandoned to their own strength.

Pichegru gave orders to the brigade of General Osten, which was then at Tournay, to approach those towns, and to proceed to the investment of them, in conjunction with the troops which remained in the centre, under General Ferrand. The command of the whole of this besieging army was confided to General Scherer.

Several engagements took place between the army of the Sambre and the Meuse and the rear-guard of the allies, which covered Brussels and the Forest of Soignes: but these were unimportant; excepting the engagement on the 18th of Messidor

sidor *(July* 6), which was fought with great loss on both sides.

Hitherto, the French won every step of their ground by invincible perseverance: and it may be fairly said, that not a day passed without some severe conflict. But the greater part of these are lost in the magnitude of others.

CHAP.

CHAP. X.

March of the Army of the North: Its Junction with the Army of the Sambre and Meuse: Passage of the Canal of Malines: Taking of Louvain, Malines, and Namur: Reduction of Landrecies: Siege of le Quesnoy.

ON the 21st of Messidor *(July 9)*, the army of the North marched from Ghent, and encamped near Eroneghem, behind Alost. A detachment of the advanced-guard entered Brussels on the same day, even before it was entirely evacuated by the enemy. On the 22d *(July 10)*, the army encamped at Ache; and on the 23d it took a position behind the canal of Vilvorde. On the same day, Brussels was garrisoned by a detachment from the army of the Sambre and the Meuse.

History will hereafter do justice to the achievements which effected the junction of these armies in the face of almost insurmountable difficulties. Its value was felt by the two armies in the most lively

lively manner. It increased their confidence, and assured them of future victory. Nor did it fail to excite the admiration of Europe. France alone forbore to receive this great event with the passion it was in general calculated to create. Faction equally split the Convention and the people into parties; and the junction of the two armies on the enemy's territory was not, at that period, an object to draw their attention.

It will naturally be expected after this junction, that the movements of these armies would be combined, and result from an uniform plan; but the meanest of passions defeated this desirable consequence.

Till the moment of which I speak, I had imagined that men who were not soldiers, either by their employment or in theory, would forbear to court military renown; that they would be content with the pleasure of seeing our armies triumph; and, while they admired the deliverers of our country, would confine themselves to the task of providing for the wants of the soldiery, and facilitating the operations of the armies.

In this, however, I had committed a very important mistake. Those representatives, who never

never ceased to reproach kings for appropriating to themselves the glory of the soldier, were perfect in their imitation of tyrants in this very instance. They assumed to themselves the glory of our victories. These ignorant men never perceived that it is not situation which secures glory, and that to usurp the post of talent and virtue was to insure contempt when they grasped at renown. Our Proconsuls were consumed with jealousy: and the command of the two armies, in which Pichegru had been so eminently successful, threw a lustre round that General which they could not endure.

Pichegru could not fail to perceive this: and, indeed, one of the Proconsuls, less circumspect than the rest, reproached him in the rudest language, at a dinner at Brussels, with the greatness of his reputation. Pichegru, though by no means of a phlegmatic temper, was on all occasions cool and deliberate; and on the present, only replied—"Citizen Representative, I perceive that *aristocracy has only changed hands amongst us.*"

Disputes of a very serious nature arose among the several commissaries of the army. Each of them insisted upon having Brussels for a dépôt: or

or rather, each coveted the field in which he could the soonest fatten himself by plunder.

Pichegru regarded with equal contempt, the mean jealousy of the Proconsuls, and the low avarice of the commissaries. But, in order to put the troops in motion, he conceded every thing that was demanded of him respecting the army of the Sambre and the Meuse. After this, he could lay down no plan of operations to embrace both armies; for, although he was commander in chief of both, the *unlimited authorities* aspired to conduct the armies of the Sambre and the Meuse according to their own plans.

It cannot be suspected that the brave Jourdan sullied himself with these petty intrigues. But a General who had been already dismissed in the midst of victories, and afterward incurred the danger of dying on a scaffold, or rotting in a dungeon, would be reluctant enough to brave the authority of tyrants.

After the arrangement by which the army of the Sambre and the Meuse was committed to the Representatives of the People, the army of the North proceeded towards Malines; and on the 25th of Messidor *(July* 13*)*, crossed the canal

of Vilvorde, and took a position between that town and Hunsbeke. On the 27th (*July* 15) Pichegru attacked the combined armies of Holland and England, who were strongly entrenched behind the canal of Louvain, between it and Malines; which latter place they occupied, together with all the ground between the canal and the river Dyle. The engagement was obstinate; but the vivacity of our troops disconcerted the enemy. The greater part of them, impatient at the delay occasioned by the preparations made to pass the canal, threw themselves into the water, swam across, and routed the enemy. As soon as the whole of the troops had passed the canal, they pursued the enemy to Malines, and entered that place by the gate of Louvain. At first, they found this gate blocked up with a prodigious quantity of fire-wood; part of the troops immediately seized upon some ladders, scaled the walls, freed the passage, and our army entered the town as the enemy were evacuating it by the causeway that leads to Antwerp.

In this action, we took several pieces of cannon, and made some prisoners. Our loss in men was not great; but General Proteau fell in the action.

Our

Our advanced guard pursued the enemy to the Neethe; and, having gained some advantage, compelled them to retreat behind that river.

The left wing of the army of the Sambre and the Meuse, having proceeded to Louvain and Judoigne, made itself master of those places on the 27th (*July* 15); and the right forced the enemy to evacuate both the town and citadel of Namur, of which it took possession on the 20th (*July* 16).

It being impossible for the places on our frontiers which had been taken by the allies in the preceding campaign to receive any succour, Landrecies surrendered on the 27th (*July* 15). General Scherer then gave orders to press the siege of le Quesnoy with vigour.

While these sieges were carrying on, the decree relative to them was brought to Pichegru. Laws made in violation of all principle, were odious to this General; and, in order to save the lives of the besieged, and at the same time to spare their honour, he proposed to transmit the decree to them only when the works before those towns should be so far advanced as to impose the

necessity of submission. But the Representatives of the People, respecting neither the lives nor the honour of men, commanded, in the tone of tyrants, that the places should be summoned even before the artillery for the siege could be planted against them. The brave commandant of le Quesnoy, notwithstanding, discharged his duty to the utter disgrace of men who were ignorant enough to trample upon the rights of war, and the law of nations.

CHAP.

CHAP. XI.

March of the Army of the North to Antwerp: Taking of that City, Tongres, and Liege: Taking of Nieuport: Siege of Sluys: Reduction of le Quesnoy.

ON the 5th of Thermidor *(July* 23), the army of the North marched toward Antwerp, and took a position with the left extending to Liers, and the right to Heist-op-Denberg, behind the river Neethe. The English did not wait for us at Antwerp, but, evacuating both the town and citadel, we took possession of that place on the 6th *(July* 24).

While the army of the North was thus employed, the army of the Sambre and Meuse marched in pursuit of the Austrians; and on the 9th of Thermidor *(July* 27) entered Tongres and Liege. The inhabitants of this last place having taken up arms against the Austrians, the French made themselves masters of it with little difficulty: but it was otherwise with the bridge which is built

across the Meuse at that place. The enemy were entrenched on the heights of the Chartreuse, which commanded the bridge: and the passage was defended with uncommon obstinacy. Even some parts of the city were bombarded from the same heights.

It was necessary that the two armies should not proceed too far from the frontiers, while our principal fortresses on that side should remain in the hands of the enemy: they therefore halted till the beginning of July in positions reaching from Liege to Antwerp. The Austrians defended the banks of the Meuse, from Ruremonde to Maëstricht, which last place they protected by an advanced guard. The troops of England and Holland, having retired beyond Breda, were encamped at Osterwist, and in its environs: and a corps was posted at Ludhoven, to keep open the communication between these armies.

The town of Nieuport surrendered on the 30th of Messidor *(July* 18) to General Moreau. The capitulation granted by this generous soldier to the garrison would unquestionably have brought him to the scaffold, if the tyranny of the Decemvirate had not been overthrown shortly afterward. The garrison consisted chiefly of Hanoverians, and

and the savage decree, of which we have had occasion to speak so frequently, still disgraced our code.

The Proconsuls, who at this time held their court at Brussels, were consulted respecting this capitulation; and they decided for the execution of the decree. Richard and Lacombe-Saint-Michel were the only Representatives who exposed the atrocity of this resolution, or expressed any horror at the proceeding. Lacombe is unknown to me; for in those times I fled from the Proconsuls as men fly from noxious reptiles: but Richard was my friend, and I must bear testimony that he abhorred the policy of the tyrants, and that he incurred great danger in labouring on all occasions to blunt its edge.

It would betray an ignorance of human nature to suppose that every man who participated in these acts was fortified with an obdurate heart. But will that be an excuse for them? Pusillanimity in times of revolution is as destructive to true liberty as ambition and inordinate passion: and that which was so aptly called *the belly* of the Convention has been the cause of as deep injuries to the nation, by its cowardice, as all the liberticide factions with which France has been agitated.

Richard, Pichegru, Moreau, and the greater part of the generals in the army of the North, chose rather to incur the risk of their lives than to deviate, in a single instance, from the laws of war. They were destined to the scaffold for their virtue. Independant of other proofs, which are unquestionable, Robespierre denounced these patriots, in the tribune, on the 8th of Thermidor (*July* 26). But happily, while they triumphed on the frontiers, the victory of the friends of freedom in the interior, on the 9th of Thermidor (*July* 27), calmed at once the fears of the citizens and the soldiers.

At the period when France began to open her eyes to her unhappy departure from principle, the division of General Moreau executed one of the boldest enterprises of the campaign. It being resolved to lay siege to Sluys, it was necessary, for the complete investment of that place, that our troops should make themselves masters of the Island of Cazand. This enterprise presented the most discouraging obstacles. There appeared no way to arrive at the island but by a very narrow causeway, inundated on both sides, and commanded by fourteen pieces of cannon, or by throwing a bridge over the streight of Coschische. Moreau had no pontoons: all his resources for the

the passage were a few small boats, of which it was impossible to form a bridge. The invincible spirit of the troops stood in the place of all other means. Some crossing by swimming, and others in small boats, they attacked and put to flight a superior force, in the face of numerous and formidable batteries. The French took in this island ninety pieces of cannon, a great quantity of ammunition and provision, and two hundred prisoners.

While General Moreau gave these great proofs of his courage and ability, his unfortunate father lingered in the bottom of a dungeon, by the order of the tyrants. This old man belonged to the robe, and had some relations who were of the proscribed cast of nobles. Neither the services of his son, nor a character universally esteemed, nor an unaltered patriotism from the commencement of the revolution, could expiate this crime. He fell beneath the sword of the assassins on the very day his son entered the almost impregnable fort of Sluys.

It was long before Moreau was apprized of this event. When it was made known to him, despair so wholly possessed his mind, that it has been said he would have quitted the territory of the

the Republic from horror, had he not been deterred by the healing counsels of his friends. The character of the son at length yielded to that of the citizen; and he continues to serve with fidelity and success a country that assassinated his parent.

The armies have not been without examples of virtue of the same nature. Tassin, a captain in the 9th regiment of hussars, was on the frontiers when his father was executed at Paris. His first thought was to fly to the enemy from such monstrous tyranny: but his friends prevailed in calming his mind, and he still serves with zeal and courage.

But these cases are not general. Numbers of young men have been unable to resist the poignant anguish of such situations, and have fled to the enemy. Can he who feels, and is just, regard these men as traitors?

Laferté-Papillon, a young man in the 9th regiment of hussars, saw his father's name in the fatal list. He fell into a deep melancholy, from which he scarcely escaped with life. One day, a soldier of the same regiment brutally reproached him with the ignominy of his father's death.

This

This young man's manners were peculiarly gentle. He could not bear this cruel stroke, and fled to the enemy. Let every sensible mind declare if it is ready to pass sentence on this desertion. But France has scarcely ever experienced any of a different character: and if our legislators do not one day repair these wrongs, men will be tempted to forswear all belief in public probity and the justice of a nation.

On the 28th of Thermidor (*August* 15), le Quesnoy surrendered, after making a gallant resistance, and being reduced to the last extremity. I am ignorant what has since become of the brave officer who commanded in the place. The answer he returned to our summons, and the declaration he made to General Scherer when he gave up the town, in which he demanded the lives of his garrison, and offered his own as the condition, deserves to be transmitted to posterity. His noble qualities won the esteem of our courageous troops.

CHAP.

CHAP. XII.

Causes which compelled the Army of the North to remain several Days in the Neighbourhood of Antwerp: Plan of Co-operation with the Army of the Sambre and the Meuse, which was afterward abandonned: Return of the Troops that had been detached for the Expedition against Holland: Taking of Sluys: Reduction of Condé and Valenciennes.

PICHEGRU was very desirous of pressing forward to besiege Breda, and the army was not less eager to undertake this expedition. But as the army of the Sambre and the Meuse had not driven the Austrians from the banks of the Meuse, the General saw that, by advancing to Breda, he should leave his right wing uncovered.

Beside, the administrations appointed to supply the troops with necessaries had always acted with so little concert that the Generals had much more trouble in finding provisions for the army than in directing its operations. This business was so badly

badly conducted that from the time we left Ghent we had continued to receive our bread from Lille. We were frequently without any, and when it arrived it was generally mouldy. We were also in great want of forage and carriages. When the Generals complained to the persons employed in this service, they answered—that they were not responsible to any but their own department. Did they address themselves to the Representatives, they were told—that our conquests were too rapid, but that they would provide for the demands they occasioned.

At this period it would have been dangerous to advance into the extensive plains of Dutch Brabant, because the difficulty of transporting supplies increased as we removed from Antwerp. These considerations determined Pichegru to allow the army to remain during eighteen days in its positions near that city.

In the mean time the administration of provisions established several magazines in different places, particularly at Ghent, Malines, and Antwerp. Though this measure diminished the obstacles we had to encounter, it did not entirely remove them. There were never any magazines of importance established, and if the army had experienced

experienced any considerable check it would have been left totally destitute of every thing necessary to its support. We were in want of a sufficient number of waggons for transporting the bread; and the horses employed in that service were so much neglected, that out of every convoy thirty or forty perished for want of food.

Notwithstanding all these difficulties, Pichegru undertook to execute a new and very extensive plan. He proposed to second the operations of the army of the Rhine in the Palatinate, and to co-operate with the movements of the army of the Sambre and the Meuse on both sides of the latter river.

The army of the North, agreeable to this plan, was to have left a small corps to cover Antwerp and watch the English army. Then directing itself obliquely to the right, it was to have proceeded to Ruremonde and Venloo, on the right of the Austrian army, to have descended the Meuse, defeated the English, and prevented them from forming a junction with the Imperialists.

The army of the Sambre and the Meuse was to have left a corps of troops before Maëstricht, to

to have passed the Meuse above Liege, attacked the right of the Austrian army, passed the Ourt, and descended by Vervier and Herve.

With the view of executing this plan the army of the North left Antwerp on the 3d of Fructidor, (*August* 20), marched as far as Westmale, and arrived next day at Moll; but it could advance no farther for want of provisions. We had not even a morsel of bread.

Besides this obstacle, the army of the Sambre and the Meuse found that the passage of the Ourt presented insurmountable difficulties. The march on the Lower Meuse was therefore no longer of any utility, the measure was consequently abandoned, and a new plan adopted.

It was then proposed to advance towards the English army, and to take the first opportunity of engaging them. At the same time it was thought prudent not to remove too far from Antwerp until we should be certain of being more regularly supplied with stores and provisions.

In consequence of this plan the army of the North moved on the 7th of Fructidor (*August* 24) to Turnhout, and on the 11th (*August* 28) took another

another position near Hoogstraten, behind the river Merk.

The Duke of York, who did not think himself sufficiently in force to engage with us, being informed of our march, retreated to Bois-le-Duc, and encamped his army near Heeswick. Thus Breda was abandoned to the efforts of its garrison. The Dutch army remained at Ramdouk.

We would have seized this opportunity to commence the siege of Breda, as the dryness of the season prevented the danger of an inundation; but all our besieging artillery were still before Sluys. Beside, the troops that we could have spared for a corps of observation would have been inferior to the Duke of York's army, who might even receive some reinforcements. It was also to be considered that the Austrian army might obtain some advantages over the army of the Sambre and the Meuse, which would render the retreat of the army of the North, if not impossible, at least very difficult. Thus the besieging of this place would have endangered the fruits of our first victories, and we should have lost perhaps more than we had gained.

Pichegru, therefore, confined his operations to the pursuit of the English, for the purpose of defeating them and forcing them to retire behind the Meuse, and preventing their junction with the Imperial army. He ordered in the mean time the army of the Sambre and the Meuse to pass the Meuse, and to attack the left wing of the Austrians. This measure was absolutely necessary for giving security to the operations against the English army, and to render our success complete.

The troops that had been detached from the army of the North for the absurd expedition against the Isle of Walcheren, returned at this time to the army; and this reinforcement, though small, was of some service in our future operations.

It was now become exceedingly difficult to approach Sluys on account of the tides, which rose at this time to an unusual height. But the heroic firmness of our troops overcame every obstacle, and that fortress at length surrendered. This important event took place on the 8th of Fructidor *(August* 25).

We should then have attempted the reduction of Sas-de-Gand, Hulst, and other places in Dutch Flanders; but the troops which had been employed in the siege of Sluys, had undergone such immense fatigue, and suffered so much from the putrid exhalations of the country, that they were reduced to at least one-half of their original number. It was absolutely necessary to give them some repose, and they were sent to Ghent, Bruges, and the surrounding towns.

Beside, it was supposed that as we approached the frontiers of Holland, that power would not leave a sufficient number of troops for the defence of those fortresses, and that they would be soon abandoned. The event proved that this opinion was well founded.

Valenciennes and Condé, the sieges of which, at the commencement of the campaign, would have required 200,000 men, capitulated on the 9th and 10th of Fructidor *(August* 26 *and* 27). An evident proof that fortresses can only hold out so long as there are armies to cover them.

The troops which were employed in these sieges joined the armies. The brigade of General Osten returned to the army of the North, and the

the division of Scherer re-joined the army of the Sambre and the Meuse. These armies were at this time in a most excellent condition. Though the season was already advanced, they took very little repose. The most piercing cold, and the deep snows, did not prevent them from crossing all the arms of the Rhine and conquering Holland.

CHAP. XIII.

March of the Army of the North in pursuit of the English: Battle of Boxtel: Engagement between the Army of the Sambre and the Meuse and the Austrians: Retreat of the English behind the Meuse.

THE plan of leaving Breda, and of following the English and forcing them to pass the Meuse, being adopted, the army of the North took a position near Meetle on the 18th of Fructidor (*September* 4). To perplex and mislead the Duke of York, a number of cavalry were sent behind Breda. In the mean time, the army continued its march. On the 20th (*Sept.* 10), it encamped near Riel and Gilse; and, on the following day, it took a position behind Osterwist and Morgestel.

On the 28th (*Sept.* 14), the army marched towards the Dommel, for the purpose of taking a position on that river. At Boxtel it fell in with the

the enemy's advanced guard, consisting of from six to seven thousand men. This post was fortified naturally by the Dommel, and a rapid stream. To make an attack, it was necessary first to pass the stream, and afterward the river, and all the bridges were broken down. This retarded the action, which commenced at three in the afternoon and continued till six in the evening. Some of the French crossed the river by swimming, others on such planks as they could procure, and the enemy, astonished at their intrepidity, laid down their arms. It has been often related, that on this occasion, two of the enemy's battalions laid down their arms to thirty hussars of the 18th regiment. The story is strictly true. It is also certain that a drummer scarcely eighteen years of age, alone and unarmed, brought in ten prisoners. There is nothing surprising in this: a single man may perform such actions when accompanied by a victorious army. All the troops behaved well. The eighth regiment of hussars found itself in a situation to gather the fruits of the victory. It is not on that account I bestow praise on this corps; it merits more for having greatly contributed to this success, and for having on all occasions displayed the greatest courage.

This slight check determined the Duke of York to raise his camp and to retire behind the Meuse. To cover his retreat he ordered nine regiments of infantry and a considerable number of cavalry to march on the following day, and to menace us with an attack at Boxtel. But we had advanced a strong party of observation, which fell in with these troops and defeated them, without the army being informed of it.

By these two affairs we obtained more than 2,000 prisoners, seven pieces of cannon, and a great number of artillery. But a still more important advantage resulted from them. The enemy now found it impossible to remain longer on the left bank of the Meuse, and were obliged to retreat across that river. Thus the fortresses of Bergen-op-Zoom, Breda, and Bois-le-Duc, were left to be defended by their garrisons.

The following anecdote may serve as an useful lesson to such military men as may happen to read it. General Souham and Adjutant-General Reunier, (6) reconnoitring round Boxtel, fell in with a party of the enemy's cavalry, which received them with a discharge of carabines. These officers, followed closely by the enemy, fell back towards the fifth regiment of chasseurs.

The

The Austrians no sooner saw this brave regiment, than they fled back faster than they had advanced. Our chasseurs, imagining that Souham and Reunier were the commanders of this party, and that it had abandoned them, attacked both these officers, and fired some pistol shot at a very small distance from them. Fortunately, they were not wounded; but on this occasion they had nearly perished by the hands of their friends. I mention this transaction here merely to remind our brave troops, that before they make a charge, they ought to be certain that it is the enemy they are about to attack. French vivacity often occasions similar mistakes. At Courtray I saw a whole post fire on their companions who were patroling near that place, and they killed several of them. These accidents happen more frequently to the French than to other nations. Brave soldiers! learn to unite prudence with courage, and you will be real heroes.

After having defeated the reserve of the Duke of York's army on the 29th (*Sept.* 15) we pursued him as far as the river Aa. Had we been able to have marched farther that day, and to have pressed him upon the Meuse, the English would have been totally defeated, and we should have taken all their artillery and baggage. But

the troops were greatly fatigued by their march of the evening before ; and, besides, our knowledge of the country was very imperfect, as it was not described in any of M. Ferraris's charts. We were in the greatest want of good maps, which occasioned several columns to mistake their route, and prevented them from reaching the places of their destination. The army was so dispersed by mistakes of this kind, that we were obliged to stop on the 29th and the 30th (*Sept.* 15 *and* 16) to reconnoitre the ground, and to concentrate the wandering parties. This afforded time to the Duke of York to make his retreat behind the Meuse.

The army of the North took a position on the 2d complémentaire (*Sept.* 18) behind the Aa, between Wechel and Bourdouck. On the 3d (*Sept.* 19), it proceeded to Denter.

The army of the Sambre and the Meuse, agreeably to the orders of General Pichegru, attacked on the same day the left wing of the Austrian army, and defeated it, notwithstanding a most obstinate resistance. In this engagement, a great number of the enemy were killed. We took 700 prisoners, 20 pieces of cannon, six standards, and a great quantity of baggage.

After

After this defeat, the Austrians retreated to Julliers, behind the Roër. They left, however, a corps of troops which entered Maestricht, but were soon blockaded in that place by our army.

CHAP.

CHAP. XIV.

Reduction of Crevecœur: Investment of Bois-le-Duc: Capitulation of that Place: Errors committed respecting Fort St. André: March to Grave: Arrival of the Troops commanded by Moreau: Taking of Julliers, Bonn, and Cologne.

BEFORE we could pursue the English on the other side of the Meuse, it appeared necessary to obtain possession of some place of strength on the left side of that river, which might serve as a point of support, and from which the army might draw provisions. Our bread was still brought from Antwerp, across the heaths of Brabant, and through roads almost impassable. We had neither horses nor carriages in sufficient numbers for transporting it; and very often we were totally destitute of that necessary article of food.

Bois-le-Duc was the place most suitable for giving security to the position of the army, and for

for serving as a magazine of provisions. The reduction of this fortress was therefore necessary, before we could attempt the passage of the Meuse. It must be allowed, however, that this enterprize was difficult, and even dangerous. Bois-le-Duc was surrounded with a number of forts in excellent condition, and well garrisoned, and which appeared almost impregnable. The country was inundated to the extent of three hundred toises from the ramparts, and the place seemed an island in the midst of a great river. Though a breach might be made in the walls, all the fascines in the world would not have been sufficient to reach it.

In addition to these difficulties, our besieging artillery were at a considerable distance, and the season was far advanced. It was also to be apprehended, that some heavy rains might fall before the artillery could arrive, which would increase the inundation, so as to render the throwing up of trenches impracticable.

Notwithstanding all these obstacles, it was determined to commence the siege. The place was invested by our cavalry on the 1st of Vendémiaire (*Sept.* 23), and the infantry took their station the next day. We immediately established

blished some batteries of howitzers, to set fire to the town, and began to form entrenchments, the difficulty of which operation increased daily, on account of the rising of the waters.

On the 2d (*Sept.* 24), we took posession of the old fort of Orten, which the enemy had evacuated. The journals published extravagant accounts respecting the taking of this fort. Doubtless, the commissioners with the army had, according to their laudable custom, made their report without consulting the officers who directed the operations against that place.

Crevecœur was not so easily taken, for we were obliged to invest and bombard it. The reduction of this fort was of great importance for forwarding our enterprize; as it defended Sluys on the Meuse. We commenced our approaches by the means of some dykes, which covered a part of the communication with the trenches. We mounted some batteries with field-pieces and howitzers; and, finally, on the 7th of Vendémiaire (*Sept.* 29), at four in the morning, the garrison capitulated. The garrison marched out with the honours of war, and were made prisoners on their parole: that is to say, they promised not to bear arms against the French until they

they were exchanged. This fort was mounted with thirty-eight pieces of cannon and four howitzers. We found in it 422 muskets, and 385 quintals of powder.

In the mean time, the rains set in, and the inundations augmenting before Bois-le-Duc, rendered the prosecution of the siege if not impossible, at least exceedingly difficult. The trenches were still at too great a distance, and it was impossible to carry them nearer to the works. Our besieging artillery arrived at last; but it was impossible to make it act with effect.

At the moment in which every obstacle was greatly augmented, when the French Generals considered the farther prosecution of the siege as almost impracticable, even before our besieging artillery had fired a shot, the Prince of —— offered to capitulate. The terms he was granted were advantageous, but not honourable. The garrison marched out with the honours of war, and retired into the interior of Holland, being made prisoners on parole.

Had the Commandant of Grave, who was not a Prince, been entrusted with the defence of Bois-le-Duc, I believe he would not have surrendered

rendered it so easily. But this worthy Prince very wisely determined not to expose his person to the danger of a bombardment. He seemed to receive no amusement from the salutation of our artillery. The house in which he resided had been carefully fortified, and covered over with heaps of turf and wood. We found in Fort Isabella, Saint-Antoine, and Bois-le-Duc, 183 cannon, mortars and howitzers, and ammunition of every kind.

We committed an error in the conducting of this siege. Fort Saint-André, situated in a small island formed by the Meuse and the Waal, to the eastward of the Bommel, not being occupied by the enemy, we sent a company of grenadiers to take possession of it. We neglected, however, to repair the fortifications, and to put it in a proper condition for defence. The enemy being sensible of its importance, attacked it briskly and retook it. They immediately fortified it, so as to put it out of danger from a sudden attack. This fort incommoded us greatly in the expeditions which were undertaken against the Isle of Bommel. It destroyed a vast number of our men; and we were not able to retake it until we had passed the Waal.

As the siege of Maestricht could not be prosecuted with safety while the Austrians were in force on the Roër, the army of the Sambre and the Meuse attacked them on the 11th of Vendémiaire (*October* 3). The enemy were defeated, driven across the Rhine, and our troops entered Julliers. By following up this victory, we obtained possession of Cologne on the 15th (*October* 7), and Bonn on the 18th (*October* 10).

A part of the troops which invested Maestricht were employed on the Roër, to insure the success of that attack. Immediately after the battle was gained, they returned to General Kleber, who commanded the besieging army, amounting to 40,000 men.

On the 22d of Vendémiaire (*October* 14), the army of the North marched to Grave, which General Bonneau's division had partially invested during the siege of Bois-le-Duc. Our march this day was rendered somewhat remarkable by the garrison of Bois-le-Duc proceeding on the same route, and our baggage being frequently confounded with their's. This garrison, which had just quitted that fortress, must have had a high idea of our activity.

It ought not to be passed unnoticed, that Souham's division replaced Bonneau's, and was posted from Opzelan to above Reek.

The Commandant of Grave wrote to Souham, begging him to preserve the armistice which he had concluded with General Bonneau until sunset on the 23d (*October* 15). This time he required as necessary for permitting the garrison of Bois-le-Duc to file by that place. The manner in which this letter was worded, plainly indicated that this brave Swiss was far from being satisfied with the behaviour of these troops. He even signified that if he had defended that fortress, we should have purchased our conquest at a dearer rate.

This Commandant acted like a man of honour at Grave; and if history be impartial it will not neglect to class his name with those who behave with bravery and honor.

General Moreau's division, which was employed in the siege of Sluys, and had suffered so much from the exhalations near the mouth of the Scheldt, joined the army of the North after having reposed some time in Flanders. On the 8th of

of Vendémiaire *(September* 30), it arrived on the Meuse opposite to Venloo, and was ordered to cover the communication of the two French armies.

CHAP. XV.

State of Belgium before the French Revolution: Ravages and Oppressions which the War occasioned.

BEFORE we leave Austrian Flanders, it may not be improper to describe the situation of these countries prior to our Revolution, and the changes which the war and our political systems have operated in them.

This fertile, but unhappy country, has long been the spot to which the people of every nation in Europe have hastened for their mutual destruction. Throughout the whole extent of these immense plains the soil is every where drenched with human blood, and not a step can be advanced without trampling on the remains of victims of ambition. A country which has been unceasingly the theatre of the most terrible and destructive of all scourges, might have been expected to present to the eye of the traveller only a heap

a heap of ashes and ruins; on the contrary, no portion of Europe displays a soil better cultivated, or a territory more populous.

That wonderful being man! who lives among the piercing frosts and perpetual snows of the arctic circle, who endures the vertical ray and burning sands of the torrid zone, and who can sleep tranquilly by the side of a volcano, could alone exist in the midst of devastation and tombs! He spreads himself every where over the face of the earth, propagates his species in the most barren regions, and under the most inclement skies, accustoms himself to every variety of food and of climate, and may, from this facility of accommodating himself to circumstances, be regarded as the most extraordinary of all terrestrial animals.

Before our Revolution, the number of the inhabitants in Belgium was nearly in the proportion of 1,700 to the square league. This exceeded the population of France in its most flourishing departments.

The industry and commerce of this country were however in their infancy, and it appears incontestible that had these two great causes of multiplying human existence been carried to per-

fection, the population of the Netherlands would not have been inferior to any of the provinces of China. Notwithstanding the ravages with which this country has for time immemorial been desolated, the hamlets approach near each other in every part of it, and the traveller cannot proceed two leagues without falling in with small towns, and at every four leagues distance considerable and very populous cities appear.

During twenty-six years, the Flemings had enjoyed perfect tranquillity. The war between England and her colonies, instead of disturbing them, produced a salutary change in their commercial relations, which could not fail of elevating them to a high degree of prosperity. Their foreign commerce was extended, their interior trade assumed more activity, and the richest country in territorial productions was at the point of becoming one of the most industrious. The sciences were already successfully cultivated, and the arts would have been speedily introduced.

After the peace of 1762, Belgium advanced progressively to a very high degree of prosperity. The inhabitants of the towns lived, if not in opulence, at least in the most perfect comfort. The country people were not like the French groaning under

under arbitrary impositions, nor like the English borne down by the weight of insupportable taxes.

The cultivator of this productive soil was free from the intolerable despotism of petty provincial tyrants. He was not obliged to assume the appearance of poverty to avoid exhorbitant demands. Those importunate, inhuman, and voracious animals, called in France *rats de cave*, *(excisemen)* never insulted him with their presence, nor distressed him with domiciliary visits. His fields were not sown merely to feed the game of a Prince, and the death of a wild animal was not punished in the same manner as the murder of a man. Neither the lord of the manor, his bailiff, his agents, nor the justice of the peace could oppress him with impunity. The great and the little, the poor and the rich, had the law and its administrators for their common protection.

It was not uncommon for a Belgian peasant to give thirty or forty thousand livres as a dowry with his daughter, to educate one or two of his sons for the arts or the sciences, to place one in some public office, another in the church, and to retain his favourite child for agriculture. The

last profession being always preferred, as every one was proud of exercising it.

The suppression of the religious houses by Joseph II. turned their property into the channel of commerce, and was much more beneficial to the people of this country than to himself. It might have been expected that this suppression would have been well received by the Belgians, as almost the half of the territorial funds were in mortmain. Salutary however as this measure was, it met with opposition, and occasioned troubles, which were the forerunners of the great political tempest which burst forth afterward in France, and then inundated this unhappy country.

Vandernoot, whose patriotism consisted in wishing to preserve ancient customs, organised an insurrection. Another individual, as little enlightened with respect to patriotism, but not less ambitious, put himself at the head of one party. Blood had already been drawn, and civil war was about to break out when the troops of the Emperor arrived and stifled it almost in the moment of its birth.

The Belgians had scarcely recovered from this shock when their territory was invaded by the French army under Dumouriez. It is alledged that

that this General, together with Danton and Lacroix, drained the country of its riches and commenced its ruin. But this first attack upon its property was nothing to what followed.

After suffering all the ravages which an obstinate war usually occasions, after having seen their habitations reduced to ashes, all the hopes of an abundant harvest destroyed, and even the little grain they had preserved carried off in sheafs to cover huts for our soldiers, still the sum of their evil was incomplete. These unfortunate people were doomed to endure the utmost extremes of oppression and devastation.

The towns were inundated by a cohort of Proconsuls, more inhuman than Phalaris, who omitted nothing that could exasperate the people. Committees and revolutionary tribunals were organised. The women were insulted, the men imprisoned, and their property confiscated. Our revolutionary code was thought too mild for this peaceable people. It was revised by these savages and enlarged with a multitude of clauses which dispensed so freely the punishment of death, that for a word or a gesture a father was sent to the scaffold, and his family left in poverty and misery.

Not content with torturing those who had so much confidence as to remain in the country, or rather who wanted the means of withdrawing themselves from a cruel persecution, it was determined to ruin even the absent and to leave to them and their families only the bitter tears of despair.

It is an acknowledged principle that a conquered people are not subject to the laws of the conqueror until a treaty of peace has confirmed the latter in his conquests: but this invariable regulation, which has always made a part of the law of nations was the first to be violated. It was natural that every citizen, who had a thousand florins at his disposal, should endeavour to withdraw himself from a country where his life was in danger, or where, if he remained he could only enjoy a precarious existence, a thousand times worse than death. Men must indeed be strongly attached to their property who do not under the same circumstances emigrate more eagerly than the Flemings.

From the moment that the Proconsuls of the Mountain appeared in this unhappy country, a barbarous arrêt was posted on every wall, declaring that every absentee, who should not return

in a fortnight, would be held to have emigrated, would be subject to the punishment of death, and his property confiscated for the benefit of the Republic.

This unjust proclamation could not reach the absentees in that short period : and though it had reached them, as the revolutionary tribunals were organised, the guillotine permanent and the destructive principles of the Mountain prevailing, I would ask every honest Frenchman if it was possible for them to return ? The preservation of life is always the first sentiment of nature, the security of property is only a secondary consideration. The fortune of the absentees was however dilapidated, without any advantage to the Republic. Their property is still in the hands of the Jacobin representatives of this country, now excluded from the legislative assembly. Justice resembles the cork-tree which may for some time be forcibly held under water : but a good constitution gives us reason to hope that justice will soon resume her reign, as the hand that presses down the cork-tree must at last become fatigued, and permit it to regain the surface of the stream.

In addition to all these unjust measures and terrible desolations, a cloud of requisitionists and members of that department improperly called the

the commercial agency, preyed like vultures on the people, and long ruined the merchant and the farmer. Never were transactions marked with such revolting tyranny. Every requisitionist laid an embargo on the articles on which his avarice had speculated. In one place the lawn and the lace were required for the use of the army. In another, varnish, pictures, and pleasure carriages, were demanded for the same purpose.

In assessing the contributions, every principle of distributive justice was abandoned, and they were levied according to the caprice of the collector. One of the Proconsuls pretended that a part of this country had not received him with the respect due to the representative of a great people: they were immediately ruined by extraordinary contributions.

It is well known, that under the old government the impositions on Brussels always exceeded those on Antwerp in the proportion of ten to seven. With us, however, this last town was taxed double the sum of the first, though the people of Antwerp received us with a cordiality which deserved better treatment. They sent us the keys of the town before we had fired a shot, and opened their gates to us as friends and deliverers.

liverers. They received the assignats at par, and gave up all the merchandise in their possession.

This honorable conduct did not prevent us from burthening them with a tax so exorbitant, that they were unable to pay it. When they had parted with all their gold and silver, they offered the assignats which they had taken at par, but that payment was rejected. All the inhabitants of any property were taken for hostages one after the other. Though the fort which served for their prison was within two days journey of Antwerp, they were, with a refined cruelty, sent by the serpentine windings of the Scheldt and the Lys. This made a voyage of three weeks before they reached Fort Scarpe, in which they were long doomed to languish, and were irrevocably ruined.

It is to be observed, that all the weight of the contributions fell on the people who placed confidence in the French, and waited until we arrived; for the rich aristocrats had all fled. It was proposed, that the property of the absentees should pay their share of the war-tax, and nothing could have been more just; but our Proconsuls replied, that their property was already confiscated for the Republic, and could not be substituted as payment for a tax. What injustice!

injustice! you obliged people to take your assignats at par, and, when they would return them, you tell them they are worth nothing. Must not such conduct occasion the fall of this sign of specie, and for ever dishonour the government that put it in practice? But knaves are not always politicians.

In the midst of these troubles and disorders, we spoke only of virtue, justice, and probity. We declared to the universe that we had only taken arms to defend our liberty, and to deliver our neighbours from the oppression of tyrants. It was ourselves however who with fire and sword spread desolation and despair among the people whose friendship we should have been desirous of obtaining, and among whom we wished to diffuse our systems. What horrible policy!

The tribunals of blood sentenced every day a number of citizens to death, under the pretext that they had disrespected the Convention. What could be more likely to bring it into contempt, than the extravagant acts of its agents? It was at this time the rage of the Proconsuls with the armies and in the departments to declaim against a disrespect of the Convention, though that august

and

and powerful senate could only be despised for the ignorance and perversity of the members it put in action.

It must be acknowledged, that there were some whose conduct deserved the highest praise, and others who were deceived by their political enthusiasm. This error might be pardoned, but those who were really dishonest, are highly criminal, and merit the execration of all Frenchmen. History will one day make its proper selection. I leave to posterity the exposure of the criminal, and shall always make it a duty not to abuse individuals.

The destruction of their religion, and the indecent profanation of every thing they had been taught to venerate, was a persecution still more sensibly felt, by the unhappy Belgians, than all their other sufferings.

It was this religious people who formed the generous plan of rescuing all the Netherlands from the Spanish tyranny, and it was in the neighbourhood of Ghent that the first effort towards accomplishing this grand object was made. The Batavians offered them a religion nearly similar to their own, but they had such repugnance to any change

change that they abandoned the party of the House of Nassau, and preferred the yoke of Spain. Our new politicians abolished a received religion, and put nothing in its place. Could they then expect to be more successful than the Batavians?

The Belgians are, by the prejudices of their education, strongly attached to the religion of their ancestors. In vain do our philosophers tell them that this religion is altogether founded in error; that their priests preach only absurdities, and deceive them with notorious falsehoods. The Fleming replies with that phlegm so natural to him—"What you say is perhaps true; but the "belief which you regard as an error, forms the "foundation of my happiness, and affords me "hope in adversity and distress. You must be a "barbarian if you wish to force me to resign this "error, and you have no right to deprive me of "it." What answer can our mimic philosophers make to a reply so simple and ingenuous?

The Proconsuls of the mountain took a deal of pains in drawing up long arrêts to convince the people that death was ETERNAL SLEEP: but they made few converts. The slave of early and deep-rooted prejudices, which are strongly supported

ported by the natural desire of continuing animal life, man, every where, dreads annihilation, and even at the moment of dissolution is more desirous than ever of perpetuating his existence. Priests, of all religions, by holding out to him the prospect of another and a happier form of being, have seized on this selfish principle of human nature, and employed it to consolidate their dominion over mankind.

Religion has always been the most powerful instrument of the legislator; and even, though founded in error, it has sometimes served to reconcile the people to the paying obedience to the laws, and to the performance of their duties. All men, till the present time, who have wished to establish a society, or to change a form of government, have begun by making or adopting a religion. The Romans preserved their conquests by receiving into their Pantheon the gods of all the conquered people, but we try to enlarge and give stability to ours, by condemning the religious prejudices of every nation. Prejudices though they be, the skilful legislator should manage them with address, and endeavour to turn them to the advantage of society. Of prejudices some are perhaps useful, some are pernicious, and many produce neither good nor evil. The first

class ought to be respected; the last tolerated; it is the second alone that should be extirpated. If, however, they are too strongly rivetted, they must be attacked with prudence. Information ought always to precede any bold attempt to remove them. The use of money is doubtless a prejudice. It is accompanied with much inconvenience, and is even injurious to nations by introducing and facilitating corruption. The legislator however, who should prohibit its circulation, would prove himself the most stupid of mankind. He would produce a famine in his country, and occasion the inevitable dissolution of the social body.

Legislators, you have regarded religion as a prejudice, and though that gave you no right to destroy it, you decreed its abolition, but substituted nothing in its place. You are the first who have undertaken to govern a great people without employing this powerful lever. The experiment has not succeeded, and in the practice of government every experiment which does not succeed is a crime. The religion of the country was drawn from one of the most ancient social codes ever adopted by man. The preservation of that civil and political liberty, which ends precisely where licentiousness begins, is one of its fundamental

fundamental principles; and it inculcates civil equality in every page. You who have at last acknowledged perfect political equality to be the creature of the imagination, ought to consider that the grand maxim of this religion—OBEDIENCE TO THE EXISTING POWER—may now prove your palladium, and the same man, who in consequence of this precept obeyed the ancient government, will obey much more cheerfully our new laws, and will respect their organs, so long as they are guided by wisdom, and seek to promote the happiness of their fellow-citizens.

When you abolished religion, you pretended that its ministers conspired against the new government. It is probable that some of those whom banishment had exasperated may have returned to la Vendée, and hoped for vengeance from the rebellion of that country; but these were only a part of this class. It is certain that none of those who remain on the territory of the Republic ever engaged in any conspiracy. If they had, your duty would have been to punish the criminal only. You ought never to confound a religion with its ministers. It is sufficient if we place no confidence in empirics; but who would proscribe medicine because there are some ignorant physicians?

People of Belgium ! the evils which you have experienced were the work of some profligate men covered with opprobrium and crimes. Impute not the ravages they occasioned to the French nation. We were like you the victims of their fury. You have been oppressed by them, it is true, but we shall sufficiently indemnify you by the opening of the Scheldt, which will do more than restore all the riches that have been ravished from you. Conduct yourselves with wisdom and all your wounds will soon be closed to open no more. No longer an intermediate state between us and the powers who wish to rival us, your territory will never again be made the theatre of ambition, and an eternal peace will raise you to the highest pitch of prosperity. Consider that your political existence is closely connected with ours, and that you cannot separate from us without exposing yourselves to destruction. A government perfectly organised arises from the wreck of anarchy. It will establish itself on the eternal basis of justice, and while it forms our happiness will lay the foundation of yours. If you know your own interest, you will cover with an impenetrable veil all the evils that are passed, and we shall be for ever united.

CHAP.

CHAP. XVI.

Military Principles of General Pichegru.

IT cannot have escaped the attention of the reader, that General Pichegru did not conduct this war on the ordinary tactics. His system was altogether new. It consisted in acting incessantly upon the offensive; in pressing the enemy without affording them opportunity of repairing disasters; in seeking occasions to engage, and planning movements to compel the enemy to fight; and in concentrating the armies in the field and never sitting down before a strong place, the possession of which was not absolutely necessary to the security of further operations.

This system was not only peculiarly adapted to the situation of France at that period, but was perfectly congenial to the French character. It will not now be doubted that our troops possessed great courage; but at that time, the armies

were composed chiefly of new levies, who were far from being sufficiently exercised in the operations of sieges to undertake any of considerable difficulty, with a prospect of success. And to this it is to be added, that the character of the French soldiery is too ardent to execute enterprizes that demand great constancy and perseverance. They are eager in action; but a long and difficult siege cools, and often discourages them.

To form an army that shall be equally calculated for all occasions, it would be necessary to join the Swiss with Frenchmen; the former to undergo the fatigues of sieges, and the latter to form armies of observation and action. But while we command Frenchmen, we must not let them languish in one position; we must keep their fiery spirits employed; and we must never lose sight of the enemy.

If General Pichegru had followed the orders of the Committee of Public Safety; if he had not penetrated the French character; if he had not formed a system for himself, he would have sacrificed at least 50,000 men before our towns in Hainault, whom he has spared. He would

have been even subject to defeats and disasters; and if he had triumphed, he unquestionably would not have pushed his conquests to the North Sea, and to the frontiers of Westphalia. I am persuaded, that the whole of our battles in the open field, together with all the petty engagements of posts, did not cost France more than 15,000 men. But the siege of Valenciennes alone, if pushed with the vigour that would be necessary if it were a leading operation in the campaign, would have destroyed 50,000 men.

The King of Prussia was the only one among the allies who understood the value of the plans of General Pichegru, and who did justice to their glory. In the earlier part of the campaign, this Monarch wrote in the following terms to the Emperor: "It will be impossible to cover your territories from invasion. The French have armies that are daily renewing; and, it is not to be disguised, that their Generals pursue an incomparable plan of operations, which disconcerts and defeats all our projects."

Success has added all that was wanting to make the plans of our Generals as complete in glory,

as they were sound in principle. In military concerns, as in the administration of civil affairs, the vulgar view nothing but the result, and every measure is condemned which is not successful. But it is base to be governed in opinion by events: the solidity of principles are to be examined: and if these be good, they are to be applauded, although the projects which are formed on them be defeated by circumstances that no human penetration can perceive. Had Pichegru been unsuccessful in his campaigns, his tactics would not have utterly failed of admiration from men of military talent. These would have said of him, as the Germans say of Clairfait: "He is a great General; but he is not fortunate." If Pichegru had been as unsuccessful as Clairfait, the Jacobins would have sent him to the scaffold. The Germans are more humanized.

The French armies proceeded into the enemy's territory, leaving Condé, Valenciennes, and le Quesnoy behind them, and in the possession of the allies; and notwithstanding those places, deprived of the support of the enemy's armies, fell, as it were of themselves, into our hands. In passing the Meuse, we left behind us the enemy's garrisons of Sas-de-Gand, Hulst, and

and Axel in Flanders, and Bergen-op-Zoom and Breda in Dutch Brabant. It was expected that these places would fall without much sacrifice on our part; and the event speedily justified the expectation.

CHAP. XVII.

Passage of the Meuse by two Divisions of the Army of the North: Engagement between the English Army and the Division of Souham.

THE future operations of the army being supported by the possession of Bois-le-Duc, the troops advanced to the Lower Meuse, in order to pass that river, to force the enemy to retreat behind the Waal, and to complete the investment of Grave. It was necessary that this last place should make part of our line on the Meuse. And these measures were indispensable for the purpose of supporting the left wing of the army of the Sambre and the Meuse, by the right of the army of the North.

The divisions of Generals Bonneau and Souham passed the Meuse on the 27th of Vendémiaire (*October* 19), in the neighbourhood of Teffelen. The enemy offered no opposition to the passage, but prepared to receive us in the environs of Puffleck.

The

The passage was designed to have taken place some days earlier than it was effected; but we had no more than ninety pontoons to cover one hundred toises of water. We were, therefore, compelled to send in search of boats along the banks of the river, which not only delayed the construction of the bridge, but rendered it less solid and secure. Owing to the repairs that were at almost every instant requisite, the passage occupied twenty-four hours. One of the demi-brigades did not pass till the following day.

The roads through which we had to advance were composed of strong clay; and, being very wet, they rendered the march extremely tedious. And this inconvenience was aggravated by a heavy fog, which penetrated through the cloaths as completely as rain. We could not reach the enemy in time to attack them on that day. The men passed the night without quarters. They had been without bread for four days; and had not had a moment given them to prepare their ordinary repast (*soup*) for eight and forty hours. In this condition, it was natural to expect murmurs from them, at least against the commissaries of the army. But not a word escaped them. They were impatient only for the appearance of morning. At the break of day, they rushed to the

the engagement, and fought incessantly the whole day. Almost every individual performed acts of heroism, the remembrance of which ought to persuade the enemies of France that she is invincible.

The nations of Europe have reproached France with crimes that were committed by a mere knot of profligate men; and do they withhold their admiration from our brave troops? The nation was in our armies, or in dungeons—not in the clubs, or in the departments of government. For a period, authority was usurped by desperate men; but where is the nation which can wash its hands of such?

This engagement had so great an influence on the affairs of the campaign, that it deserves to be detailed with considerable minuteness. It prepared the way to the reduction of Nimeguen, to the complete investment of Grave, and, of consequence, to the conquest of the United Provinces.

To prevent our penetrating into this country, the enemy were entrenched in a position upon the banks of the Meuse and those of the Waal, with one of their flanks covered by Apeltern,

and the other by Druter. The ground which lies between the banks of these two rivers is lower than the bed of either river. It is an immense meadow, intersected with deep and wide ditches, filled with mud and stagnant water. The enemy's front was protected by the canal of Oudeveteringuen, whose bank commands the whole meadow: and from this canal to Druter ran a dyke of the same elevation as the bank of the canal. This formidable line was strengthened with entrenchments and batteries, and was filled with the infantry of the English and the Emigrants, and a great body of cavalry.

An impartial historian will be ready to acknowledge that on this, and many other occasions, the dispositions of the enemy for the purposes of defence were made with great skill. The same observation is to be made of their dispositions for retreat on every occasion. That which the English were compelled to make after this affair was deserving of the highest praise. It demanded uncommon foresight and precaution: and it may be justly said that no means of safety were neglected. I have already spoken of the ditches which intersected the meadow. These were usually from eight to ten feet in breadth: and over each there were several bridges placed at certain

certain distances. The retreat of the enemy was made in such good order, that these bridges were every where broken down after them.

Independent of the means of defence which I have above stated, the enemy had rendered the roads almost impracticable by a number of abattis and broad ditches. Our troops advanced in four columns. The main body, consisting of the two strongest of the columns, crossed the meadow; and a column, consisting of 2500 men, marched along the banks of the Waal; and the remaining column, composed of the same number, along the banks of the Meuse.

The attack, which commenced at the break of day, lasted till eight o'clock in the evening. The two columns which advanced through the meadow had to cross the canal of Oudeveteringuen, and the passage was disputed with great fury. After some discharges of artillery, the 3d and 24th demi-brigades charged with the bayonet. Their impatience was so great, that they leapt into the canal and crossed it, although the water reached to their shoulders. A detachment of the 5th regiment of chasseurs followed to support them. The enemy being disconcerted by this impetuosity gave way, and seemed solicitous

tous only to save their cannon : but as the number of the troops who had passed the canal was not sufficient to pursue them, and it was some time before the whole of the two columns could pass, they retreated in good order.

The success of the column which proceeded along the Waal was more rapid. The 9th regiment of hussars, the 30th division of the gendarmerie, and the 1st battalion of light infantry, under the command of the chief of brigade Bonhomme, fell upon the 37th regiment of the English foot, and took the whole regiment with their two pieces of cannon.

Citizen Minier, a hussar of the 9th regiment, broke through the English ranks, killed one of the ensigns of the regiment, and carried off the colours. The bold actions of a similar nature which were performed by our troops are numerous. An account of many of them have been sent to a committee charged with the publication of them ; but they seem to have been lost in some of the offices. Much cannot be said however for the patriotism of this negligence.

General Fox was taken by one of our hussars while he attempted to rally the 37th regiment : but

but his horse being superior to that of the hussar he afterward escaped. A considerable detachment of hussars belonging to the Emigrants surrounded a corps of the French hussars of the 9th regiment, and expected to carry them off prisoners; but the latter, charging them with great impetuosity, broke through their ranks, and joined their comrades.

On the side next the Meuse, Jardon, (7) General of Brigade, fell, with the 3d regiment of hussars, on the legion of Rohan, composed almost entirely of Emigrants, whom he totally cut to pieces, with the exception of no more than fixty that he made prisoners. In this quarter, it was Frenchmen that fought with Frenchmen, and who were mutually exasperated. The carnage may be therefore imagined.

The first division of the army of the North, one of the most numerous and formidable of the French armies, had never yet made a retrograde movement. We are indebted to this division, and the division under Moreau, for our greatest victories. The latter was charged with a variety of sieges, and the former with the important care of observing the enemy. Neither the one nor the other

other ever miscarried in any enterprize that was committed to them. In this engagement, the first division displayed a vivacity and constancy that has rarely been equalled. If these patriots had resembled the patriots at home, they would have expended their zeal in declamations against the conduct of those whose duty it was to provide for the wants of the army, and instead of marching against the enemy would have halted to denounce their commissaries. The allies would have snatched this moment to have routed them. But our brave troops were of another mould. They saw that to lessen their wants there remained no way but to engage and beat the enemy. They reasoned and acted as became patriots.

Nimeguen was the only post which remained in the hands of the enemy by which they could advance upon our armies. It was therefore necessary to make ourselves masters of that place for the purposes of securing the positions of the two armies upon the Rhine and the Waal, of covering the siege of Grave, and of giving an opportunity of placing the troops in cantonments with safety. For these reasons, although the season was far advanced, the troops approached Nimeguen; and on the 6th of Brumaire *(October* 28), it

it was partially invested: and after the victory of Puffleck the investment of Grave was completed by detachments that took positions at Wickem and Boninguen.

CHAP.

CHAP. XVIII.

Siege of Venloo: Capitulation of that Place: Taking of Maëstricht, Coblentz, and Rheinfeld: Taking of Nimeguen.

THE siege of Venloo, the conduct of which was confided to General Laurent, is among the remarkable transactions of the campaign. I have been assured, that this General had not more than 4,000 men under his command on this occasion; and those who are acquainted with the strength of Venloo, and to whom the difficulties of a siege are known, will perceive that it required great boldness to succeed in this enterprize, with means so seemingly inadequate. This service was nevertheless performed by General Laurent.

He commenced by opening his trenches at no greater distance than a hundred toises from the covered way. The enemy were utterly disconcerted by this audacity. Our musquetry silenced the artillery of the besieged. We then erected

batteries; and although they were mounted only with field pieces, the garrison was summoned to surrender. They were unwilling to give up the place, and made a sortie, but were vigorously repulsed. Intimidated by the nearness of our works, and the vigour with which they were pressed, they at length capitulated, and our troops entered the place on the 5th of Brumaire *(October 27)*.

The gallantry displayed in this siege excited very little attention at Paris. It will not be difficult to develope the reasons. The policy of the Committee of Public Safety was of so fierce and unrelenting a nature, that the Generals dreaded its rage. Some of these sought their security in exaggerating their success; and others in concealing, as much as possible, their glory. The army of the North preferred this last course. It is observable that Pichegru always confined himself in his dispatches to an account of the result of his operations, avoiding the detail of circumstances which constituted the great portion of his glory. This General seems to have penetrated perfectly into the character of the government of that period.

But

But although this achievement, which was conducted with equal boldness and skill, passed unnoticed at that time, it nevertheless merits our admiration; and none but such patriots as the Proconsuls could with-hold their praise either from those who directed this enterprize, or those by whom it was executed.

I was unfortunately little acquainted with the officers of the engineer corps or of the artillery. I regret that I cannot give my reader their names, nor recite the particular instances of the great services they rendered the Republic. The various works they constructed, whether for defence or before strong places, merit to be carefully detailed; but being myself little informed on this subject, I am unequal to the task. Had I foreseen that I should write this history, I should not certainly have left myself so unqualified. Citizen Dejean, General of the engineers, was a man remarkable at once for his knowledge in his profession and his amenity; and it would have afforded him pleasure to furnish me with materials for this part of my history. I had sometimes conversations with this accomplished soldier relative to some of our works, and I have reason to believe he would not have been reluctant in furnishing me with a minute account of the operations of his

corps. But the usefulness of this acquisition escaped my observation.

I am not acquainted with the particular services of General Marescot of the engineers, nor General Heblé of the artillery; but those officers enjoy the universal esteem of the troops, and have the reputation of having rendered very important services to the armies.

General Pichegru was afflicted with a cutaneous disorder, contracted by the fatigues of the compaign, and the custom of sleeping in his cloaths. It compelled him to quit the troops while they were before Nimeguen, and to proceed to Brussels for advice. During his absence, General Moreau took the command of the army; but Pichegru corresponded with that General and with Jourdan, and aided them with his counsel.

It cost Louis XIV. thirteen days, and Louis XV. three weeks, to take Maëstricht. General Kleber made himself master of that important fortress on the 14th of Brumaire (*Nov.* 5.), eleven days after the trenches were opened before it. On the two former occasions, our greatest poets celebrated the glory of the siege; the pencils of our best painters have been employed on the same subject. Yet

Yet Kleber is scarcely known. We ought to enquire what is the cause of the present apathy: and what excited that eagerness which was displayed to immortalise the two Monarchs? Doubtless, it was, that those Sovereigns had wealth and places to confer; and that our Generals were destitute of this power. But there will come a time, it is to be expected, when the actions of our Generals will be more admired and more celebrated than those of Alexander or Cæsar. But we must first become *Republicans:* that is to say, we must become more enlightened and virtuous.

About the time that Kleber made himself master of Maëstricht, Coblentz and Rheinfeld were taken by the right wing of the army of the Sambre and the Meuse. And the army of the Rhine having advanced into the Palatinate, Mentz was the only place in the possession of the enemy on the left bank of the Rhine. Well informed politicians say, that a peace is to be formed only in Mentz. It is to be hoped our brave troops will procure it in that place. Every nation has need of it; and every nation begins to desire its blessings.

The investment of Nimeguen could not be completed without the possession of the left bank

of the Waal. The English army, amounting to 38,000 men, were encamped on that side, and the communication was open to them, by means of a bridge of boats, as well as a flying bridge, to throw succours into the place at their pleasure. The fortifications of that place were in the best order. Its advanced works, or, as they were called, the lines of the place, were furnished with heavy cannon and with mortars. These lines covered the ramparts, and formed, in fact, an entrenched camp. Beside these disadvantages, a circular line of *trous de loup**, very deep, and at a short distance from the batteries, surrounded the whole place, and prevented our cavalry from acting.

To drive the English from their position, it would be necessary to cross the Waal with 30,000 men; beside the difficulties of the passage, which were great, the inundations of the water might cut off the communication of this corps with the army, and, in case of repulse, might expose it to destruction.

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* This is a military term for which we have no adequate word or phrase. They are wide and deep ditches, which have sharp stakes planted at the bottom, and being covered over with branches of trees, and earth thrown upon the branches, are very dangerous snares for the cavalry.

The

The success of this siege was therefore deemed very uncertain. General Souham, to whose conduct it was committed, regarded this service as a vengeance exercised against him by the Representatives of the People, whom he had always treated with a marked indifference. In a short time, the persuasion of the miscarriage of the enterprize became so general, that orders were given for a desperate assault on the whole of the lines, as the only resource. The necessity of this dangerous attack was prevented by the fortune of our troops, and the terror with which their reputation had inspired the enemy.

At each extremity of the half moon formed by our troops, was constructed a very heavy battery. Both of these directed their fire upon the bridge of boats and the flying bridge, which preserved the communication between the English and the fortress. Our artillery succeeded in sinking several of the boats that sustained the bridge. The English in Nimeguen were so alarmed by the skill of our artillery, that in the night of the 17th of Brumaire *(Nov.* 8.) they repaired the bridge, evacuated the town, and drawing the bridge to the right bank of the river, burnt it, and left the Dutch troops to defend themselves.

The Dutch garrison being too weak to hold the place, fell into great disorder. Part of them embarked on the flying bridge; but the cable by which it was worked being cut by our shot, or broken by the weight of the troops, they could not effect their passage. At this instant, the gates of the town were opened to us, and our troops proceeded to seize upon the bridge, in order to make the Dutch soldiers prisoners.

It cannot be passed by in silence, that, while the Dutch troops landed from the bridge, the English fired upon them as well as upon our soldiery. These islanders had already committed a dishonorable action in withdrawing the bridge and burning it, before the Dutch garrison could effect its retreat: and they completed their perfidy in firing upon their allies, and comrades.

The troops of the Republic were by no means called upon to grant terms of capitulation to the small garrison which remained in Nimeguen, for they were already in our power. But General Souham, fearing that the town would be regarded

as

as being taken by assault, and delivered up to pillage, made a form of capitulation, consisting of one single article, which declared that the garrison should immediately lay down their arms on the glacis, and be made prisoners of war.

In the official reports of the Representatives, relative to the surrender of Nimeguen, they stated that they enemy were induced to evacuate the place by the taking of fort Scheneck, which opened to us the passage of the Waal. These ignorant men were not informed that this fort is no longer, as formerly, on the right bank of the Rhine. They did not know that, during a flood, this river changed its bed in this place; and that the ruins of the fort are at present on the left bank, and are of no importance. But provided they treated, in their reports, the enemy as cowards and slaves, and made a sufficient number of those slaves bite the dust, and that this slaughter was effected with the loss of no more than two or three Republicans, the report was made in due order, and was perfectly well received.

These ridiculous phrases, however, had better given place to exact details. To avoid contempt, it would have been well for our Proconsuls to have visited the spot, concerning which they had to make their report. But they affected to be infallible; and this presumption led them into a great many absurdities which gave infinite diversion to the armies.

CHAP.

CHAP. XIX.

Destitute Condition of the Troops at the Time of their entering Nimeguen: necessity of their Cantonment: Expedition against the Isle of Bommel: this Expedition abandoned: Investment of Breda: Evacuation of the Towns of Dutch Flanders.

IT is not possible to form any just idea of the circumstances of the troops when they entered Nimeguen, without having seen them. While our brave troops gathered eternal laurels, they were subject to every species of inconvenience, being actually covered with rags, and in the most deplorable condition. An uninterrupted service of seven months had reduced their cloathing to a miserable state. There were many who would have equipped themselves with new cloathing at their own expence; but long even before the places in which these could be obtained were taken, the requisition of cloth was perfectly digested, and when our soldiers marched into

into a town, they could not buy as much as would repair their worn-out garments. No one had a chance to wear a whole coat that was not one of the agents of commerce, or one of the members of the requisition.

The situation of the officers was still worse, for being entitled to no cloathing from the government, they had no way left to procure any.

The Generals bore very impatiently the excuses that were made on every occasion when cloathing was due to the soldiers, and even when the troops were willing to pay for them. Souham drove from Nimeguen all the members of the requisition; he even threatened to throw them into prison if he found any of them within the town. The Representatives, it was said, were displeased with this measure: but they, nevertheless, condescended, and perhaps for the first time, to act contrary to their inclination. They appointed certain places at which cloth was delivered to the officers for ready money: and a great part of them had, at last, an opportunity of being tolerably well cloathed.

But the soldiers suffered long after this from the want of stockings, shoes, and in short every part

part of their dress. Although the cold began to be very sharp, it was by no means uncommon to see a sentinel with the sleeves of his coat hanging in shreds, without any hat or cap, and obliged to cover himself with the sack in which he carried some of his necessaries. Nor was he and his comrades much better provided with respect to provisions; so that the degree of his distress is scarce to be credited.

Notwithstanding this deplorable state of the troops, our Proconsuls, well cloathed, sitting in rooms well warmed, and accommodated with abundance of every thing, projected an expedition against the isles of Bommel and Bethuwen, instead of consulting the repose of the troops, and providing for their wants.

If this enterprize had been practicable, other considerations might have given way to its utility; but the execution of it was impossible, and the Representatives are not easily to be pardoned for resisting the advice of our most experienced officers with invincible obstinacy.

Moreau, Reunier, and the other Generals, represented to them, that the troops were in need of repose, and after undergoing such severe services,

vices, and experiencing so many privations, it was time to give them cantonments; that part of the winter ought to be employed in equiping them, and re-organizing them; that, in the mean time, boats might be constructed, and materials collected to make the bridges that would be necessary; and that the spirits and vigour of the troops being recruited, they might support new fatigues. Finally, they exposed the numerous obstacles which must be encountered in the passage of the Waal and the Rhine. All these considerations seemed unimportant to rhe Proconsuls: their sagacity removed all difficulties.

It is certain that the passage of the Waal presented obstacles which were at that time insurmountable. That river is very broad, and we had only a few small boats for the construction of a bridge; the rain had fallen in great quantities; and the roads were so bad, it was impossible to bring up the artillery for the expedition. If the passage was even executed, contrary to all appearance, the two rivers might fill with ice, and close all communication between Nimeguen and the isles; and thus the troops employed on the expedition be cut off from all reinforcement, and even subsistence, and given up to the mercy of the enemy.

The Proconsuls decreed the expedition; and the Generals had no way left but to obey.

It has been said, General Daëndels (8) undertook to effect the passage, and pledged his head for the success of the expedition. There is no doubt of the great value of this officer; but the lives of a great many brave soldiers who perished before Fort Saint-André, in consequence of this rash enterprise, were more precious to the Republic. It was, moreover, a dangerous experiment to attend to the advice of one General against the opinion of all the rest; although an example of this kind of policy was already given in the Convention by its being governed by its own minority.

General Daëndels, being the only officer who adopted this expedition, had made silent preparations for its execution. He had assembled at Crevecœur, and on the left side of the Meuse, a number of boats to transport the infantry to the Isle of Bommel; and at Bois-le-duc there were materials for constructing a bridge.

Not far from Kokerdun, a little above Nimeguen, there were a number of boats upon the Waal sufficient to hold 300 infantry. But there were

were no means of conducting the cavalry and artillery to the attack.

This point would have sustained a serious attack, but Moreau ordered only a feint to be made there, on account of the difficulties of the passage in that quarter. He made a feint also on the fort of Saint-André; and the main attack was directed against the Isle of Bommel. General Daëndels was charged with the execution of this last part of the expedition; and it could not be confided to better hands, for he was perfectly acquainted with the position against which he was to act. He was not long in discovering his error; and perceiving that his zeal had drawn him into an unfortunate undertaking, he was the first to propose that it should be abandoned.

The 21st of Frimaire *(December* 12), was the day fixed upon for the commencement of this expedition. The false attack in the neighbourhood of Kokerdun was tolerably successful. Four companies of grenadiers passed the Waal in boats, made a Hanoverian major prisoner, and spiked four pieces of cannon. But they were speedily very glad to reimbark precipitately, for that post was reinforced, and our troops were attacked by very superior numbers. And this was a proof

a proof that a serious attempt upon that quarter would have been disastrous.

The attack upon Fort Saint-André was returned by a sharp and well-directed fire, which killed a great number of our men. The soldiers who fall in war are to be lamented: but the loss is still more afflicting when it is not demanded by the public service.

As to the main attack, which was directed against Bommel, General Daëndel soon perceived its utter inefficacy. He represented to General Moreau, that the project must be abandoned, since he could not act without his troops being too greatly exposed to the fire of the enemy. Moreau was not surprised at this information, and he gave immediate orders for the retreat of the troops.

The army now obtained a repose of some days, and its situation demanded that this should be prolonged throughout the whole winter. But it was not long before the frost became extremely severe, and the rivers were so completely frozen over, that the troops could pass over upon the ice. Pichegru did not permit this great opportunity to escape him.

It was his original design to winter the troops on this side the Waal; but, in order to prepare for the opening of the ensuing campaign, by the taking of some important place, he had determined to invest Breda with some of his winter cantonments. He therefore ordered the division of General Bonneau (9), which was cantoned in the territory of Bas-Waal, to march on the 27th of Frimaire (*Dec.* 18), for the purpose of forming the blockade of Breda, in junction with the division of le Maire. And the investment of that place was completed on the 1st of Nivôse (*Dec.* 28).

Being masters of Nimeguen, we had no longer reason to fear that the enemy would attempt the passage of the Waal, and endeavour to relieve Grave. We might have, therefore, pressed the siege of this place, although very strong, and in a perfect state of defence. Being left to the strength of its own garrison, it could not have held out. But this siege would have proved very bloody; and the inundations of the Meuse might have even rendered our works useless. The Commandant of the place was a brave man, and could not be expected to surrender till he should be reduced to extremity. Cut off from all succour, it could not fail, however, to fall into

into our hands before the end of winter; and a little patience would save us a great deal of blood. We were, therefore content to keep it blockaded, and to throw a few bombs into the fortress. The event proved the wisdom of this plan; for Grave was compelled to surrender without any sacrifice on our part.

It had been already foreseen, that the Dutch would be obliged to evacuate the towns in Flanders, for the purpose of reinforcing their army with these garrisons. This event fell out accordingly; and General Michaud took possession of those places in the course of the month of Frimaire.

The Austrians no longer occupied any post on the left bank of the Lower Rhine. They had, however, thrown up entrenchments at Burick, opposite Wesel, which might have served to cover a passage. They were driven from this position with some loss on their part, on the 19th of Brumaire *(Nov.* 19), insomuch that during the time of our troops being in cantonments, we received no molestation from the enemy. The Rhine was the boundary between us.

Previous to our entering Gueldres, the Representative Richard left us. Richard visited the armies accompanied only by his secretary, and lived with the officers on terms of friendship, conducting himself on his mission with great moderation and equity. The persons by whom he was replaced, appeared with sumptuous equipages, and carried themselves with a pride that excited universal disgust. They seemed to ape the Roman Proconsuls. But that which gave most offence to the officers who bore the brunt of the day, was to see them attended always by adjutant-generals, who served for a body-guard to them. And this circumstance adds one more proof to the many already existing, that, under every government, there are men who would rather advance themselves by servility and adulation, than by the hardships of the field.

I have heard that one of the Proconsuls, whom I do not know, and certainly have no desire to know, struck down a soldier with the broad side of his sabre upon the glacis of Nimeguen, for having changed some part of his arms with one of the prisoners. He must have confided greatly in the terror created by the guillotine, to have committed this rash act. But the *Mountain*, while they cried out against despotism, were a thousand times more despotic than the tyrant of

Morocco. They spoke only of equality, and equality had no greater enemies than themselves. They affected to glory in the appellation of *sans-culottes*; but this name, for which they appeared to have so much complaisance, was no more than a pretext to cover depredation; and instead of being seen as heretofore on foot, they never condescended to move without splendid carriages. If this be patriotism, what name shall hereafter be given to robbery? If the pretended disciples of equality use this word only to raise themselves at the expence of others, and above them, how shall we ever expect that equality will establish itself in France.

CHAP. XX.

Pichegru again assumes the Command of the Armies: The intense Frost enables him to cross the Rivers: Taking of the Isle of Bommel: Capitulation of Grave: Blockade of Heusden.

GENERAL Pichegru became impatient of inaction, and regretted the necessity of remaining at Brussels for cure of his disorder. But when he saw that the severity of the season would furnish him with an opportunity of executing his design of invading Holland, he joined the army, although his cure was not perfected.

In the preceding year, this General had gathered no mean experience of a winter campaign. His great successes on the Upper Rhine are perfectly known. But all that he effected on the side of Weissembourg might have been accomplished in any season. Nothing but a winter as severe as that of 1795 could have furnished the occasion of the brilliant actions which followed in this country.

The

The conquest of Holland may be generally considered as impracticable, on account of its immense waters. The whole country is intersected with lakes, rivers, and canals. The roads are raised upon dykes. These might be thrown down behind an army in an instant, and then its retreat would become, if not impossible, at least extremely difficult.

In times of extremity, the inhabitants of North Holland could destroy the dykes of that country, and lay all West Friesland, the province of Holland, and part of the province of Utrecht, under water. By cutting through the dykes of the rivers, the provinces of the East might be inundated, and the greatest obstacles thrown in the way of an invasion. But how far is it from being improbable, that the Stadtholder would have adopted these measures, however destructive they might prove, if we had made our invasion in the following spring? His predecessors had recourse to them against Louis XIV. And there can be no reason to suppose he would not have employed them against us.

Pichegru regarded this conquest as impracticable in ordinary weather. The inhabitants of Dutch Brabant were so persuaded of our miscar-

riage in this expedition, that, having told them we designed to proceed to the Zuiderzee, they gravely answered—" If you march there, not one " of you will return ; they will drown your " whole army !"

Notwithstanding these hazards, policy imperiously commanded the attempt, to detach this corner-stone from the Coalition, and to enable the army of the North to act and gather fresh laurels in another quarter. To secure these objects, required no less than the extraordinary and intense frosts which fortunately favoured us. When they arrived, it was seen how necessary it was to seize the opportunity, notwithstanding the condition of the troops and their want of further repose. If we had suffered this occasion to escape, we should have put all our success to new hazards.

The Dutch government immediately perceived their danger, and being now used to appreciate the prowess and the enterprize of our armies, made attempts to conclude a peace. But their propositions, although sufficiently advantageous for former circumstances, were by no means adequate to our present situation. They also demanded an armistice, but this demand wes rejected.

jected. In a word, the authority of the House of Nassau was gone: nothing could restore it.

This House had created a multitude of enemies in the country; and its latter usurpations had rendered the reigning Stadtholder odious.

In 1579, the Batavians had chosen a chief to guarantee themselves from the dominion of a master. The office of Stadtholder was cotemporary with the existence of the Dutch Republic. The power of this officer was confined to the direction of the forces both by sea and land. The dignity was elective, and subject to be suppressed. It had even been suppressed in the last century, during twelve years, that is to say, from 1660 to to 1672. The Batavians had expressly reserved the legislative, administrative, and judiciary authorities. But it is in vain that a people take precautions against a chief, when they are unwise enough to accept of one; in vain they divide and mark the limits of the several authorities, and reserve to themselves their rights in speculation: every chief has a natural tendency to become absolute when occasion offers, and, if he possess himself of the power, he speedily discovers the right of being a tyrant.

In

In 1747, the Stadtholder began to attack the constitution, by rendering the dignity hereditary to all his posterity, male and female. This usurpation could not fail to disgust a people jealous of their liberty: but it did not at that time occasion any disturbance.

In 1787, the late Stadtholder made an open and direct attempt upon all the civil and political liberties of Holland. Not content with being hereditary Governor-General, Captain-General, and High-Admiral, he resolved to direct the legislative and judiciary bodies. He so far succeeded, that there were neither legislators, magistrates, nor even burgomasters of the smallest villages, who were not appointed by him or his faction. The people rose against these usurpations. The King of Prussia marched troops into the country, who, according to the language of tyrants, reduced them to reason. The Stadtholder was stronger than the people; but his claims were not sanctified by his power. As long as he could suppress discontent by his power, he enjoyed his usurpation. But the moment the French appeared, he ceased to be the stronger party: the scaffolding that was the prop of his political existence fell, and drew down with it the authority of himself and his family.

From

From the birth of the Republic to the year 1747, the Batavians regarded their Stadtholders as the fathers of the country. From that last period, they were considered as its Kings. But in this latter chief, they had nothing but a tyrant. In this, is to be found the cause of his degradation: *and in this, is included a lesson to every chief of a nation who presumes to violate the constitution of his country.*

The degradation of the family of the Stadtholder is not worthy of our notice. But it is a question of great importance, whether the Dutch nation shall be sufficiently enlightened and courageous to shun its dangers. To this end, it is necessary that they imitate their brave ancestors; that they become soldiers; for a people who confide the defence of their liberties to mercenary troops, or to allies, are not far distant from slavery.

About the end of Frimaire, the Meuse was frozen over, and in several places the ice was sufficiently strong to enable us to pass it. The cold was more intense in the beginning of Nivôse, and the Waal was covered with a solid sheet of ice. Pichegru did not neglect to seize the opportunity which this presented, and orders for the passage were speedily given.

On

On the 7th of Nivôse *(December* 28), the brigades of General Daëndels and General Osten were ordered to pass the Meuse on the ice, and to march to the Isle of Bommel. All nature was bound up by a frost of unexampled severity. The republican soldiers alone preserved their activity. The Dutch, struck with terror by an attack so unexpected, opposed but a feeble resistance. The garrison of Fort St. André, astonished by the intrepidity of our troops, soon surrendered. Thus the reduction of Bommel and Fort Saint-André, which formerly would have been thought an operation of the greatest difficulty, was easily made, at a period when the thermometer was seventeen degrees below the freezing point. It seemed that the cold had benumbed the enemy's troops and invigorated ours.

On this occasion, we took 1600 prisoners, a great number of cannon, and other fire-arms.

Generals Bonneau and le Maire, whose divisions were cantoned around Breda, did not lose the opportunity which the frost afforded them. They made a vigorous attack on the lines of Breda, Oudesboch, and Sevenbergen, of which they soon made themselves masters. This manœuvre

nœuvre was very advantageous, and strengthened their position round Breda.

The town of Grave, that master-piece of fortification, being in total want of provisions and ammunition, was obliged to capitulate on the 8th of Nivôse *(December* 28).

Men of honour and courage, wherever they are found, claim our esteem, and the Governor of Grave merits the highest encomiums. That fortress had been blockaded on the side towards the left bank of the Meuse, from the commencement of the siege of Bois-le-Duc. It was completely invested on the 6th of Brumaire *(October* 28). This officer saw Nimeguen taken, and all the armies that could relieve him driven beyond the Rhine. Maestricht, Venloo, and all the places of strength on the left banks of the Rhine and the Meuse had been during more than two months in our possession. Though he was summoned several times to surrender, and the town was bombarded, he held out for two months completely surrounded by our battalions, and did not surrender until he had neither ammunition nor provisions. If the Stadtholder had placed men equally brave in all the fortresses, our conquests might perhaps have been less rapid.

The

The brave Salm's (9) division, which was employed in the investment of Grave, was no sooner freed from that duty than it marched for the Isle of Bommel. This movement took place on the 10th (*October* 31). The enemy still possessed the small fortress of Heusden on the left of the Meuse, which being completely blockaded in consequence of our entry into the Isle of Bommel, was not long before it surrendered.

In a few days after we had taken the Isle of Bommel and Fort St. André, the cold increased to such a degree that we were able to pass the Waal above Nimeguen. It was a grand spectacle to see our infantry, cavalry, and artillery, manœuvring on the rind of ice which covered this river with as much freedom as if they had been on solid ground. Posterity will scarcely believe this prodigy, and those who know the incumbrance of the carriages which must attend a great army will find many reasons to incline them to doubt. The fact is however notorious. The army with all its equipage passed this arm of the Rhine without either bridges or boats.

We previously took the precaution of sending some strong reconnoitring parties to the right bank of the Waal. There they established some

posts to protect the passage of the army, which was easily effected.

The armies of the allies were behind the Linge. The Prince of Orange had established his head-quarters at Gorcum, and his army was near that town. The English army extended from Culembourg, where the right wing was posted, to the canal of Panerden, which supported the left.

The corps of 25,000 Austrians commanded by General Alvinzi, and which was in the pay of England, formed a line from Arnheim to Wesel.

These troops would probably have been capable of resisting us in the spring, and might have prevented us from penetrating into Holland. They were perfectly concentrated; but torpor or cold had overpowered them, or the dread of our republican armies prevented them breaking many lances with us.

The Duke of York, who, after his attempt upon Dunkirk, had been continually beaten, was at last disgusted by so many defeats. Having no prospect of being more fortunate in Holland than in Flanders, he was unwilling to witness so many of our triumphs. He embarked therefore for England,

gland, deeply regretting that he had not been able to erase France from the map of Europe.

It is said that this Prince, undesignedly, rendered more service to France than to the coalition. It is asserted, that had it not been for him the campaign of 1793 would have been still more brilliant for our enemies, and that they would have carried their conquests still farther into France. The following are the grounds of this opinion.

It is well known, that when the enemy took possession of our first line of fortifications in Hainault, we were far from being in a condition to make a formidable resistance. The French nation was not yet inured to war, and had not received the grand impulsion of the Revolution. It is also known that our three first fortresses were taken in the name of the Emperor, which excited, if not the jealousy, at least the ambition of the English Prince. In the situation in which France then was, he believed that he had only to stoop and take up his prize. As Flanders, but particularly Dunkirk, had always excited the cupidity of England, he withdrew from the Austrian army for the purpose of making the conquest of that town in the name of his father. Dunkirk is not a

place

place of great strength. Its fortifications are merely composed of earth; and this town, which may be considered as an entrenched camp, could not have been expected to resist him: but it contained men whose courage supplied the place of ramparts, and all the fortifications which this place wanted. The issue of this enterprize is sufficiently known.

Many persons, well acquainted with military affairs, attribute our success, and the reverse of the enemy, to this false step of the Duke of York. It is not doubted that if the combined forces had remained united on the same point, they would have acted more efficaciously, and their first conquests would have been pushed much farther. But the plan of these powers was to divide France. Each Monarch wished to seize upon that territory which was most agreeable to him. This ruined the Coalition, and rendered all their schemes abortive.

He must be a dupe indeed who believes that the Emigrants or the Bourbons were at all considered in the views of the Coalition. Even if the leagued despots had attained their object, those rebels would have been nothing benefited. They would perhaps have formed a small kingdom

in the centre of France, and given it for a retreat to the son of Louis XVI. After his death subaltern employments would have been given in other countries to the French Princes and Emigrants. In a word, we would have been no longer Frenchmen. Such was the result which might have been expected to arise from this vast and perfidious plan. It may then be said that it was the ambition of the coalesced powers, and particularly their want of union, which preserved us from this unjust partition. The Duke of York was the first who, through jealousy or ambition, withdrew himself from the circle. Without pretending to too much gratitude, we must certainly consider ourselves obliged to him for having detached himself from his allies, and afforded us an opportunity of defeating him separately, which opened the way to our future successes. Tyrants! you are disappointed in your schemes of vengeance and ambition! You have lost the only opportunity you had of realising them, and we now smile at all your feeble efforts. As well may you hope to see the Seine unite with the Tagus as to find again a moment so favourable to your views.

On the 19th of Nivôse (*January* 9, 1795) a few days after the passage of the Waal by our troops, the

the brigade of General Devinther (10) and Souham's division, then commanded by Macdonald, took possession of Thiel, and pushed their reconnoitring parties as far as the Linge. General Salm also posted some troops on the river at Geldemanden and Meterra.

The passage of the Waal above Nimeguen presented far greater obstacles than had been experienced below that fortress. That part of the river was not completely frozen, and the enemy opposed more troops to us there than in any other quarter. Beside, the corps commanded by Alvinzi might have fallen upon our flank, which would have greatly embarrassed us. Notwithstanding all these difficulties, the passage was effected on the 21st of Nivôse *(January* 11). The brigades of Generals Vandamme and Compere, with the division commanded by Moreau, passed at Millinguen, and took a position on the canal of Pannerden, in order to cover the right of the army. The intrepid Jardon passed at Rokerdun-sur-Gente, and the skilful Reunier at Oie-sur-Bommel.

The success of these four brigades facilitated General Macdonald's passage at Nimeguen. He crossed the river with several companies of gre-

nadiers in small boats, and entered the fort of Knossembourg, which the enemy had evacuated. Here he took a temporary position.

The English opposed a feeble resistance to all our attacks. All the tricks and intrigues of which they are such perfect masters were at this time useless. They therefore did not attempt to contend with our troops, and hastened to withdraw from the scene of their humiliation and disgrace.

The Austrians were more firm, and fought more obstinately. They even returned several times to the charge, after having been beaten. Had it not been for the defection of the English, they would have made a more formidable resistance ; but they must have yielded at last to the courage of our republican heros. They were repulsed, and obliged to retreat. We took a multitude of prisoners, and found a vast number of artillery in the batteries on the dykes of the Waal. After this successful operation nothing could prevent the reduction of all the United Provinces.

CHAP. XXI.

Observations on the Political and Geographical Situation of Holland.

THE United Provinces form, beyond all comparison, the lowest and most flat country in Europe. They are chiefly composed of what the Flemings call a *polder*, which signifies land stolen from the water.

The eastern part is so little elevated above the level of the sea, that the eye scarcely distinguishes which way the rivers flow. Most of them have factitious beds, and the overflowing of their waters is prevented by dykes of great height and solidity.

The western part, particularly West Friezeland and the province of Holland, is still lower; for unless the dykes, which are kept in repair with great trouble and expence, be perfectly

sound, these two provinces would be soon swallowed up by the sea.

The Dutch had displeased a Turkish Emperor, who, in a moment of passion, expressed himself in the following manner:—" If these Merchants " offend me much farther, I shall send a corps " of pioneers to destroy their dykes, and make " the sea overflow all their country." Against no other state could a similar threat have been made. But every one knows the position of Holland, which enabled that country to arrest the conquests of Louis XIV. and almost drown the whole of his army, by making inundations.—I shall add no more to these geographical observations. To say that this is a country artificially formed, is saying all that is necessary.

The air of the United Provinces is pretty temperate; but it is humid, thick, and unhealthy. The water is disagreeable and impure. In general the country is fitter for the habitation of frogs than men. The soil of Holland is the worst in the world: none but the provinces of Utrecht and Gueldres produce sufficient grain for the consumption of the inhabitants. The other provinces have little more than some pasture-grounds. They make a great deal of butter and cheese,

cheese, which form the chief food of the Dutch, and are indeed their principal productions. Not more than two hundred years ago, the Batavians offered the sovereignty of their country to France or to England, and both these powers refused to accept the offer.

But a vast change must have since taken place in this country. These aquatic provinces are now covered with a number of beautiful and magnificent cities. It is more populous than France in proportion to its extent. Before the late invasion by our troops, it equalled in riches the most flourishing state of France. It was not to the productions of the soil, but to very different causes, that this country was indebted for its immense population and astonishing riches. It owed them to its commerce and manufactures, and to its East and West India Companies. Destroy all these causes of population, and Holland will be soon deserted. It requires only a short time, and no great efforts, to ruin a state which supports itself upon an artificial basis; but ages, joined to uncommon industry, are necessary to re-establish it. If the Batavian Convention does not possess more wisdom than our party of the Mountain, Holland is lost for ever.

Had it not been for the extraordinary efforts which England made to acquire a superiority over Holland, this Republic would have engrossed the greatest part of the commerce of the world. Though the neighbour of that people, who are chiefly employed in extending their commercial relations, whose conduct tends to crush the commerce of every other nation, and whose wars have always been undertaken for some mercantile object, Holland still preserved a trade so extensive as to excite the envy of that proud and avaricious island, and might be considered the second commercial power of Europe.

This state which, as I have already said, produces only butter and cheese, has, by its commerce, laid every country in the world under contribution. It is barren of wood, yet the ocean is covered with its vessels, and it sells, beside, a prodigious quantity of wood for shipbuilding to Portugal and Spain. It produces no grain, yet it exports great quantities to every part of Europe. There is not a vine in all the Republic, though its commerce in wine and brandy is most extensive. In a country so low, their can be no mines; but gold, silver, and every other metal, are found in greater abundance here than in any other state. In a word, to give

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an idea of the trade of Holland, would be to make a catalogue of every object of commerce.

It has been said of Holland, that Norway is its forest; the banks of the Rhine, the Garonne, the Dordogne, are its vineyards; Silesia, Poland, Saxony, Spain, and Ireland its sheepfolds; Pomerania, Prussia, and Poland its granaries; India and Arabia its gardens. This idea is far from being erroneous.

The Dutch carry on a direct and always lucrative commerce with all the nations of our continent. The sums paid to them for freight form one of their principal sources of profit; and for this reason they have been denominated the carriers of Europe. They gain still more by their ingenious manufactures. They import vast quantities of raw materials from foreign countries, which they return in various shapes, after having passed through the hands of their manufacturers and artists. But the exclusive commerce of spices, with which they supply all Europe, and the herring fishery, are the two objects which have elevated Holland to the highest point of riches and prosperity.

This

This Republic owed its astonishing progress in commerce to an excellent measure never adopted in France. The Council of State always admitted to its sittings, and carefully consulted well-informed merchants, who had travelled, and who joined to the theoretical principles of commerce, all that practice which is so indispensably necessary for the knowledge of its details. Beside, rewards were given to those who introduced new manufactures, or who opened new branches of commerce with foreign countries. Every thing was properly organized for extending the commercial relations of the nation, and nothing was neglected that could forward that grand object.

It is doubtless to be regretted, that it should be necessary to give or permit exclusive privileges to towns or to mercantile companies, for the purpose of promoting the commerce of the state. Experience proves, however, that this condescension on the part of the Government is necessary, to unite all the merchants of a state, and to make them act in concert. The *Economists* of France were not of this opinion. Almost all of them wish to give the most indefinite liberty to commerce. But by carrying these principle into practice, only a very limited and trifling com-

merce

merce can be expected. It was by adopting an opposite system, that the Dutch succeeded in overcoming obstacles which, in their situation, were considered as insurmountable. The *Econonomist* may turn his attention to the comfort of each individual of society. The statesman considers only the aggrandizement of his nation.

Holland had perhaps carried this principle of exclusion to an improper extreme. Beside some companies, the different towns of that Republic shared the commerce of the nation among them. Each place had its particular branch of trade, with which no other district could interfere.

Amsterdam was the entrepôt of all the commerce of the East and West Indies, the Levant, Spain, Portugal, and the Baltic.

Rotterdam, Enkuissen, Schiedam, Maaslanduis, Galinguen, and some other places, carried on the herring and cod fishing trade, which was called the great fishery.

Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Enkuissen, and a few other places, possessed the Greenland trade, which they called the little fishery.

Dort and Rotterdam had the commerce of the wines of the Rhine; and Saardam, the trade of ship-building. All was organized in such a manner, that no branch of commerce was isolated, and by these means they were all carried to the greatest perfection. In addition to all this, their commercial countries were the most flourishing of Europe. We cannot then be astonished that this nation, condemned from the nature of its soil to endure privations, should become so populous, and attain so high a degree of prosperity and riches. But the mercantile genius of Holland has greatly contributed to subvert their original constitution, This people, wholly addicted to commerce, neglected to fill up the civil and military functions periodically. They allowed these functions to remain in the same hands, and to become hereditary in certain families. The ambition of the Stadtholder found an aliment in this negligence. He easily corrupted the Dutch magistrates and attached them wholly to his interest.

Thus the Republic was changed into a governvernment purely royal.

Had the Dutch government been republican, as formerly, it would have preserved a perfect neutrality.

neutrality. Had it been necessary for them to make some sacrifice for their repose, they would not have failed to purchase it at that price: they would have drawn from the belligerent powers, by their commerce, what the injustice of these powers would have ravished from them by violence. It was only by this measure that they could have avoided the tempest which has ravaged their territory, and which unfortunately is not yet entirely dissipated. They are now, like us, engaged in a revolution. Their *King* is the brother-in-law of a powerful monarch; and they have only mercenary troops to oppose to his well disciplined armies. If they would recover their ancient rights, they must imitate their ancestors; they must become soldiers, otherwise their resources will be soon drained, and they will be obliged to resume their ancient yoke, or bend their heads under another.

People of Batavia! to avoid your destruction, and rise again from your ashes, you must be guided by the greatest wisdom; but it is not in the clubs you will find it. Permit not popular societies upon any pretext whatever to establish themselves among you. At first you were inclined to imitate us, had not our Generals, who are the enemies of these fanatics, prevented you. Had this imitation taken place, your territory would have been the prey of devastation and death.

Consider

Consider the evils the clubs have operated in France. Let the ravages we have experienced be a warning to you. We are strong and powerful, and were able to recover from these evils without any assistance; but you cannot imitate us without risking your destruction. A swallow may break through a cobweb, but the fly which should attempt to perform the same feat, would infallibly perish. Hasten then to digest your code of constitutional laws, and be less changeable than we have been. You cannot exist without commerce: let therefore your constitution be calculated to encourage every thing favorable to that grand source of your prosperity, and to repress every thing injurious to it. Your great capitalists have no doubt left their country: terror must have made them fly; but they have not, like many of our emigrants, taken up arms against their country. Recal them into your bosom, for they will prove the best promoters of your prosperity. We have now no commerce, because the Mountain assassinated our richest merchants, and killed the goose with the golden eggs. Do not imitate us. It is only great capitalists who can revive and extend your commerce: Hasten then to restore them to the bosom of their country, and to their former useful pursuits.

The emigration which the revocation of the edict of Nantz occasioned from France, took place chiefly among the active and industrious. They carried from their country many useful arts, the loss of which we have not yet recovered. The last emigration was principally of the drones of society, whom, politically speaking, we have not to regret. But with you there is not one of your great capitalists to whom a part of your prosperity is not attached. Those enlightened merchants who direct your banks or your commercial companies are too valuable to be banished. Reflect maturely on your situation. It is critical, but it is not irremediable.

CHAP.

CHAP. XXII.

Embarrassing Thaw, but which was of short Duration: Deputation from the Province of Utrecht: Evacuation of that Province by the English: Departure of the Prince of Orange: Entry of the French into Utrecht, Arnheim, &c. Capitulation of Gertruidenberg: Capitulation of the Province of Holland: Entry of the French into Amsterdam.

ON the 22d and 23d of Nivôse *(January* 12 *and* 13, 1795), a thaw began to take place, which occasioned much uneasiness as to the consequences which it might probably produce. The communication between the troops who had passed the Waal and those who remained on this side of that river, was totally interrupted. Happily, on the 24th, the frost again set in; our troops marched across the ice without any accident, and took a position on the Ligne.

This passage being effected, we were not long in becoming masters of all that large island, which is formed by the Waal and the Leck before they fall into the Meuse. We entered on the same day into Buren and Culembourg. On the next, the army was posted behind the Rhine and the Leck.

Gorcum, that celebrated fortress, which, from the strength of its works, and the facility of its inundations, has been called the key of Holland, was still possessed by the enemy. The head-quarters of the Prince of Orange were there. At another time, this place would have made a better resistance, but the frost had rendered every town of Holland accessible. When the Prince of Orange saw that it was impossible to resist us, and that he was in danger of becoming our prisoner, he hastened to leave Gorcum. He determined then to abandon the States, and, after bidding them adieu at the Hague, embarked at Schevelling for England. He acted very prudently; for, at this time, the redoubts of Tartarus would not have arrested the impetuosity of our troops, if the rivers of hell had been frozen.

A prince must doubtless be in a very desperate situation when he determines to abdicate the state

which he governs. The Stadtholder was however obliged to submit to this humiliation. What an example to men whom fortune has elevated to a similar degree of power! What a warning to those who have the ambition of governing others. They cannot succeed but by acquiring a powerful moral influence—force is insufficient. They ought therefore to employ all the means that wisdom can suggest in directing and preserving that influence. It must depend for its support on the basis of the strictest justice, which alone can preserve it entire. Despots may make a party, and become terrible for a time. Profligate men are every where to be found, who for places or pensions will abandon the interests of their country, and sell themselves to a tyrant. But he can neither find places nor money sufficient to gratify the greater number of the sycophants who assail him. They then become discontented, which they fail not to manifest whenever an opportunity offers. This is the picture of what happened in Holland.

The Stadtholder had forgotten the solemn treaty which his ancestors concluded with the Batavian nation. To enable him to assume greater powers, he violated that constitution which he was bound to hold sacred. Had he res-

pected it, the Dutch would have adored him, and erected altars to his memory. He yielded to his ambition, and they resisted him. Though he was the strongest, his pretentions could derive no sanction from his power. He believed it to be policy to proscribe the patriots, and they took refuge in France. They availed themselves of circumstances, and promoted the war against him. He was conquered, and was of course obliged to abandon his states, never to return to them more. This is what has happened, and what will always happen to all governments who listen only to their caprice, and who dare to violate the constitutional laws of the people they govern. O you who drink of the intoxicating cup of power! you whose situation would require all the wisdom of a deity, but who possess too often all the worst passions that disgrace human nature! direct an attentive eye to this event; engrave it deeply on your memory; let it instruct you to restrain your passions, and to pursue the paths of justice and virtue. The destruction even of a number of men is comparatively of little consequence: the destruction of a government never fails to produce a period of anarchy, during which society may be afflicted with the greatest misfortunes.

To represent to ourselves a Revolution we may imagine a globe of immense size and weight sometimes rolling over a rugged soil, crushing every thing that stands in its way, and sparing only those who fly to one side, or who conceal themselves in the hollows of the uneven ground. In its movement it will bruise some, crush others to atoms, injure more or less every one near it, and alarm all the world.

Our Revolution, in its rapid and progressive movement, has destroyed two millions of men, and ruined an hundred thousand fortunes. A retrograde movement, or Counter-Revolution, would be still more dreadful; it would immolate more victims, and destroy more property. To repair the ravages made, we ought not to make greater. The individual who wishes it is a bad citizen.

At the time when our troops passed the Waal, the division of General Bonneau left the environs of Breda, and approached towards Gertruidenberg. It even attacked vigorously and took some of the forts dependant on that place.

The English, finding it impossible to defend Holland, evacuated it. On the 26th of Nivôse

(*January* 16), their right began to abandon the province of Utrecht. Soon after their retreat, our troops took possession of Darestede and Kenen, and pursued them to Bageningen, which they entered on the 27th (*January* 17).

On the 25th of Nivôse (*January* 15), the deputies of Utrecht came to General Salm, and proposed a capitulation for their province. That General took possession of the capital of the province on the 28th, and General Vandamme entered Arnheim on the same day.

Utrecht is a large and populous town; it is more agreeably situated than the other towns of Holland; and the air is less impregnated with morbific matter. The union of the Seven Provinces was finally concluded at Utrecht in 1579. At the same place was held the celebrated congress in 1712 and 1713, which terminated the war of the Spanish succession, and restored peace to Europe. The army of Louis XIV. entered Utrecht in 1672. It opened its gates to the army of the Republic on the 18th of January 1795. The Leck was an insurmountable barrier to the conquering monarch. At a time when France was without a chief, without a government, and without finances, her troops crossed the Leck and

the Isel, and pushed their conquests to the Ems. This will astonish posterity, and immortalize the bravery of Republicans.

On the 29th *(January* 19), General Devinther's brigade took possession of Amersfort. This place is well fortified, and situated in one of the most tolerable plains of Holland. Its territory is pretty fertile in grain and pasturage, and may be considered as one of the most agreeable spots of the United Provinces. On the same day Macdonald took a position behind the lines of Grebe, his right being extended to Rhenen, and his left to the Zuiderzee.

On the 30th *(January* 20), the garrison of Gertruidenberg capitulated with General Bonneau. The troops were granted the honours of war, and were made prisoners on their parole.

On the same day the deputies of the province of Holland presented themselves before Pichegru at Utrecht, and capitulated for their province. That General without losing a moment proceeded to Amsterdam, which he entered on the 20th of January.

Amsterdam

Amsterdam is the largest and most commercial town of the United Provinces. It is one of the bulwarks of the trade of the Universe. If it is not the first entrepôt of the merchandise of Europe, it may at least be considered as the second. Notwithstanding these advantages, Amsterdam is the abode of dulness. The air is thick, and loaded with morbific vapours. The greater part of the people are afflicted with fevers and the scurvy. A Neopolitan in London wrote thus to a friend:—"When you see the Sun, pay my "respects to him, for I have not seen him these "six months." Those who reside at Amsterdam must expect the same inconvenience. The rays of that planet never reach the inhabitants of this city. They see it only through a thick foggy atmosphere, which forms between them and it an impenetrable veil. This renders the citizens of Amsterdam subject to a multitude of chronic diseases, and has imprinted upon them the character of dulness, which is here more remarkable than in other countries.

The Dutch direct all their intellectual faculties towards commerce. This has doubtless given them that air of gravity which makes them appear to be buried in thought. A Dutchman seldom smiles; but a merchant of Amsterdam ne-

ver permits a laugh to escape him. If he is asked the reason, he answers, that gaiety is incompatible with a commercial life. To drink his tea, smoke his pipe, and live very economically with his wife, his children, and his clerks, are the only pleasures which a rich merchant allows himself to take, unless he would pass for a prodigal among his fellow citizens. He is therefore all his life dull, morose, and parsimonious. If you speak to an inhabitant of Amsterdam of any thing but commerce, all his part of the conversation will be confined to the monosyllables *yes* and *no*. In a word, he is dead to every pleasure; but give him the prospect of the smallest profit, and he is all activity. The French merchants were generous, elegant in their manners, and sometimes magnificent. The Dutch, but particularly the Amsterdam merchants, are the very reverse. In a mercantile transaction with a Frenchman, in which he has been deceived, he may perhaps complain once, but will never speak of it twice. A burgher of Amsterdam is continually importunate, and never ceases to complain until he has obtained an indemnity. If the manners of the Dutch are those only which are compatible with commerce, may the French never become great merchants! Experience however proves, that melancholy and moroseness are not absolutely essential

sential to commerce. We have had in our maritime towns merchants of very amiable manners, who understood perfectly well every branch of trade; but they have been murdered or ruined by our anti-political systems. I am of opinion, therefore, that the apathy of the Dutch is more the effect of climate than of their commercial habits.

It is remarkable, that the people who hold the second rank in maritime commerce have not one good harbour. The port of Amsterdam, which is the most frequented, is so large, that it can contain more than a thousand vessels; but ships of considerable burthen can only enter with spring tides, and then a machine, called a *camel*, is used to prevent them from drawing too much water. Almost all the ports of Holland are in the same situation.

Thus the Dutch have had always great obstacles opposed to the extension of their trade; but, in consequence of their passion for gain, they have carried commerce to so high a degree of perfection, that in Amsterdam, near which there is neither mines nor corn fields, the interest of money is only three per cent.; while in Spain,

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notwithstanding the fertility of the soil, and the mines of Peru, it is six.

The Bank of Amsterdam, and the two India Companies, have contributed greatly to extend the commerce of Amsterdam, and all the United Provinces. Though these establishments are not immediately connected with this Work, it will not perhaps be thought an improper digression if I take a brief view of the two great instruments of the prosperity of Holland. The French constitution prohibits all establishments of this kind, which appears to me a misfortune ; but France is powerful and rich in internal resources, and may perhaps prosper without such aid. It is not so with the Dutch : if they destroy their commercial companies, they are irrecoverably lost.

In vain do our philosophers tell us, that companies fetter commerce ; that individuals, associated with an exclusive privilege, will turn the profits to their own advantage, which is not always the interest of society. These reasons are excellent for a commerce which may be within the reach of every person ; but the present question respects commerce of great hazard and expence, which neither one nor several individuals can undertake. This trade must,

must, therefore, either be totally renounced, or privileges must be granted to companies, to induce them to carry it on; or, as the only other alternative, the government must take it into their own hands, which would be madness. When we had commercial companies, they sent more ships to the East Indies in one year than individuals will do in thirty. The India Company imported thirty times the merchandise that our free trade does now. Which then is most advantageous to society? The solution of this question is not difficult. I know that our modern politicians will object, that we can do without the merchandise of India. So may we also exist without bread, as many do in the mountains of Switzerland! but are they therefore more happy? Every good government ought to study to augment the happiness of the governed: to multiply the enjoyments of man is to add to his felicity.

Our philosophical politicians have ventured to affirm, that the commerce of Asia, which drains us of our precious metals, and excludes almost every exchange, presents no advantage to Europeans. How limited is this reasoning! Gold and silver are no more the aliment of man than paper. These metals are of less intrinsic value than iron, and are only rendered precious by their scarcity.

Gold

Gold is heavier than iron, but it is not so hard. The one resembles a pampered Sybarite, who lives in effeminate idleness; the other an artist or manufacturer rendered vigorous by labour. The first is more sought after, the other is the most useful.

It is true, that for four ages, our metallic riches have been carried to Asia, from which they never return. But it is evident, that had we retained in Europe all the produce of the mines in the other hemisphere, the metals we call precious would have been depreciated as well as assignats, and would have now appeared to us less valuable than iron.

The same politicians affirm, in a magisterial tone, that the loss of men, which commerce occasions, is injurious to population. This assertion is far from being well founded. I admit, that man in society resembles those industrious insects whose happiness is the result of increased numbers: but, I know also, that a state never fails to be populous in proportion to the means of subsistance which it affords. If it is allowed, that industry and commerce multiply agricultural productions, it follows that the trade to Asia must,

must, like every other kind of commerce, contribute to the propagation of our species.

It is true, that the greater part of those who risk the dangers of the ocean, and brave the intemperance of climates, become often the victims of their avarice, and perish. In every swarm of bees there are some that labour, but do not propagate; they contribute not the less however to the multiplication of their species.

It is certain, that one hundred thousand families are supported in France by the commerce of Asia: I include in this calculation the workmen who manufacture the materials brought from the Indies. The diseases of an extreme climate, and accidents of navigation, carry off nearly three or four thousand individuals, who expose themselves to the hazards of that career. Will not the progeny of 100,000 families compensate for this loss? It ought certainly to be concluded, that when the inconveniences of a trade are more than compensated by the advantages that may be drawn from it, a wise government ought not to hesitate to create that trade if it do not exist, nor to protect it if it be already established.

It is only a company of merchants that can successfully conduct the commerce of India. It is beyond the ability of any single merchant. It would then be of utility to constitute a new India Company, if it is not determined to abandon absolutely that commerce.

To revive the commerce of the West Indies, it would, perhaps, be found necessary to establish another company, and to encourage it likewise with privileges. There must be an accumulation of riches in the same hands, or an immense credit to revive the trade of our colonies. The demons who formerly governed us have assassinated, or ruined, all the merchants of large capitals and extensive credit. Lyons and Bourdeaux, by losing their richest citizens, have lost the source of their prosperity; and that loss recoils, or will speedily recoil, upon all France. But the existence of commercial companies, which would be useful even to France, is absolutely indispensable in Holland.

The Dutch can no more exist without their two India companies, than they can without commerce. During two ages, these companies have been the sources of all their riches. Were they so imprudent as to dry up this source they would

would be ruined for ever. We have destroyed much and replaced nothing. Let them take care not to imitate us. It is easy to diminish that which is great; but it is very difficult to enlarge that which is little.

All the commercial companies of other nations have had their periods of prosperity and reverse. The rocks on which they have usually split have always been the excessive expences of first establishments, prodigality, the impatience of sharing dividends, disgust, and misunderstanding. The companies of Holland have also experienced their periods of reverse; but, the perseverance which characterizes the people of that country have always preserved them from ruin.

The Dutch companies, particularly those of the two Indies, have been always in a state of progressive improvement; and, by the wisdom of their management, have become the richest and most powerful of Europe. Their commencement was small, but their progress has been magnificent.

In 1592, the merchants of Zealand equipped a vessel, which they sent to the East, by the route of the north of Tartary, which is so little explored.

explored. Their plan was to sail round the ancient continent by the Frigid Zone, and, doubling Japan, to arrive at China. This enterprize miscarried. Sometime after, the same merchants joined some others, and fitted out four vessels, which doubled the Cape of Good Hope, and arrived happily at the peninsula of India. They brought home some of the productions of that distant country, the sale of which scarcely defrayed the expences of the voyage; but this first essay afforded much information on the nature of the commerce, which, through this route, we carry on with Asia. Notwithstanding the little success of the first adventurers, a company was formed at Amsterdam, which sent out eight vessels on the same expedition. A considerable profit resulted from this voyage. This determined the States-General, in 1602, to establish the famous East India Company, to which was granted the exclusive privilege of trading from the Cape of Good Hope to China. Our politicians pretend, that such privileges are incompatible with a republican constitution. Holland was, however, the only democratic republic which, at that time, existed in Europe. But it had not the insanity of resolving to extend liberty beyond its own territory, or of endeavouring to force

force it on nations which did not want it, or who did not know how to enjoy it.

The first stock of the Dutch East India Company was 6,459,840 florins. The merchants of Amsterdam, Zealand, Delft, Rotterdam, Horn and Enkhuisen. contributed shares according to their respective ability. With this sum, which was then considerable, two fleets were equipped, one of which, consisting of fourteen vessels, sailed for the first time in the year 1603. In 1610 the company divided at the rate of 75 per cent.

The West India Company was first established in 1621. It had the exclusive privilege of trading on the coast of Africa, from the straits of Gibraltar to the Cape of Good Hope; and, in America, from the most southern point of Terra Nuova to the straits of Anian. Its first stock was 630,000 florins. The original shares, which were at first 6,000 florins each, have produced 195 per cent.

These two companies have experienced fewer revolutions, and have maintained their power and their credit longer than others in Europe. The first has become exceedingly powerful in Asia. It employs 160 vessels from 30 to 60 guns each: and has establishments in all the states of Asia.

CHAP. XXIII.

Passage of the Biesbosch: Taking of Dordrecht, Rotterdam, the Hague, and Helvoetsluys: Order of the States General, enjoining the Commanders of strong Places to deliver them up to the French: Taking of Naërden: Our Cavalry possess themselves of the Dutch Ships of War: Capitulation of the Province of Zealand.

THE lake called Biesbosch, is situated between Gertruidenberg and Dordrecht. Those countries which abound with high mountains are subject to revolutions, some occasioned by volcanic fire, others by the shocks of those enormous masses, which falling precipitately on the dwellings of man, entomb them under the wreck. Let a traveller pass through Italy and Sicily, he will see the spots where Herculaneum and a multitude of villages and hamlets stood, ere thus they were buried under the lava of the volcanos. Let him go into Switzerland, he must pass over the ruins of Pleurs, Epone, Yvorne, and other places, which have

have been overwhelmed by ruins of the mountains. Countries which are flat and low, like Holland, are subject to the irruptions of the water, which destroy the people, and overflow their habitations. In the year 1421, the sea broke one of its dykes, and swallowed up sixty-two villages, which stood on the spot now occupied by the lake Biesbosch. Upon this lake, being frozen over, the division of Bonneau marched to approach and take possession of Dordrecht.

The United Provinces are full of such instances of destruction. Weak and wretched mortal! thou art continually at war with the elements! The planet thou inhabitest is not even a point in the immensity of the works of God; it is covered with nothing but wrecks and ruins, and yet thou hast the vanity to wish to rule over thy fellow man; thou art perpetually exposing thy life to serve thy own ambition, or that of others. How great is then thy folly!

The 2d of Pluviôse *(Jan.* 22) the same division entered Rotterdam. This city, the most considerable in Holland, next to Amsterdam, is built in a vast morass on the left bank of the Meuse. Its largest street is formed on a dyke more elevated than the rest of the city, and thus secured from

inundation. The air of Rotterdam must necessarily be very thick, and different from what we breathe on the Griensel, and at the habitation of the monks of Mount St. Bernard. Yet man lives in both places, which is surprizing, since the chamois would perish at Rotterdam, and animals used to the stagnant waters of the United Provinces, could not live at the habitation of the monks of Mount St. Bernard.

On the same day (*Jan.* 22), the division of General Macdonald entered Naërden, and took a position with its left covered by this place, and its right by Amersfort.

The division of General Bonneau also advanced and placed itself behind the lines of the Grebe, with its right at Rhenen, and its left at Amersfort.

On the 3d (*Jan* 23) we took possession of the Hague, and the palace of the Stadtholder served at once for head-quarters and the residence of the Representatives of the People. These latter had a practice of placing very singular inscriptions on the houses they chose to inhabit. On that at Lille was written, in letters of gold—

WE WISH THE HOUSE OF THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PEOPLE WAS OF GLASS, THAT THE PEOPLE MIGHT BE WITNESS OF ALL THEIR ACTIONS.

The houses thus inhabited, were certainly very solid and handsome; but there was no occasion for them to be of glass. They could not be reproached with a culpable concealment of their actions.

The Hague has long passed for a village, and is only a large village, if fortifications are necessary to constitute a city. But if it be no more than a village, it is the largest and handsomest of Europe. They reckon here are 4,800 houses; and a vast trade is carried on in this place.

Close to the Hague is the village of Ryswick, famous for the treaty of peace made there in 1697, and which bears it name.

On the same day (*Jan.* 23) we took possession of Helvoetsluys, where the enemy had left 600 of our soldiers prisoners. They were set at liberty; and 800 English were taken and sent into France.

The left of the army of the Sambre and the Meuse, which had quitted Prussian Gueldres, took possesion of Arnheim. This city, which is large, handsome, and well fortified, is situated on the angle which the Isel forms at its separation from the Leck. This part of the army, having its right there, and its left at Amersfort, compleated a formidable line from this point to Nauden, on the Zuyder Zee.

I have now to relate a fact which will, no doubt astonish posterity; and which, though scarcely passed, begins already to be disbelieved by many. Repugnant, however, as it may be to the laws of probability, the fact, nevertheless, is perfectly such as I shall state. We must recollect, that the conquest of the United Provinces was accomplished during a winter that will form an epoch in meteorology. In the most rigorous moment of this season, troops, consisting chiefly of horse and light artillery, marched into North Holland, over the ice, and seized the Dutch ships of war.

This is, without doubt, the first time we have seen fleets taken by horsemen. The circumstance is surprizing enough; but every thing was extraordinary in this winter campaign.

The

The surprize excited by this event will be decreased by a knowledge of the situation of those ships. The reader will recollect, that the Hollanders do not possess a single port into which their men of war can enter armed and rigged. They are, therefore, obliged to leave them at the entrance of the Zuyderzee, in a narrow arm of the sea, which lies between the North point of West Friezeland and the island of Texel. This strait freezes almost as readily and as frequently as the rivers. And here the extraordinary expedition took place.

The sand and earth which the Scheldt has deposited at its mouth during many ages, or perhaps an irruption of the sea, has formed a little Archipelago, composed of six pretty large islands and several that are smaller. This is what is called the Province of Zealand, the third, according to the order in which they give their voices in the general assemblies of the nation. These islands, like all the rest of West Holland, have only an artificial territory, gained from the sea by means of dykes.

The air of Zealand is thick and unwholesome. Its soil is fertile enough in grain, and abounds in pasturage. Its commerce was once as flourishing

as that of Holland. The directors of the East and West India Companies were obliged to reside at Middelbourg two years in eight. This province, in a manner, gave birth to the East India Company. Next to Amsterdam, she took the greatest share in raising their funds. The sovereign council of Dutch Flanders likewise resided at Middelbourg; and this country, which one might suppose uninhabitable, was raised to a high degree of prosperity. The fall of the companies of commerce, and the bank of Amsterdam, could not but bring ruin on all this Archipelago.

The States of this province capitulated with the French in the latter end of January. But it would have been matter of much difficulty to have reduced it, as the intermediate channels were not firmly frozen.

CHAP.

CHAP. XXIV.

Halt of the Army behind the Lines of the Grebe: Retreat of the English Army behind the Yssel: Evacuation of Zwol and Campen: Taking of Doësbourg: Evacuation of Coëvarden.

THE provinces of Zealand, Gueldres, Utrecht, and Holland, were already in the power of the French. Those of Overyssel, Groningen, and Frizeland, which are on the right of the Yssel, were still occupied by the English. Our army halted some days behind the lines of the Grebe, forming a line from the separation of the Leck and Yssel to Naerden; our advanced-guard had reached Harderwick.

Many general officers were of opinion that this position ought to be preserved. The line was completely connected and exhibited a front capable of defence; but subsequent events made way for bolder counsels. We had impressed the enemy with too much terror not to be tempted to pursue our advantages. We found it unneces-

sary

sary to wait for fine weather to complete the conquest of the Seven United Provinces.

The English army had retreated behind the Yssel, and formed a line from Doësburg to Campen. This position was not untenable; but none is good to an army that has lost its confidence. Those who had not feared to cross the Lys, the Scheldt, the Meuse, the Waal, and the Leck, to pursue and beat them, could not fail to despise the Yssel. The English were so perfectly aware of the fact, that as soon as our advanced-guard appeared at Hordenwick, they were struck with a panic, and evacuated Campen and Zwol. This pusillanimity augmented the confidence of our troops, and removed all thought of postponing their conquests.

After the evacuation of these two places, the army marched without loss of time across the Yssel. On the 15th and 16th of Pluviôse, *(February* 4 *and* 5), the division of Macdonald took a position between Campen, Zwol, and Deventer; and that of Moreau extended itself from Zutphen to Deventer. On the 17th and 18th *(February* 6 *and* 7), the left division of the army of the Sambre and Meuse occupied Doësbourg, and guarded the canal of Drusus, as well as that of Pannerden,

Pannerden, where there were already some of our troops.

After the invasion of the places on the right bank of the Yssel, the English army was totally unable to face us. It was under the necessity of abandonning the whole of the Dutch territory, and retiring into Westphalia. The King of Prussia was not slow to form a line of troops from Wesel to Embden. The English immediately fell back, placing him between them and us. But I even doubt if they found themselves quite at ease behind this respectable line.

O ye English ! you are too subtile for us ! Our bayonets are not so well polished as yours; but do not take so much pains with rubbing them; the arms which push ours are the most firm, as we have taught you by experience. By a perfidious policy, you have been the occasion of the murder of two millions of Frenchmen. You have ruined the commerce of all the maritime powers of Europe. You have raised yourselves on the bleeding ruins of every state. You reign over the sea, it is true—but let us have a few years of repose: and remember that Carthage saw a period to her usurpation. We want ships, but in time we can construct them. We want naval officers, but in

in time we will form them. Our sailors are less skillful than yours, but you know they are more courageous. In despite of your intrigues, we have established a government. Beware of it—for if there be but wisdom to conduct it for ten years, your existence afterward will not be more than eight. Eager for this catastrophe, so salutary for all the states of Europe, I shall now conduct your army out of Holland, far from the reach of our cannon.

After the passage of the Yssel, terror was so deeply impressed on the minds of the Britons, that the sight of ten of our soldiers would have made a thousand of them tremble. The Italian proverb, which compares an Englishman to a lion, was certainly not quite correct at this moment. On this occasion, he was like a hare.

A battalion of grenadiers, and two squadrons of chasseurs of the brigade of Reunier, were sent to reconnoitre Goo, Ressen, Almelo, and Hardenberg. They immediately drove the English from Twente. The patrole, which appeared at Hardenberg, were less numerous; but they seemed to have borrowed Medusa's head. As soon as the English saw them, they were so frightened, that they evacuated Coëvarden in the utmost

 disorder.

disorder. In fact, it must have been seen, to be believed.

The thaw had rendered the roads so impassable, that our grenadiers, in order to seize Coëvarden, were forced to march two leagues up to the knees in water. But this signified nothing; this obstacle, which would seem insurmountable to the faint-hearted, was only sport to our grenadiers; they arrived, and made themselves masters of this strong place.

Our rich sybarites complain they want common necessaries, if they have not enough to keep thirty servants, a table furnished with elegance and luxury, twenty horses, and as many mistresses. Rich carpets must cover the floor of the apartments they inhabit, or their delicate constitutions are liable to cold, which, thanks to medical aid, throws them into a serious malady. The smell of a tallow candle makes them sick; they are quite unhappy if they cannot procure wax. There are rich men in Paris as well as other great cities, who have never used their own hands even to dress themselves, nor their legs to walk even a league; they have always been drawn in sumptuous carriages from their own houses to those of their

their friends, and thence to their mistresses. There is no doubt but in France individuals have refined on the voluptuous life of Caligula.

The children of these degraded beings, were in our armies. To be in want of every thing, with them, was to want bread, cloaths, shoes, and every thing which is most necessary in life. Instead of beds of down, they had no where to repose but the damp ground, often covered with snow; instead of rich carpets, they walked through the water. They dressed themselves without help, and yet were more healthy and happy than their fathers. Had not this war ruined the present generation for arts and sciences, what an admirable lesson it had taught! Yet, properly speaking, *sybarism* has only changed hands. I see *sans-culottes* enriched by oppression and plunder, who are no bad imitators of old Crœsus. They are perhaps more gross and more indolent: I perceive no other difference.

The little resistance the English made on the right bank of the Yssel, has astonished many observers. Conjectures have even been formed that do no great honour to that nation. Yssel is a large river, which may be reckoned a good bar-

rier; it is bordered on the right by a multitude of places sufficiently strong to check an army, at least for a while. Doësburg, Zutphen, Deventer, Campen, and other towns, are places which form a very good line of defence; and we may well put the following questions: Why did not those islanders suffer themselves to be besieged in some of these places? Why did they evacuate them at the sight of an advanced-guard, or a single patrole, without so much as even burning the priming of their muskets? If it was through cowardice, they are too contemptible; if it was one of their treacheries, they are detestable.

I may perhaps be mistaken in my conjectures; but I can find none in their favour: perhaps that which follows is not deserved even by them. I have compared their conduct to that of a thief, who has crept into a house when a fire has broken out. He pretends to stop the flames, but his real aim is to rob the house of every thing valuable. This simile does no great honour to England, but her constant plan ever since our entry into Holland confirms my opinion.

It is well known, that the policy of the English has aimed for two centuries at crushing the maritime commerce of other nations. Their wars have

have had no other aim; in fact, they could have no other object. The Dutch, though the neighbours of this rapacious nation, have preserved possessions in Asia and Africa, which have long been objects of desire to the Britons. They wanted a pretext to plunder them. The English government has made one; it has treated this nation as rebels, at the time when it was conquered by another power. Was so frivolous a pretext sufficient to justify the plundering of it? Can we see any thing but atrocious perfidy in such conduct? When will mankind open their eyes to the intrigues of this nation? How long will other powers be her dupes?

England could not entirely shut her ports against the Dutch. She had denied them the importation of merchandise in general; but as they exclusively possessed the spices of the East, she was compelled to make an exception in favour of this merchandise. Under pretence that the Stadtholder had taken refuge among them, the English seized the countries that produce this valuable article. I know them so well, that I believe they must be at the last extremity before they give them up; and, if they be compelled to restore them, they will not do it till they have desolated

desolated them. Our Decemvirate covered themselves with crimes during the term of their power: those of the Cabinet of St. James's are not so glaring, but they are perhaps more pernicious to Europe.

CHAP. XXV.

The French make themselves Masters of Friesland and Groningen: their Entry into Groningen: Battle of Berterzil: Retreat of the Enemy behind the Ems: Peace with the King of Prussia prevents the Conquest of Westphalia: Changes made in the Command of our Armies.

THE provinces of Friesland and Groningen were the only two which the French had not garrisoned, and the English army was still in one part of the province of Groningen. Good policy demanded aloud that we should possess ourselves of it; but our troops were harassed by fatigue, and very ill equipped. A march over these provinces, rendered almost inaccessible by the thaw, was dividing our army very much, and exposing it to a disastrous reverse of fortune if resisted by fresh troops. On the other hand, it was dangerous to leave them in the power of the enemy, since they could there receive reinforcements, and return to attack us. All these reasons were well weighed, but those of policy carried the point.

It was therefore determined to send the division commanded by Macdonald into those provinces; another division of the army of the Sambre and Meuse was also ordered to approach: so that there were two divisions of that army on the right bank of the Rhine. They were destined to advance to the extremity of the frontier, jointly with Moreau, supporting their right by Emmerick, which the Austrians had evacuated.

Things being thus disposed, on the 1st of Ventôse *(February* 10) our troops made themselves masters of Groningen. The English, not supposing that an army could make any progress in a country so very difficult, and through roads which the thaw had rendered impracticable, thought that no more than a party of our army were advancing. They did not therefore abandon the hope of resisting us, in order to preserve the forts which cover this province on the side of Germany. But they were not more fortunate here than elsewhere.

The brigade of General Reunier arrived on the 10th *(March* 1), and this reinforcement facilitated the attack. The principal blow was given at the sluice of Berterzil, where they had begun to throw up works. Their field-works were not so

good as the natural barrier of the Yssel; the English therefore were here, as well as in every other place, completely beaten, and forced to evacuate Neuweschans and Oudeschans, of which we took possession.

On the 12th *(March* 3), our troops took Bourtanges, and pursued the enemy to the Ems; but the thaw prevented us from pursuing them farther, and this river was the boundary of our career. We took on this and the following day *(March* 4), three hundred prisoners, three pieces of cannon, and all the ammunition and provisions that were in the forts.

At the same time, General Moreau, who commanded the right wing, drove the enemy from the county of Benthen, and possessed himself of the fort of that name, having made many prisoners, and taken several pieces of cannon.

The province of Friesland was once much more extensive than at present. The North of Holland, which yet preserves the name of *West-Friesland*, made part of it. In 1225, one of those revolutions of the globe which are very frequent in countries as low as the United Provinces separated them for ever. A sudden irruption of the

sea

sea formed that great gulph thirty leagues long, which is called the Zuyder-Zee, The city of Stavesen, once the capital of Friesland, and then situated in the centre of this vast province, was nearly swallowed up by the ocean; the little that still remains of this city is situated at one of the extremities of the country called Friesland.

Such terrible events ought to keep the inhabitants of this immense morass in perpetual fear. The sea and the rivers are suspended over the heads of the Hollanders, and are only retained by artificial barriers. A Dutchman, who on the flux of the sea perceives the waves mounting over each other, and violently striking the feeble dykes his industry has opposed to them, ought to say to himself, "This adversary twice a day threatens "the habitation I have made for myself. At last "he will devour it; I must therefore leave it." No Hollander will make this reflexion; it is however natural, for in fact all Holland must be looked upon as a country whose existence is altogether uncertain.

The French armies were posted on the frontiers of Westphalia, having before them a superb field of conquest. They needed no more than fifteen days rest; and, a little recovered from

their fatigues, they would easily have despoiled the King of Prussia of all his possessions in this Circle.

This monarch had with reason sent his armies into this part, and formed a line from Wesel to Embden; but he was not in a condition to resist us. Prudence shewed him what risks he was running; he therefore negociated a peace at Basle, which was concluded amidst the applause of every real Frenchman. I do not include in this class either the Emigrants or Mountaineers; because neither the one nor the other wish for peace. They prefer anarchy and robbery.

The King of Prussia detached the first stone from that barbarous edifice which was founded at Pilnitz, of which the English furnished the plan, together with the money for its cost, and the other Powers of Europe supplied labourers and materials. Since this time more have fallen away; and it is time for the architects to beware.

On the 1st of Germinal (*March* 20), the French army received orders to put an entire end to hostilities with the Prussians. From this moment, men, who were lately destroying each other, with

every

every appearance of passion, began to be companions and friends. The English were astonished and terrified by this event; and, screening themselves by the line of the Prussians, which they knew we should respect, they indemnified themselves by getting drunk with punch and brandy.

Here terminated the conquests of the French in the north countries. Having nothing to the northward but the sea, and the states of the King of Prussia, they were forced of necessity to terminate their conquests, not for want of warriors, but of countries to conquer.

The two divisions of the army of the Sambre and Meuse, which had passed the Rhine, and occupied the county of Zutphen and part of the province of Overyssel, were no longer necessary in this country. They repassed the Rhine, and followed the movements which the army of Jourdan made in returning up that river. This army, which reassembled principally in the neighbourhood of Coblentz, relieved that of the Moselle round Luxembourg, and this last joined the army of the Rhine before Mayence.

After the conquest of the United Provinces, the army was ready to reinforce the armies acting

in other quarters, except 25,000 men which the States-General obtained from the French Government; and the disposal of the troops which followed, perhaps determined the changes which took place in the command of our armies.

Pichegru was ordered to go and direct the movements of the army of the Rhine and Moselle. He however retained the command in chief of those of the Sambre and Meuse and that of the North. The first continued to be commanded by Jourdan, and Moreau was nominated to the command of that of the North.

Pichegru was at Paris on the 12th of Germinal (*April* 1), the day when the anarchist faction projected a repetition of former scenes of horror. His presence, and the positions he caused the armed force to take, destroyed the projects of this desperate faction. The zeal he shewed that day was not forgiven by them. They seized upon a moment of credulity; they deceived the acting government, and obliged Pichegru to give in his resignation. Aristides was condemned to the ostracism: Pichegru is nominated Ambassador to Sweden. This General has retired poor; but with all his glory. He possesses the esteem of every Frenchman that loves his country: he has

has no enemies, except such as would tear it to pieces. He has deserved even the esteem of the enemies he has so often beaten. Can so much glory be long concealed? No: Pichegru loves his country too well for her to remain always ungrateful.

CHAP.

CHAP. XXVI.

Reflections of the Author on the incredible Successes of the French in the present War.

POSTERITY will never believe the astonishing exploits of the French during this campaign, and history, though it shall confine them to the bounds of the most scrupulous truth, will only seem a monstrous exaggeration. Finding nothing in the lapse of ages to compare with our victories, they will at length become doubtful. In fact, all things seemed to presage the destruction and dismemberment of France. She beheld formidable enemies surrounding her in every point of the horizon :—the two Sicilies, Tuscany, Portugal, Spain and Sardinia on the South ; Austria, and the vast horde of feudal Powers of the Empire, on the East ; England, Holland, Prussia, and Russia on the North ; and that horrible scene of carnage called la Vendee on the West.

The

The whole force of Europe was concentrated against one people; against a people deprived of external succour, torn to pieces with internal disorganizing factions and civil war; against a state whose bands of society were entirely unknit; without leaders, without money, without bread; abandoned to the most complete anarchy, a prey to the most destructive troubles, and polluted with crime and assassination. Who will believe that a state thus tottering on the verge of utter ruin, could abide such terrible shocks, could bear such an immense burthen, and parry blows aimed with such dexterity? Who could believe that France, assailed on every side, could preserve her territories untouched? Yet she has accomplished all this, and actions even greater. Not contented with defending her ancient boundaries, she has considerably enlarged them, and became victorious at the moment that every circumstance menaced her with conquest and dismemberment.

In the days of Scipio, the exploits of Hannibal brought Rome to the verge of destruction. The dangers that threatened this city roused, like an electrical shock, the dormant courage of the Romans. They conquered Hannibal; and, not contented with escaping the greatest of dangers, they

they carried war, ravage, and destruction into the bosom of Carthage.

This is the only historical fact which bears any resemblance to the inconceivable events of our campaign. But what a difference! Our deeds disdain the comparison. The Romans had but one power to combat; we had at least thirty. They needed only to direct their strength to one point; we had to divide our forces, so as to act on every point of our circumference. The Romans were united at home; we lived in the midst of discord. They had a wise and well-organized government; we were plunged in the abyss of anarchy and disorder, under the controul of those murderers who had seized upon the ruins of the state. History has crowned with never-fading laurels the heroes who fought under Scipio; but our defenders even surpass their merits.

In this surprizing war, the cloud of Powers coalesced against one single people fancied there was nothing so easy as the conquest of France. They saw no difficulty, unless in the division of the plunder. They were already falling into dissention about the skin of the bear, and one may boldly say, that their rapacity and folly paved the way to our successes, and rendered them so rapid.

The

The necessity of defending even our houses and our children, extended our energy to the utmost. We had no soldiers; but a glowing patriotism caused them, as it were, to spring out of the ground in numbers that defy calculation. Terror made them march—the sacred enthusiasm of liberty rendered them intrepid—and victory has made them heroes. No nation was ever involved in such dangers; no nation ever braved them with such intrepidity, or extricated itself with such honour.

In 1792, the enemy had penetrated through Lorrain, and advanced as far as the plains of Champagne; and their camp of la Lune was not more than three leagues from Chalons. They had no breach to make, no fort to storm. There was no obstacle in their way to Paris, but the ardent courage of our young and untrained countrymen, who acted without order or discipline, and who were apparently unable even to make a stand. By one of those events which no foresight could presage, the enemy were repulsed, and driven beyond our boundaries. We did more, we marched into the Belgic territories, and conquered them.

In 1793, the treason of Dumouriez occasioned us to lose Austrian Flanders in even less time than it took us to conquer it. Our exterior line of fortification in Hainault was attacked and taken by the enemy.

At the same time, Alsace was reduced by the enemy, the famous Lines of Weissembourg were forced, Landau blockaded, Lauterbourg, Fort Louis, Hagenau, and other places taken. The enemy were only three leagues from Strasbourg, and that city, driven to madness by the indignities it had received from the Proconsuls of the Mountain, wanted only the power to open its gates to them.

In the South, affairs were in no better posture; the Spanish army, which had crossed the Pyrenees, was close to Perpignan; and all the departments of the South, which are not guarded by fortified places like those of the North, could not fail of being invaded by the Castilians.

Toulon, that bulwark of our fleets in the Mediterranean, was in the hands of Great Britain; and, if that Power had had an army to cover the place, it had been impregnable.

Our

Our silly gouvernment threatened the life of Paoli, at the time that he had the whole executive and military power of Corsica in his hands. Paoli, to save himself from their fury, delivered up the island to the English, as the only step he could take in this extremity.

La Vendée assumed a threatening aspect, and was a gulph which swallowed the greatest number of the French.

Lyons revolted to save itself from anarchy. This city has since submitted; but its commerce, so envied by the English, is ruined, and its buildings demolished. The anarchists, after having exercised their fury against the inhabitants of this city, laid out large sums in destroying the finest of its buildings. If the English did not pay them enormously for this deed, we may safely say, they laboured hard in their service for nothing.

Bourdeaux, after seeing its faithful deputies murdered by a wicked faction, without having power to punish the criminals, threatened to deliver itself up to the English to avoid ruin and assassination.

France in general, seeing nobody throughout the whole government and administrations but foolish and perverse men, desired a new order of things: but, astonished to see such a number of assassins and plunderers proceed from her very bosom, she fell into despondency and a perfect apathy, with respect to the choice of her government. Under this severe despotism, she only desired to be delivered from her tyrants. Incensed by the murders committed on her most virtuous Representatives, her murmurs began at length to prove loud. To appease her, that squalid constitution which perverse men so much wish to see restored, was thrown out to her, as sweetmeats are given to children. She saw one article which promised the protection of persons and property; at that crisis nothing more was wanting to make her receive it with gratitude. The poison was not unseen; but this single article revived hope, and it was accepted. It is also to be added, that liberty was no more; the most enlightened men, who wished to point out its defects, were imprisoned, and many sent to the scaffold. The primary assemblies, which ought to be free as air, were oppressed by a horde of villains. To conclude, this constitution which, mistaken as it was, gave some hopes to the country, was laid aside, and the revolutionary govern-

government which succeeded, covered our unhappy country with carnage and ruin.

Could it be supposed, that a people surrounded by enemies without, distracted by interior factions, groaning under the most cruel scourges, could it be presumed that this people should become the terror of their enemies? should drive them from their territories, conquer empires, pass the Alps and Pyrenees, traverse the morasses of Holland, and extend their conquests beyond those of any former martial power? All this is inconceivable, incredible! but it is true.

In the beginning of January, 1794, at a time when all nature was at rest and benumbed with cold, our troops left the environs of Strasbourg, retook Lauterbourg, Hagenau, Fort Louis, and other places; relieved Landau, and drove the enemy far beyond our limits. From this epoch we date our successes. We had before only met with disasters or temporary advantages; and it was Pichegru, who, though not commander in chief, directed this first operation.

About the end of March in the same year, part of the French troops marched from before Lisle, and another from the environs of Douay.

They overturned every thing before them like an impetuous torrent. They fought the soldiers of every State in Europe, triumphed over their efforts and gained a vast territory guarded by fortresses, crossed rivers and lakes, and wrested from the enemy our important places in Hainault, and pushed their victories to the left bank of the Ems. All this was done in less than a year. Does there exist another nation capable of such an effort ?

The Jacobins arrogate to themselves the glory of having pointed out this grand movement to the French nation, which indeed was necessary to deliver it from the avarice of combined despots. I acknowledge that their cruelty and injustice have greatly contributed to increase the number of our defenders : good has resulted from evil ; but one of these things they have done by choice, the other by chance. Luckily these men have acted the part of the whetstone, which makes other things cut though incapable itself of cutting. They sent out vast numbers to the frontiers, though they did not choose to go themselves ; they were more frequently to be found at home bawling in the clubs, torturing and robbing the peaceable citizens, than in the dangers of the war. It is therefore their cowardice that has

saved France ; for, had they infected the armies, and cried out against the decorations of the officers, as they did in Paris, France had been lost. But if their atrocious measures were even indispensably necessary ; although even we owed all our success to their barbarity, they were only vile, contemptible tools. An architect builds his scaffolds with vile materials ; when the edifice is finished, he throws them away : and this is the only credit due to the anarchists.

But were these measures absolutely necessary ? The successes we have experienced since the destruction of tyranny, prove incontestably that they were not. Folly may chance to produce the same effects as wisdom ; but the latter is always to be preferred. A man who had a dropsy in his chest fought a duel : he received a wound with a shot in the very place where the water had collected, and this lucky accident saved him from a painful operation, and effectually cured him. But ought all who are subject to the same disease to seek the same remedy ? or, is not the ſkilful hand of the surgeon guided by the rules of his art, preferable to that of a swordsman ? In general, where wisdom and prudence can produce good effects, we ought not to apply folly for them.

Our Revolution (considering the fiery character of the French) must be terrible; it has been the most so of any that has taken place in Europe. It has ruined the finest country in the universe; by destroying that religion which custom had deeply rooted in the hearts of the French, it has ruined their morals; by persecuting enlightened men, it has absolutely destroyed that public spirit which shewed itself in the two first years: yet, we may say with Seneca, '*sanabilibus egrotamus morbis*,' our complaints are not incurable. Make the French happy, let property be strictly respected, both by the government and governed, and public spirit will again rear its head and become the rampart of the present government. Till this moment every thing has been wantonly violated. A government of plunder cannot be beloved; as therefore the present one is not of that kind, if it depart not from the constitution, it is entitled to our support.

The majority of the French were, perhaps, against sapping the very foundations of the former constitution; but it is gone; and it would be acting the part of a bad citizen to demand its restoration. However good, its return is impossible, and would be pernicious. We may set off from

from the spot we now stand upon, but we cannot possibly set off from that we formerly stood upon. We have a wise constitution, but it will never be established till all true Frenchmen concur in putting it in motion. All governments are good when they respect property, and are administered by honest men. It is not therefore that government which would please every one that we should seek after; we ought to respect the existing one, and good Frenchmen should rally round it, support it, and put it in motion. Eighteen months of anarchy have done more mischief than the very worst of governments could have done in twenty years. May the past be a lesson to us.

There are political as well as natural volcanos: both produce great destruction. We cannot however repair this by new explosions, but by partial labour. When the delightful bowers of our first parents were destroyed, either by the supreme will, as we are bound to believe, or by a volcanic eruption, as the infidels suppose, the earth was covered with ruins. The children of men, by assiduous labour, have made a new terrestrial paradise. It rests with ourselves to follow this good example. What will heal all our

wounds? Wisdom in the governors and morals in the governed.

Are there any Frenchmen, who have an invincible aversion to the new institutions? At the peace, every citizen, no doubt, will be permitted to realize his fortune, and go to reside under other laws; for the *locomania* is a natural right. Every state has the real possession of its territorial funds; but their price and their produce are the property of the individual, who may make proper use of them, or abuse them, or transport them as he thinks proper. But when the house is on fire, no one should be permitted to quit it; every one should give his assistance to extinguish the flames.

CHAP.

CHAP. XXVII.

ANECDOTES OF THE CAMPAIGN.

I HAD made minutes of a variety of anecdotes relative to this campaign, including the names of the persons concerned in them; but I have lost the book which contained them, and I can only supply a few of them from my memory, and of these I am frequently at a loss for the names of the several actors.

It is particularly mortifying to me, that I cannot call to mind all those who gave signal proofs of probity: for although I admire courageous actions, justice appears to me to be the most valuable of all qualities. Homer paints his heroes as being endued with infinite strength and courage; but he never exhibits them as being just. We admire them: but we cannot love them. In our armies, we have some who combined justice with intrepidity: and these are men whom I would choose for my heroes.

I.

I fled to the army to withdraw myself from the fury of the Jacobins. I was not wealthy; but I could read, and that was a great crime.

On my arrival at the army I did not fill any military employment, for that was not my profession. I accompanied the troops as the relation and friend of General Souham, and a spectator of the scene. The soldiers, seeing me usually with the staff officers, often took me for a General of the army. One day when the expedition to Flanders was in agitation, I was tempted to try the spirit of the soldiery on this subject, and I said to a grenadier—" We are marching to Flanders : " do you think we shall succeed ?"—" To Flan- " ders !" said he, " that country has as much " chance before us as the dew before the sun."— " But, comrade, you forget the line of fortifica- " tions from Namur to Ypres ! Will that, think " you, be so easily digested ?"—" Those fortifica- " tions !—phoo !—believe me, General, we shall " swallow them like a bundle of asparagus."

II.

In the night of the 10th of Floréal *(April* 29), while Menin was hotly bombarded, I mounted a hill

hill which commands a view of that town to the South. The centre, and every quarter of the place, was on fire. The bombs and howitzers worked incessantly; and ours, and those of the enemy, made most brilliant arches in the air. About ten o'clock a shell fell upon the steeple of a church, which being of wood, it resembled a light-house in the midst of a lake of fire. It was a magnificent scene of horror. I never saw any thing in painting which could give a faint idea of it. The eye would have been delighted with its beauty, if the heart had not been desolated with its consequences.

III.

At the battle of Moëscroen, a chasseur of the 5th regiment, who was not more than eighteen years of age, took an Austrian officer prisoner. As he was conducting the officer to the head-quarters, he was met by eight or ten volunteers, who were preparing to take his prisoner from him, when he drew his sabre, and putting himself in a posture of defence, declared he would die sooner than the officer should receive the least insult. He conducted his prisoner safely to the head-quarters, when the officer told him every valuable article he had about him was at his service;

service; but he declined all pretensions to any part of his property.

This fact was related to us by the officer himself.

IV.

The day after the affair of Courtray, I went with General Duverger to view the scene of the action. We saw a cottage pierced with bullets, and into which a shell had made its way. We entered, and found the several splinters of the bomb. The owner of the house told us it burst while he and his wife and three children were in bed, and that not one of them was hurt. But what added to our surprise was, that this cottage was not more than twelve feet square.

V.

On another occasion, a shell fell in the midst of a squadron of carabineers drawn up for action. It fell between two of the troopers, and burst under the bellies of their horses without wounding either. We were told this fact by the commanding officer of the squadron, and several of his comrades were present.

These

These facts are almost incredible; but war produces very extraordinary accidents.

VI.

In a brisk engagement which took place between Courtray and Ingelmunster, the 20th regiment of cavalry suffered their cannon to be taken from them. General Pichegru gave orders that neither this regiment, nor any other that should lose their cannon, should be supplied with any till they had taken an equal number from the enemy. Within three days after this affair, the 20th regiment took four pieces from the enemy.

VII.

In the engagement between Moreau's division and Clairfait's troops near Lincelles and Blaton, fifty of the enemy's horse made their way into our park of artillery. Some Belgian recruits, who were left to guard the park threw down their arms and fled. Our cannoneers snatched up their firelocks, and planting themselves behind the ammunition-waggons, fired upon the troopers, killed several, and compelled the remainder to take to flight. This presence of mind saved the artillery of that division on this occasion.

VIII. During

VIII.

During the siege of Ypres, a shell fell on the knapsack of a soldier of the 2d battalion of la Corrèze, which cut the straps of the knapsack, and broke a pot of butter that the soldier had placed above his necessaries. This volunteer, who was a native of Limousin was not at all affected by the danger; but looking eagerly at the fragments, cried in his provincial dialect—*Ah! grand Di, moun toupi de burré! de qué farai yau mo soupo?* Ah God! my poor pot of butter! what shall I do to make my soup now?

IX.

At the battle of Hoogleden, the 62d or the 24th demi-brigade (I cannot recollect which of these it was), were posted by the side of the road leading from Rousselaer to Hoogleden. The regiment of la Tour, which is one of the bravest regiments of dragoons in the Emperor's service, advanced along the road covered with their cloaks. The chief of this demi-brigade, not seeing the uniform of the Austrians, thought it was a detachment of our cavalry; and when his men were preparing to fire, he cried—"Stay, stay! I think they belong to us." The commanding officer of the dragoons answered—"Yes, we are French. But what do you

you do in that dangerous position? you will have the whole army of the enemy upon you. If you take my advice you will change your position." As he finished these words, he discovered his uniform. Our officer instantly gave orders for his men to fire, and a sharp engagement ensued. An entire squadron of the enemy were left on the field. The road was covered with the carcases of men and horses. The carnage was shocking.

Through the whole of this campaign our infantry stood the shock of the cavalry with perfect steadiness. There was no charge in which they were broken or thrown into confusion. It is the incredible steadiness of our foot soldiers which has made our armies invincible. Their conduct will form a period in the history of military transactions.

The moment the infantry suffer themselves to be broken by the horse, they expose themselves to be cut to pieces. But if they have the courage to remain firm, they seldom or ever fail of gaining the advantage. The cavalry of the enemy have often been seen to charge our foot on the full gallop. The first rank of infantry discharged their muskets and presented their bayonets. The second

second and third kept up a constant fire, and the horse were compelled to retire with loss. If our battalions had suffered themselves to be broken, the cavalry would have made a terrible carnage, and we could have succeeded in no enterprize.

X.

Gaspard Thierri, colonel of the 9th regiment of hussars, was reconnoitring with his regiment; and placing some troops in ambuscade in a hollow way, he proposed to draw the enemy into it, by provoking them to action, and afterward flying before them. He ordered his hussars to insult the enemy in every possible manner. They accordingly advanced pretty near the Austrians, calling them the slaves of despots, and giving them such other names. The abuse was returned by the enemy, who reproached our troops with being compelled to take paper for food, with killing their King, and melting down their church bells. They, mean while, suspected the snare, and could not be tempted to move. One of our hussars, at length, losing all patience, galloped up and killed an Austrian trooper with a pistol shot; but the enemy, instead of being drawn to seek revenge for this insult, cried out — *Bravo!*

mention

mention honorable! insertion au bulletin!—Bravo! Honourable mention! Insertion in the bulletin!

XI.

Immediately after the decree which commanded the French armies to give no quarter to the English, our soldiers forbore from plundering the first Hanoverians they took. The latter offered them their watches and money, but our troops would take nothing from them. The English officers were extremely alarmed by this refusal. They concluded it was the result of pity for men whose fate was decided. One of them said to me—"This conduct is an unhappy omen for us; it proves that your brave troops detest the law which sacrifices us; but it is a proof to us also, that they consider that you have executioners in the nation who are not so feeling."

I endeavoured to remove his apprehensions; but in vain. So true is it, that there are circumstances in which a favour is no longer a consolation.

XII.

XII.

A hussar of the 9th regiment, whose name was Petre, was sent to a village in Brabant, to protect the inhabitants from marauders. A party of these entered the place, and searching for concealed effects, dug up a small box, in which all the inhabitants of the village had deposited their money. Petre arrived at the very moment when they were carrying off their booty, and, drawing his sabre, by his intrepidity and firmness, he induced the plunderers to take to flight. He called together the inhabitants, who opened the box in his presence, It contained ninety thousand livres, and Petre was desired to take what he pleased from it. Petre thanked them, and only added, "I have done my duty, and you owe me nothing: but I would advise you to hide your money better in future."

General Duverger was at that time chief of the Etat-Major of General Souham's division. Delighted with this act of probity, he sent an account of it to the head quarters, expecting that mention would be made of it in the general orders, as well to do honour to the delicacy of this

this hussar, as to hold out this fine example to the whole army. Will it be credited that it was neglected, and that General Duverger, complaining of the neglect, was told, it was not an example worthy of being imitated!

Is it possible you desire to form Republicans, and will not celebrate probity? Be assured, then, you will never succeed.

XIII.

It rarely happened that the Emigrants suffered themselves to be taken alive, especially in any great numbers. The brigade of Jardon, however, took sixty-six belonging to the legion of Rohan, the greater part of whom were convicted of emigration, and condemned to be shot. Among them was a young man from the department of the Pas-de-Calais, who declared he had been driven to quit his country on the greatest extremity, and to escape from the fury of *Lebon*. He heard his sentence with the composure of an innocent man; and having begged permission to write to his brother, who was serving among the Emigrants, he expressed himself, on the spot, in the following terms.—"Dear brother: at the

time you will receive this letter, I shall be no more. I beg of you to sell my camp-equipage, and pay my debts, and take the remainder for your own use. I earnestly exhort you to quit the service. You know I was driven to it to save myself from dying of hunger. The greatest of all crimes is to bear arms against our country: no motive can justify it."

This is a proof that a man may have great feeling and honour, and embrace a bad cause. It is none but the *anarchist* whose opinion is uniformly incompatible with rectitude of mind.

XIV.

After we had entered Nimeguen, it happened that I was left alone at the head-quarters. A beautiful woman, accompanied by her maid-servant, entered the room in which I sat, and with marks of extreme terror, threw her arms round my neck, and cried "Dear General, I hope they wont fire any more bombs on the town." "No, Madam; we are now masters of it." "But will not the English fire upon us?"—"I do not think they will," I answered.

She

She fell senseless, being quite overcome with fear; and when she came to herself, she told me that several shells had fallen on her house. and made it a heap of ruins; and that one of them fell very near her, from the terror of which she could never recover.

I offered every argument my mind could suggest to calm her apprehensions; but without any effect. A terror like this, is with difficulty conquered.

It has been said, there is a faction at Paris who are enemies of peace. Assuredly, these men have beheld nothing of the ravages of war, but as they are described on paper. They imagine, no doubt, it is as harmless as they see it in the theatre. It would be well if the partizans of war were all shut up, with their wives, their children and their friends, in a besieged town: if they continued to cabal for war, we must conclude them to be incorrigible.

XV.

Towards the latter end of the summer of 1794, a Proconsul, who was very ostentatious of his

authority, was accustomed to pay very constant visits to the camps, where he was very assiduous in teaching the troops that his power was above that of the General, that he had authority to punish them if they ill-treated any soldier, and that all military rank was at his disposal.—" Denounce any one who does you injustice," he would say, " and he shall be dismissed." And he never failed on every visit, before he quitted the camp, to exact very rigorously from the troops the cry of *Vive la République !*

One day, I heard the following conversation on this subject among three of the soldiers.

" The drums beat the *general*," said one, " what has happened ?"

" Oh," said another, " it is * * * come to see if we are base enough to denounce our officers !"

" That man," the third observed, " must be a furious republican, for he makes us quit things of the greatest consequence to cry *vive la République !*"

" I

" I do not love such affectation," replied the first, " it is unnecessary ; we are all republicans, and will never cease to be so ; but I'll tell my mind—these noisy fellows never were republicans, and will one day shew themselves."

" How !" said the other two soldiers.

" I tell you," continued the first, " these fellows who make so much parade of republicanism, are great rascals. As long as we maintain them in their fine places, and there is something for them to get, they'll be for the Republic ; but, when nothing more is to be got by it, they'll change their tone. If they were obliged to bear our hardships only for three days together, don't think they would ever bawl out for the Republic afterward."

The conduct of the greater part of the ex-members of the Convention has since recalled this conversation to my memory.

XVI.

A Proconsul, who had often boasted of having held a high rank in the artillery, under the old government, was dining one day with one of our Generals, and the conversation turning on some

operations, he asked very simply—What was meant by pontoons?

His ignorance might have been pardoned, if he had not had the folly to boast of his knowledge of military affairs.

XVII.

At the time when the Parisians were on the point of creating a civil war for *a choice of two songs*, one party demanding the *Réveil du Peuple*, and the other the *Hymn of the Marseillais*, it was asserted that the latter had often led our troops to victory, and they never went to battle without singing it.

But the argument was not good for much; for no other music is heard when the troops are about to charge but the melancholy sound of a single beat of the drum. The soldiers do not amuse themselves, at that moment, with songs.

In the camps, when the troops were a little at their ease, they sometimes sang the *Marseillais*, and *Veillons au Salut de l'Empire*. They also had a pleasure in singing the *Réveil du Peuple*, for they

they hated the assassins of their relations and friends, at least as much as they hated the royalists.

Patriotic songs filled the journals: but very few of them had the honour of being sung. The lyric works of *Chénier* were regularly sent to the armies; but they had no better fortune than the *drelins, drelins, (tingle, tingle,)* of *Guffroi.*

The soldiers were more ready to sing a song which they had among them, and which was at once bacchanalian and military, but was not calculated to inflame the hatred of parties. I do not know who was the author of these verses. They are, however, extremely natural and pleasant, and the music is simple and harmonious. The delight with which they were sung by our troops is a proof that songs of this kind are better calculated to give general satisfaction than those sublime productions, to obtain which the poet and musician seem to have been placed upon the rack. Let *Chénier* be commanded to write an ode, and the police afterward must interfere before it will be sung. Let *Barré* and *Gaveaux* write songs, and it would need some restraint to prevent their being resounded in every corner of France.

As it is greatly my desire to please the soldiery in this work, and as I know the delight they take in the song of which I have been speaking, I embrace this opportunity of giving them a correct copy of it. They are acquainted with the air; but I have often heard them corrupt the words.

COUPLETS BACHIQUES ET GUERRIERS.

VOULEZ-vous suivre un bon conseil?
Buvez avant que de combattre;
De sens froid je vaux mon pareil,
Mais quand j'ai bien bu, j'en vaux quatre.
Versez donc, mes amis, versez,
Je n'en puis jamais boire assez. *Bis.*

Ma foi! c'est un triste Soldat
Que celui qui ne sait pas boire,
Il voit les dangers du combat,
Le buveur n'en voit que la gloire.
Versez donc, &c.

Comme ce vin tourne l'esprit,
Comme il vous change une personne!
Tel qui tremble s'il réfléchit,
Fait trembler quand il déraisonne.
Versez donc, &c.

Cet Univers, ah qu'il est beau!
Mais pourquoi dans ce grand ouvrage,
Le Seigneur a-t-il mis tant d'eau?
Le vin me plairait davantage.
Versez donc, &c.

S'il n'a pas fait un élément
De cette liqueur rubiconde,
Le Seigneur s'est montré prudent,
Nous eussions desséché le monde.
Versez donc, mes amis, versez,
Je n'en puis jamais boire assez. *Bis.*

Imitation of the above Verses.

DRINK, Soldiers! noble is the plan,
E'er dreadful on the foe you pour:
Though I can, sober, fight my man,
My bottle gives me strength for four.
Then fill the bumper, let it pass!
I'm never weary of my glass.

He that to battle sober goes
Will dimly shine in future story;
He views the danger of the blows,
The toper only views the glory.
Then fill, &c.

As wine the heart of man can cheer,
And raise him to a brighter fellow,
He that when sober shakes for fear
Makes others shake when he gets mellow.
Then fill, &c.

This

This world's a wondrous work and fine,
  Yet to my mind the Great Creator
Is somewhat sparing of his wine,
  And mighty lavish of his water.

Then fill, &c.

'Twas wise though, not to bid the tide
  With ruby-colour'd nectar flow,
Our drinking, else, the world had dried
  To dust and ashes long ago.

Then fill, &c.

NOTES.

NOTES.

Page 6.

VALETAU.

VALETAU was at that time chief of brigade. He has since been raised to the rank of general, and in both situations his conduct has always been that of a good soldier. He acted on the persuasion, as will be the case with every officer who understands the nature of the service, that discipline will compensate for the want of numbers, but that nothing can compensate for the want of discipline: but where such men as *Cethegus* have the domination, it must be expected that such men as *Fabius* will be persecuted.

In the month of January 1794, a gendarme left the town in which he was quartered without leave, to go and make speeches in one of the clubs. Valetau confined him for this breach of discipline. This soldier being one of that mass which was collected from the refuse of Paris, was perfectly acquainted with the etiquette of denunciations, and the manner and circumstances in which they could be employed with advantage against an adversary. Although he could with difficulty write his name, he set himself down to write a farrago of calumnies against his commanding officer. He commenced by declaring that he was a republican, and that

Valetau

Valetau must be an aristocrat because he had punished him only for attending the popular societies: and he concluded by asserting that Valetau had been in the corps of the late king's body-guards, which alone was a sufficient reason for dismissing that officer and giving his rank to a good republican like himself.

This despicable memorial was addressed to General Souham, who at another time would not have suffered its author to escape with a light punishment. Considering however the character of the government at that period, this general contented himself in the present case, with telling the soldier that some attention might have been paid to his memorial if it had been drawn up before he had been punished for a breach of discipline, but that it now bore the marks rather of passion and revenge than of true patriotism.

The soldier addressed himself to the administrators of the district of Lisle; but they referred this second memorial to the same general. Souham returned the same answer to the district that he had given the soldier.

This man knew his course in this affair perfectly well. He sent his denunciation to the club which at that period swayed France. An occasion of disorganizing the troops was never rejected by that society. They obtained a positive order from the Committee of Public Safety to the Representatives of the People resident at Lisle to dismis Valetau, and to subject him to all the rigour of the law of the 17th of September.

Fortunately for the Republic Pichegru took the command of the armies, and discipline was restored. Without his courage

courage and exertions, the troops would have been totally disorganised, and the result of this disorder must have been the dismemberment of the Republic. For my part I have no doubt that this was the end proposed by the leaders of the Jacobin faction. A thousand instances of the same kind as this I have related concerning Valetau, are to me irrefragable proofs of the truth of this opinion.

Page 9.

P I C H E G R U.

General PICHEGRU was born at Arbois, in 1761. This town is in that part of Franche-Comté which was formerly named the Bailiwick of *Aval*, and which at present makes great part of the department of *Jura*.

Pichegru is about five feet five inches in height. He is large and athletic in his form, but without being encumbered with flesh. His constitution is robust: in a word, he is calculated for the fatigues of war.

There is something of austerity in the appearance of this general; but in conversation, his countenance and manners are enlivened and beget confidence. He has none of that politeness which is the result of duplicity or of a frivolous disposition: but he is obliging without affectation, and from a natural disposition to benefit others.

I have not been able to learn in what station his parents were. He himself told me his family were neither noble nor opulent. But men of great merit are illustrious without the

the aid of ancestry. Pichegru has no need either of ancestors or descendants to preserve his name.

The French have thrown off the yoke of prejudice relative to the value of blood. They know of none but what is attached to action; and in this they have reasoned with perfect accuracy. As it is of no avail to a blind man that his forefathers could see, so neither does it change the character of a profligate man that his ancestors were virtuous.

Pichegru received the rudiments of learning at the college of Arbois. He afterwards studied under the care of an order of monks in that town; and having displayed a great capacity for the higher sciences, he was appointed by those monks to teach philosophy and the mathematics in a college belonging to their order in the town of Brienne. But Pichegru was not a monk: the report arose from this circumstance.

In teaching the mathematics to others, Pichegru perfected himself in that science. He afterward enlisted himself in the first regiment of artillery; and being soon distinguished for his knowledge of his profession, he was raised to the rank of serjeant. It is well known that this was formerly thought a high station for a person of mean birth, and that it formed the greatest advancement to which such persons could arrive, for the nobles were as eager after exclusive privileges as the Jacobins.

The revolution followed: and Pichegru, without paying his court to the Proconsuls, was known to them. He rose, from step to step, to the command in chief of three great armies.

Rose, Fabert, Chevert, Laubanie, Jean-Bart, and *Du Gué Trouin* were examples that ought to have proved to the French Nobles that military talent does not depend on birth: but that cast were inexorable on that subject. They preferred their privileges to the prosperity of the state: and our tattered *sans-culottes* were worthy successors of the nobles.

Page 13.

S O U H A M.

General Souham was born in 1761, in the department of la Corrèze. He is of a gigantic stature, being six feet two inches in height. His strength is proportioned to his height, and his courage is acknowledged by the whole army. He is endowed with a sound judgement, and great natural penetration; and although he is not himself a scholar, he loves men of letters and has cultivated their acquaintance with great success.

His division, which is one of the finest in the armies, was never beaten. He acts always with the advanced guard; and by his firmness and activity has rendered important services to the army. The victories gained at Moëscroen, Hoogleden and Puffleck, are almost entirely due to his brave troops.

Page 13.

M O R E A U.

Moreau is a native of Morlaix in Lower Brittany. He is nearly of the same age and of the same stature as Pichegru.

He possesses a cultivated mind as well as that general; but his studies were of a different kind: he was bred an advocate. His manners are polished and engaging, and he would be a man perfectly amiable, if he were not employed in military concerns. When you have known Pichegru an hour, he possesses your confidence: it is impossible to see Moreau and not attach yourself to him.

Previous to his being raised to the rank of general, Moreau was colonel of a battalion of *l'Ile et Villaine*. It was with difficulty this battalion could be prevailed upon to accept the constitution of 1793. Moreau, who had studied civil polity, was not more the friend of that constitution, and was extremely averse to the government which assumed the name of *revolutionary*. I have heard him argue profoundly on the crude code of 1793: he foresaw the scenes which sprang from its principles.

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MACDONALD.

General MACDONALD is a Scotchman. He was formerly in the Dutch service, but has been a considerable time resident in France. He is a young man of about thirty-one. His military talents are very great, and he is by no means deficient in the knowledge of tactics. He was general of brigade in the first division of the army of the North; and although the column he commanded consisted of more men than any other column of the army, yet he directed the movements of General Jardon's column.

Saint Just removed Macdonald on the supposition that he must be an aristocrat because he bore a Scotch name and

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was not popular in the *revolutionary committee*. These were the causes assigned by that representative when remonstrances were made on his unjust dismission of Macdonald. General Souham said to him—" I cannot pretend to say that Macdonald is a republican in his heart because I know of no means of diving into men's hearts, but I know that he is an excellent officer, to whom the service is greatly indebted : and I will pledge my life that he will serve the Republic faithfully".—" We can admit of none but firm and zealous republicans in the army," said Saint Just, " and Macdonald has neither a name nor manners that accord with that character."

At that period, to incur the suspicion of guilt was to undergo the punishment of the guilty : and the dismissal of Macdonald was signed. It is mortifying that the Proconsuls did not think proper to detail the motives of their judgments. In those frightful times the *revolutionary committees* were employed in rendering men suspected, and the *revolutionary tribunals* in sending the suspected to the scaffold.

The sentences of the tribunal of the city of Arras were sometimes sent to the army. If the subject had been of a less horrible nature, the summary of the motives on which they were formed would often have excited irresistible laughter. I have seen one which ran in these terms :

" N * * *, suspected of being a suspected person was condemned to death." The motives which our Proconsuls would have been able to give for the dismission of officers would not have been less ridiculous.

The fellow-soldiers of General Macdonald maintained his cause with undaunted courage at a period when nothing was so dangerous as to be allied to worthy men; and this fact exceeds any praise I can give him. They have never had reason to be sorry for their support, he has continued to render important services to the Republic. He is, at present, General of division in the army of the North.

There was a General of the same name in the English army. After the passage of the Meuse, this officer came to us to parley on some occasion. He afterward said to us—"You have amongst you a General who bears my name, I should rejoice extremely to take him."—"It will be well rather to take care you do not fall into his hands," was the answer given to this General: and, in fact, on the following day he escaped very narrowly from being taken by Macdonald's column.

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D E V I N T H E R.

General Devinther is one of the Dutch patriots who took refuge in France in 1787. He is about 35 years of age. He has a fine person, and his countenance is very expressive; but he is extremely reserved and delicate in his manners.

He was a seaman previous to the Dutch revolution of 1787: and it appears that he is well acquainted with the Dutch seas. He applied himself with great assiduity to military affairs, of which he gained a considerable knowledge; but it is probable he is even better versed in naval concerns, since he

he has lately been made an Admiral in the Dutch service. He rendered important services, however, to France in the quality of General of brigade.

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JOURDAN.

General JOURDAN is a native of Limoges. It was long reported by the enemy that he was the famous ASSASSIN of Avignon. No man is more opposite in character to that dreadful murderer than Jourdan. He is an excellent soldier, of a saturnine disposition, and possessing a solidity of judgment which has no alliance with the crimes of the South of France.

This officer has rendered great services to France, especially in compelling the allies to raise the siege of Maubeuge, when he actually saved the Republic. In the very moment of this victory, he was dismissed by the revolutionary government; and this fact affords a proof that the government of that period acted in concert with the allies, and were mortified that Jourdan should defeat their designs.

Many crimes are covered by the intrigues of this revolution: but they will be unveiled to posterity.

The faction of *Levellers* are assiduous in exalting Jourdan, at the expence of Pichegru and the other generals. Will it be imagined that Jourdan is their accomplice? I have no belief in that opinion. I declare that in general I have found none but true patriots in the armies. Jourdan may have been compelled to keep terms with this faction, as honest men do who fall into the hands of plunderers, least

they should be destroyed by them. This general has been more embarrassed with the assassins of France than with all the battalions and squadrons of the enemy. But I am wholly deceived if there be an officer of any note in our armies who would not willingly plunge every one of these assassins to the bottom of the Seine. Nothing is wanting to make them march against the horde, but a signal from the legal authorities. The soldiery have never departed from the line prescribed to them by legal authority; and consider themselves only as the passive instruments of the nation: Let the legislative and judiciary authorities follow this example, and we may say with Seneca, *sanabilibus ægrotamus morbis.*

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REUNIER.

General REUNIER is a native of Lausanne. He is 23 years of age; his height is about five feet six inches; and he has a tolerable good person. His appearance at first is unfavorable; but those who converse with him soon perceive that he is a man of genius, and is well informed. He has great difficulty, however, to express himself, by which defect his talents are often thrown into a disadvantageous light. I have known many officers who, after a conversation with him, have mistaken his talents greatly. In fact, it is necessary to study his character to do him justice.

Reunier was but 21 at the commencement of the campaign; and at that age when reason scarcely begins to unfold itself with the generality of men, he directed the movements of one of the strongest divisions of the army of the North. The generals frequently consulted him on their operations;

rations; and Pichegru listened to his opinion when a council of war was held with particular attention.

During the winter of 1794, he drew a map of the cantonments of the first division which was remarkable for its accuracy, there being scarcely a path, or any work either new or old belonging to that part of the line that was not to be found in it. It was of great service to the several officers of the division.

Previous to the commencement of this campaign, Reunier was twice named for general of brigade, but he excused himself on the pretence of being two young for the rank. He was even under great apprehensions that he should be compelled to accept of the promotion; for in those times the Proconsuls insisted upon officers taking the rank they thought proper to offer, under pain of being treated as suspected persons. The majority accepted of these promotions, rather than be dismissed and imprisoned; but in truth eminent situations were extremely dangerous; if fortune for a moment forsook those who filled them, they had no fate left but the scaffold.

Reunier was not compelled to accept the promotion; and he served in the quality of adjutant-general till after the triumph of the 9th of Thermidor (July 27), when the government possessing more moderation and being constituted on less capricious principles, Reunier accepted of the rank of general of brigade. He is at present chief of the état-major of the army of the Rhine. His knowledge in tactics is profound, his courage is eminent, and his experience is already great. He has qualities of which the commander in chief of an army is formed; and there is no doubt he will hereafter rise to that station.

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BONNEAU.

General Bonneau is a young man. His manners possess all the gravity and dignity which ought to distinguish a senator. I have at times seen the Representatives of the People with him: they had the appearance of school-boys, full of silly tricks, and Bonneau the air of a tutor who is mortified to hear his pupils betray their ignorance, but is unwilling to disgrace them by a public reproof.

Bonneau has served with success. He is esteemed by his fellow-officers, and by the whole of the troops. His form is robust; and his appearance inspires respect.

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JARDON.

General Jardon is a native of Verviers, in the territory of Liege. He is about 36 years of age. It is asserted, that a man's character may be read in his countenance. That of Jardon is not expressive of extraordinary courage; it is large, flat, and unmeaning; yet nothing is more rare than to meet with a courage so great and uniform as is displayed by this officer. Jardon would charge an army of 20,000 men at the head of two companies of grenadiers, with as much pleasure as if he commanded an equal force. I use the word *pleasure* purposely in this place: for he has no delight equal to that of engaging the enemy. He is exactly the *Baldus* of *the Macaronic Poets*. He has sometimes invited me to dine with him,

and

and it was always natural to him to add—" After dinner we will pay a visit to the enemy."—It was his desert, and it was not possible to substitute one more to his taste.

His extravagant courage resembles the prejudice of the inhabitants of Liege respecting children who are born with hair on their heads. Jardon asserts, with the air of a man whose opinions cannot be altered, that neither cannon-shot nor bullet can touch his person, and that nothing but a mine sprung under his feet can kill him. If he has really adopted this opinion, which appears to me to be the case, it must now be rooted in his mind by his extraordinary fortune. We have scarcely had an action in which Jardon has not had a horse shot under him. His aides-de-camp, and other officers who attended in the field, were generally killed or grievously wounded. He scarcely ever returned from battle without having his hat or several parts of his dress torn with balls. His horses were scarred with wounds of musquet-shots. Their ears, and their nostrils, have been pierced, and Jardon untouched. At the battle of Puffleck he had two horses killed under him. A boy, that was his nephew, received five wounds fighting by his side, almost every one of which was in a vital part. One of his adjutants was killed, with several other officers who surrounded his person. A ball that was in a direct line for his breast was turned aside by the blade of his sabre which was shivered to pieces. A second broke the guard of the same sabre, without even touching a finger. On one occasion, he put to flight 900 Austrians with no more than 75 men: And he never went to reconnoitre that he was not received with a discharge of musketry by which some of his attendants fell, but he always returned unhurt.

At

At Moëscroen he threw himself into the enemy's ranks, and was fighting with excess of bravery, when some of our troops attempted to take him prisoner supposing him to be an Austrian. He had great difficulty to undeceive them, for his uniform resembled that of some of the Emperor's regiments. In a word, the military life of Jardon is filled with as many prodigies as those of the most celebrated buccaneers. We cannot, however, attribute to him either great talents or a knowledge of military affairs: but an unexampled intrepidity cannot be denied him.

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DAENDELS.

General Daendels was also one of the Dutch patriots. He had been an advocate; but became a most excellent soldier. His character is uncommonly vehement. After serving with great success during the winter in the quality of chief of brigade, he was raised to the rank of General at the commencement of the campaign, and had the command given him of the left column of the first division, in which he distinguished himself on every occasion.

He is reproached with having imbibed violent principles in a visit he made to Paris. I never saw him after his return; but I can witness that his principles were moderate previous to that journey. It is not to be disguised that he expressed an implacable resentment against such of his countrymen as had been his enemies in consequence of the revolution of 1787. He not only desired to be restored to the possession of his estates, which was a just demand, but he indulged

in threatening to massacre all who had been concerned in the selling or buying of them. Certainly, this conduct was to be censured.

For my part, I do not hate the Emigrants because of their having quitted their country. There may be circumstances which justify this step. But if they have borne arms against their country, if they propose to wade through the blood of Frenchmen in order to return to it, I make one of their enemies. I could not approve of Daendels when he has threatened to cover his country with dead bodies, nor can I applaud the conduct of the French Emigrants when they betray similar tempers.

I have been informed that Daendels conducted himself with moderation when he returned to his country, and I forgive the folly of his words. He has been appointed to the command in chief of the army of the Batavian Republic.

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S A L M.

General SALM is a young man, and has a very fine person. He commanded a brigade of the division of Dépaux. His brigade was noticed for its fine appearance, and his camp was always marked out with greater nicety than those of other officers. I do not know of what family or country he is. A *Major-Domo* of the family of Salm-Salm, who was in the palace of Hoogstraten when we entered it, assured me that this young man was of that family; but that having spent all his fortune at Paris, he had been induced to enlist in a regiment of dragoons.

goons. Perhaps there may be some reason to doubt this statement, because at the time when the Jacobins drove all the nobles from Paris in order the more readily to massacre them afterward, a Proconsul, who was no less ferocious than he was ignorant of the true principles of a statesman, issued an order for all the nobles to quit the armies, whatever might be their rank. The greater part, even to the privates, were obliged to obey; and it appears to me impossible that Salm, had he been of that cast, could have escaped the vigilance of this monster. It is true the carabineers obtained an exemption from this order; and insisted on retaining Colonel d'Anglard who commanded them, and who is an officer of distinguished merit. Perhaps Salm was exempted from that order by the same means. However that be, both this officer and all the nobles who remained in the armies have served with fidelity and honour.

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DUVERGER.

General DUVERGER is a native of Estampes. He is about 40 years of age; his person is well formed; and his countenance and appearance are very prepossessing. Being chief of the état-major of the first division, and wholly occupied with the duties of that situation, he had no opportunity of directing any of the operations of the campaign, and I have not therefore had any occasion to speak of him in the course of this history. He is, however, a man of talents and military knowledge. His mind is cultivated, and his manners delicate and obliging. Notwithstanding these qualities he was pursued by the hatred of the absurd government of the Ja-

cobins, and was dismissed the service on the unjust accusation of the notorious Lavalette. In consequence of the spirited remonstrances of General Souham he was reinstated in his rank. But Duverger was terrified with the intrigues of his enemies, and neither the protection of Souham, which had restored him to the service, nor the friendship of the other generals could remove his apprehensions. Whatever might be their exertion or power, he was persuaded he should be sent, at the end of the campaign, to the scaffold. This persuasion was the cause of an extreme reserve in his conduct; and although his sensibility was wounded, by the perpetual instances of injustice and tyranny which he saw in the government, yet he observed a profound silence on the subject.

He is, at present, general of brigade of the army of the Rhine, and no doubt his column will be conducted with reputation by him. He has been more than twenty years in the service, and not only his experience but his talents qualify him for his station.

Generals LAURENT, KLEBER, and others, who have been named in the course of this history, enjoy a great reputation in the army; but not having opportunity to be personally acquainted with them, there is nothing I can speak of my own knowledge of these respectable officers.

It may be said in general that the officers of distinction have rendered great services to France, either by their courage or their talents. They are also Republicans and honest men. When I went to take refuge among them, my opinion of them

them was very different. I imagined they resembled the horde I left in France: and I am bound in honour to make them this reparation. They held the crimes of the Jacobin faction in as much detestation as myself.

FINIS.